NOVEMBER 1962

Commentary

CHINA and the UNITED STATES

by OSCAR GASS

JEWISH RESISTANCE TO THE NAZIS: Oscar Handlin

THE POLITICS OF THE PAPER ECONOMY: David T. Bazelon

THE FUTURE OF JEWISH GIVING: Marshall Sklare

UP IN MASSACHUSETTS: John Phillips

CUBA—THE WAKE OF ISOLATION: Hans J. Morgenthau

BOOKS IN REVIEW Alfred Chester Dan Jacobson
Samuel Shapiro Julius Gould Lionel Abel

PUBLISHED BY THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE 60c

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FOR THE FINEST HOURS...



Rich in rewards for the fortunate is the wonderful world of Miami. **Health** for the body. **Refreshment** for the spirit. And **time** for the finest hours of life — bringing friendships to perfection in the company of Seagram's V. O.!



For this is Canadian whisky at its very finest — rare in flavor and aroma, bright in color and clarity, cherished by mayvinim all over the world!

KNOWN BY THE COMPANY IT KEEPS



SEAGRAM'S V.O.

IMPORTED CANADIAN WHISKY AT ITS FINEST!

Imported in the bottle from Canada, Seagram's V. O. Canadian Whisky—a blend of selected whiskies, six years old • 86.8 proof • Seagram-Distillers Company, N. Y. C.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A Statement of Aims

In sponsoring COMMENTARY, *the American Jewish Committee aims to meet the need for a journal of significant thought and opinion on Jewish affairs and contemporary issues. Its pages will be hospitable to diverse points of view and belief, and it hopes to encourage original creative endeavor in the various fields of culture.*

The opinions and views expressed by COMMENTARY'S *contributors and editors are their own, and do not necessarily express the Committee's viewpoint or position. The sponsorship of* COMMENTARY *by the Committee is in line with its general program to enlighten and clarify public opinion on problems of Jewish concern, to fight bigotry and protect human rights, and to promote Jewish cultural interest and creative achievement in America.*

AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE
A. M. SONNABEND, *President*

THE COMMENTARY PUBLICATION COMMITTEE

RALPH E. SAMUEL, *Chairman*

FRANK ALTSCHUL DOROTHY L. BERNHARD ELI M. BLACK
CHARLES D. BREITEL RICHARD C. ERNST ALBERT FURTH
MAURICE GLINERT J. M. KAPLAN SYDNEY M. KAYE
LEWIS J. LAVENTHOL HAROLD MANHEIM ARTHUR L. MAYER
DAVID SHER ROGER SONNABEND HARRY STEINER
ALAN M. STROOCK LAURENCE A. TISCH BEN TOUSTER

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

WE WILL SEND YOU a selection of superb

Original Oil Paintings

by contemporary European masters . . . remarkable values!

Far from the madding throng in their quiet studios in Europe, a group of extremely talented French, Italian and Spanish artists are creating works of art destined to become true collectors' items. Many of their paintings have long been part of collections in Rome, Paris, Madrid, London, Copenhagen and other European art centers. Some are already part of well-known American collections. These paintings are truly distinctive in every sense of the word. And they are remarkably low-priced—ranging from $65.00 to $130.00 (and worth several times these prices!).

These are large paintings—each approximately 24" x 30" canvas size—by Pujol, Montini, Abati, Finos, Fragelli and other noted European artists.

WE SHALL BE HAPPY TO SEND YOU—WITHOUT OBLIGATION—A SELECTION OF THESE PAINTINGS TO INSPECT IN YOUR OWN HOME OR OFFICE. The paintings are sent fully insured in their own special container. *We pay the postage both ways.* Purchase terms available.

Since the paintings are of considerable value, we ask that you include the name of your bank or other reference when you write us.

PORTAL GALLERY Dept. C
921 FRONT STREET, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

By the Waters of Manhattan

Selected Verse by
CHARLES REZNIKOFF
Introduction by C. P. SNOW

"He is a deep, sarcastic, lonely writer . . . there is for me running through his writing the threads of the Jewish loneliness, the Jewish delight in God's gifts, and the Jewish triumph."—Introduction, C. P. Snow.

Paperbook Original, $1.50

NEW DIRECTIONS
333 6 Ave. N. Y. 14

McGUFFEY'S READERS

After a long and costly search, reprints of the original 1879 revised editions of the famous McGuffey's Readers have been completed and you can now purchase exact copies at the following low prices POSTPAID:

1st Reader	$2.50	4th Reader	$3.50
2nd Reader	$2.75	5th Reader	$3.75
3rd Reader	$3.25	6th Reader	$4.25

OLD AUTHORS, Dept. CY-11, Rowan, Iowa

Your Book Published!

If we think your manuscript has unusual possibilities, we will offer you a straight royalty or partial subsidy basis. Send manuscript for free editorial report or write for Brochure CC.

Pageant Press, 101 Fifth Ave., New York 3, N.Y.

LAND OF THE KAMAH is a beautifully published book that you will keep on your reading table always. The seventeen short stories Kunta tells as he travels across the desert with his followers will be remembered and enjoyed as long as you live. A wonderful CHRISTMAS gift for your friends. This book is a classic.

$2.95 per copy.

BARTON HOUSE Inc.
Box 1506 Hato Rey, Puerto Rico

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Commentary

NOVEMBER 1962
NUMBER 5
VOLUME 34

China and the United States 369 Oscar Gass

Jewish Resistance to the Nazis 398 Oscar Handlin

The Politics of the Paper Economy 406 David T. Bazelon

The Future of Jewish Giving 416 Marshall Sklare

Public Affairs

Cuba—The Wake of Isolation 427 Hans J. Morgenthau

Observations

Up in Massachusetts 431 John Phillips

Letters from Readers 422

Books in Review

Pale Fire, by Vladimir Nabokov 449 Alfred Chester

Portrait of a Jew, by Albert Memmi 451 Dan Jacobson

Latin America Between the Eagle and the Bear, by Salvador de Madariaga 453 Samuel Shapiro

Memoirs of a Special Case, by Chaim Raphael 455 Julius Gould

Contemporaries, by Alfred Kazin 457 Lionel Abel

Editor: NORMAN PODHORETZ

Managing Editor
SHERRY ABEL

Associate Editors
RICHARD LINCOLN
THEODORE SOLOTAROFF

Contributing Editors
MILTON HIMMELFARB
GEORGE LICHTHEIM

Editorial Assistant
RHOMA MOSTEL

General Manager: FRANCES GREEN

Advertising
DOROTHY PUTNEY

COMMENTARY is published monthly by the American Jewish Committee ● Single copy 60¢; $7 a year; 2 years $12; 3 years $17 ● No extra Canadian or foreign postage charge ● Editorial & Business offices: 165 East 56th Street, New York 22 ● Printed at 10 McGovern Avenue, Lancaster, Pa. by Business Press, Inc. ● Second class postage paid at Lancaster ● © Copyright 1962 by the American Jewish Committee; all rights reserved under International and Pan American Copyright Conventions ● Indexed in Readers' Guide & Public Affairs Information Service ● **Unsolicited manuscripts must be accompanied by return postage.**

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Save

as you sail Cunard to Europe

Thrift Season—save 10% over low Thrift Season fares on round-trip bookings. Half round-trip fares from $385 First Class; $235 Cabin Class; $180 Tourist Class.

Excursion Fares—save 25% over Thrift Season one-way rates and enjoy up to 30 days ashore plus your ocean holiday in Cabin or Tourist.

Party Plan—save 25% over Thrift Season one-way rates as a member of a party of 25 or more sailing together in Cabin or Tourist Class.

Ask any Cunard office or your travel agent for full details.

Direct Service to the Mediterranean: Starting next Spring, Cunard will add to its transatlantic routes a regular service in the luxurious air-conditioned 35,600-ton Mauretania between New York and Naples via Gibraltar, Cannes and Genoa. Convenient connections to Israel; special attention to dietary needs, facilities for worship aboard ship.

Cruises in every season: Mauretania Christmas and New Year's Cruise to the West Indies, Dec. 21. Caronia Great World Cruise, January 25, 1963. Mauretania Mediterranean Cruise, February 5, 1963. Queen Elizabeth Nassau Cruises Feb. 21, Feb. 28, March 6. Caronia Mediterranean Cruise, May 1. Caronia North Cape Cruise, June 29.

Getting there is half the fun! Go

Cunard

CUNARD LINE, 25 Broadway, N.Y. 4 • BO 9-5300
441 Park Avenue, N.Y. 22 • PL 5-4300

Vital ST MARTIN's books for reading and reference

•

WE DISSENT
Edited by Hoke Norris

A timely, provocative book of 13 articles by prominent Southerners who disagree on some points but who are emphatic in their opposition to the rabid segregationists and their works. The contributors are Wilma Dykeman, James Stokely, Ralph McGill, Kathleen Keen Sinnett, Thomas D. Clark, Lenoir Chambers, Jonathan Daniels, Hodding Carter III, LeRoy Collins, Francis Pickens Miller, James McBride Dabbs, Borden Deal, Paul Green, and Hoke Norris. $4.95

SOMETHING HUMAN
by Mohamed Mehdevi

The thoughful—and sometimes disturbing—personal account of a young Iranian's experiences in America. Whether he praises our high standard of living and the drive and energy of the pioneer spirit, or criticizes the superficiality of our education, his crisp style and keen eye make his book sparkling reading. Portions of it appeared in *The New Yorker*. "Vivid and intelligent. . . . He is a candid writer."—*Punch* $4.50

THE SOVIET HIGH COMMAND
A Military-Political History
1918–1941
by John Erickson

"This authoritative history . . . contributes powerfully to an understanding of what Khrushchev has called Stalin's 'faulty methods of directing the nation and the Party.' . . . A substantial, heavily annotated and readable work of considerable insight."
—A. H. LOVELL, *Book-of-the-Month Club News Maps* $15.00

THE STATESMAN'S YEARBOOK. 1962–63
Edited by S. H. Steinberg

The indispensable one volume encyclopedia of essential facts on every country in the world including those behind the Iron Curtain. Information on national and international affairs, governments, constitutions, officials, exports, and much other data of permanent importance. 1,720 pages. $9.50

THE ANNUAL REGISTER OF WORLD EVENTS

A review of the year 1961. Surveys historical events, country by country. Also developments in science and economics, religion and law, literature and the arts.
Index, map $25.00

At your bookstore or from
ST MARTIN'S, New York 10, N. Y.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES

OSCAR GASS

When you shall these unlucky deeds relate,
. . . Nothing extenuate,
Nor set down aught in malice.
—Othello

I. War and Revolution, 1941–49

Chiang Kai-shek and his Kuomintang regime were swept from the mainland of Asia in 1949 because of their failure in all that relates to the building of an army. In the China of 1941–49, the customary foundations of consent and obedience were in dissolution. Clubs were trumps. But the Kuomintang was not capable of creating a steady, efficient organization of wielders of clubs.

At no time, from Pearl Harbor to the Japanese surrender, was there serious warfare against the Japanese in mainland China.* Chiang simply waited for his allies to defeat Japan. While waiting, he supported General Chennault's aerial strategy—and, in this, was abetted, for some years, by Roosevelt and Hopkins. If only Chennault were given a comparative handful of planes, his brave airmen would defeat Japan without further burdening a sorely tired China!

While Chiang rested, the Chinese Communists did assiduously train troops. They were determined never again to be dependent on non-Communist war lords, as they had been in their smashing defeat of 1925–27. They fought Chiang bitterly, whenever necessary. But, against the Japanese, the Communists did not fight. Instead, they untiringly urged Chiang on. What a traitor *he* not to devote himself single-mindedly to the liberation of the national territory! For themselves, publicity first. And indeed the Communists so succeeded in magnifying the image of their pinprick guerrilla raids against the Japanese that they provided strong competition, in world propaganda, for the Chiang-Chennault journalists.

In fact, in October 1938 the Japanese advance in China came to a halt. No strategic offensive was ever resumed. Already from mid-1938 Japan was fighting a more powerful opponent. In August 1939, the Russians gave them a beating, inflicting at least 16,000 casualties. The Japanese repeatedly explored moving their maximum strength against Russia. Then, in the middle of 1941, the attack on Russia was set aside, for the present. There was no oil or rubber in far eastern Siberia, and Japan had no disposition to do Germany's work, at day laborers' wages. It was a time for rich prizes, and the ones selected by the Imperial Conference of Japan were the Dutch and British possessions in southeast Asia. If success in seizing these prizes

OSCAR GASS is a consulting economist in private practice in Washington, D.C. Under the Roosevelt administration, he spent five years as a chief economist in the office of the Secretary of the Treasury; and since entering private practice, he has served as economic adviser to foreign governments in various parts of the world, including the Far East.

* The most valuable study establishing this fact is the distinguished official U.S. history of *The China-Burma-India Theater*, by C. F. Romanus and Riley Sutherland, 3 vols. (1953–59).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

necessarily involved war with the United States, that trial would have to be borne—though with a heavy heart and in a mood of desperation. But there would be no margin for side shows. The Japanese accordingly put their China forces on a garrison basis. In the supply plan for 1942, munitions for the garrison in China were set at a level enough only for one battle; the resupply factor for rifle ammunition was set at 0.3. The war in China was called off.

This Japanese choice of priorities has eased the way for the growth, in febrile minds, of a legend—invincible China. The legend mingles with half-remembered pictures of the *Grande Armée* bleeding its heart out on the retreat from Moscow. And that image merges, in confusion and misunderstanding, with memories of Stalingrad. So are born two myths—an invincible China and an invincible Russia. These notions may evanescently serve peace, but they close the eyes of understanding. The Japanese choice does not bear witness to an unconquerable China. No territory is unconquerable. No natural obstacle but can be surmounted unless passage is denied by fire. If there be an invincible people, it is made so by politico-military strength, not by geography and numbers. Nature is—and always has been—powerless to create safe havens. "Whatever flames upon the night/Man's own resinous heart has fed."

WHEN JAPAN surrendered, the Kuomintang armies had about 4 million men. Perhaps 2 per cent had been trained to U.S. standards. Another 4 or 5 per cent had been through one thirteen-week cycle of training, and a similar number had received *some* training. There were more modern weapons on hand than soldiers who knew how to use them. But, most important, the great mass of common soldiers were weakened by hunger and disease, and demoralized by neglect and brutality. American officers described Kuomintang military hospitals as extermination camps. In August 1945, only a few days before the surrender, General Wedemeyer found it necessary to remind Chiang Kai-shek that Kuomintang China had no soldiers. Wedemeyer then gave Chiang a memorandum, entitled *Conscription,* from which I quote:

> A Chinese conscript's pay can be pocketed [by his officer] and his ration sold. That makes him a valuable member of the Chinese Army. . . . As they march along they turn into skeletons; they develop signs of beriberi, their legs swell and their bellies protrude, their arms and thighs get thin. Scabies and ulcers turn their skin into a shabby cover of an emaciated body which has no other value than to turn rice into dung and to register the sharp pains of an existence as a conscript in the Chinese Army. . . . Many of those who run away run off during the first few days. Later they are too weak to run away. Those who are caught are cruelly beaten. They will be carried along with broken limbs and with wounds in maimed flesh in which infection turns quickly into blood poisoning and blood poisoning into death.

Millions of such conscripts went over to the Communists without fighting.

A month before Wedemeyer gave Chiang this *Conscription* memorandum, the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department submitted a special study entitled *Report on the Chinese Communist Movement.* This stated:

> . . . the Chinese Communist Regular Army is a young, well fed, well clothed, battle-hardened volunteer force in excellent physical condition, with a high level of general intelligence, and very high morale. Training . . . may be rated as fair . . . even though it is woefully inadequate by American standards. Military intelligence, for their purposes, is good. The most serious lack . . . is in equipment.
>
> The outstanding weaknesses . . . include lack of sufficient small arms ammunition, lack of artillery, lack of engineers and other technical personnel, lack of signal equipment . . . and heavy casualties among officers with consequent weakness in junior leadership.

The Kuomintang army was not weakened by "heavy casualties among officers."

Stalin seems not to have believed that

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the Chinese Communists could prevail over the Kuomintang. (He is even reported, by Dedijer, to have told the Chinese comrades to join the Chiang Kai-shek government *and* dissolve their army!) He therefore apparently gave them little assistance, and that he gave covertly and while maintaining formally correct relations with Chiang. The United States, for its part, was not neutral and did not pretend to be neutral.* The U.S. air force and the U.S. navy transported whole Kuomintang armies, so that they could occupy the country and assert their authority. Chiang's forces were given military supplies of every kind—much of which they promptly surrendered to the enemy. In sum, in 1945–49 the United States did everything for the Kuomintang short of the deed of engaging the soldiers, sailors, and airmen of the American forces in combat with the Communists. But being short of this, the Kuomintang regime lacked the politico-military basis to sustain itself in mainland China.

II. Chinese Governments, Fascist and Communist

In the most decisive period of recent Chinese history, Franklin D. Roosevelt chose General Patrick J. Hurley to be Personal Representative of the President to Chiang Kai-shek. After a few months, Hurley was also made Ambassador. By March 1945 he had spent seven months negotiating to bring the Communists and Kuomintang together, and then Hurley reported:

> . . . two fundamental facts are emerging: (1) the Communists are not in fact Communists; they are striving for democratic principles; and (2) the one party, one man personal Government of the Kuomintang is not in fact fascist; it is striving for democratic principles.

Was ever more error compressed into so few words?

Fascist *is* a reasonably apt name for the Kuomintang regime of 1927–49. True, the Kuomintang, in greater degree than the European fascisms, was a government for landlords. In China, the urban economy was secondary. Land was so scarce that farm rents were commonly 50 per cent (and even 70 per cent) of the whole produce. The livelihood of the peasant could be improved quickly only by reducing or eliminating his payments to the landowner. Hunger drove on one side; on the other side stood the desperate desire for a mode of life above the human subhuman. The Kuomintang protected the landowner and repressed the peasant. This landlord-peasant conflict was not equally the fulcrum of European fascisms.

In the urban social conflict, the similarity with Europe was greater. Both the Italian and German fascisms rose to power, in part, as shielders of property and society against Bolshevism. Chiang's rise had a similar history. (Many, even in the West, will know well the story of Chiang's decisive shift, in April 1927, to the role of repression of the urban working class, from the brilliant fictionalized account of this turning point given by André Malraux in *Man's Fate,* first published in 1933. Some will know these events even better from Harold R. Isaacs' impassioned essay, *The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution,* first published in 1938.) From 1927, Chiang's regime was, at all times, the terror of the urban working class. It is a terror that will not be forgotten by Chinese who lived through those years. And they are receiving assistance in teaching the memory of it to their children.

In terrorism, Chiang had nothing to learn from Europe. The U.S. State Department counts Chiang's purges after April 1927 responsible for "several hundred thousand deaths." Then it was settled policy to kill all active and determined opponents. Strike leaders, recalcitrant peasants, or even student demonstrators were beheaded or shot on the spot.

* Of this aspect, a very fair account is given by Herbert Feis in *The China Tangle* (1953).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In prison, execution was preceded by torture and mutilation. In the countryside, peasants were buried alive, burned to death with kerosene, or cut to pieces. Imprisonment, torture, and execution were used not only in social warfare: they were employed also to extort ransoms and to satisfy personal grudges. The secret police and the thought-control police were not limited by legal process. And they were not pedantic about evidence: at times, bobbed hair was evidence enough to execute a girl.

The Kuomintang leadership, shut out from the richer areas of China by enemy occupation, returned in 1945 hungry. Soon all classes of the Chinese population were comparing their restored national government unfavorably with the departed Japanese. Then, in Formosa, the government prepared its ultimate retreat. Under fifty years of Japanese rule, Formosa had achieved a far higher standard of literacy and prosperity than China. Now came the Kuomintang. In the spring of 1947, it launched a campaign to kill off the Formosan leadership class. Teachers, students, editors, lawyers, doctors, and businessmen were rounded up and shot. School enrolment lists were used to find and kill educated young people. Soldiers went everywhere, in city and village, killing and looting as they pleased—evidently to show the Formosans that the Chinese had better be obeyed. On April 18, 1947, Ambassador Leighton Stuart wrote to Chiang Kai-shek:

> The continuing presence of fresh bodies in Keelung Harbor and other evidence indicate that the elimination of the informed opposition is continuing. . . . It is reported at Taipei that although shots and screams in the night have become less frequent, they continue, and that there is no palpable difference in the tense atmosphere of the city.

Chinese Communism never concealed its ultimate objectives. In this, Mao has as great a claim to candor* as Lenin or Hitler. The Communists could join the Kuomintang in 1924: this reflected a public arrangement between the Kuomintang and the Comintern. They could also make a "united front" with Chiang in 1936 and talk coalition with him endlessly a decade later: in these things, they had the public approval of Stalin. Similarly, the Chinese Communists were under no pressure to pronounce for early agricultural collectivization. In Kiangsi (from 1930) and Yenan (from 1935) and even after taking power in Peking (1949), the Communists could advocate first rent reduction and lower interest rates and then more equal redistribution of land in private ownership. Had not Lenin, for a time, adopted the tactical policy of "The land to the peasants"? Again, in relation to urban capitalism, Mao was able to proclaim even *after* the occupation of Peking, that there was a constructive role in the new China for "the petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie." Why not? This policy was not incompatible with Communism. Had not Lenin utilized capitalists temporarily under the New Economic Policy? But the longer-run objectives were never obscured: China would be made a modern industrial country, free of imperialist influences; all ownership of capital would reside in the state; all power would be held by the Communist party; all opposition would be reformed or obliterated; China would help less fortunate countries to join the world society of Communism. The approach to these goals might involve zigzags; the goals themselves were never denied or attenuated.

They are, I think, in error who speak of a Maoist, peasant Communism in contrast with a fancied Russian, proletarian Communism. The single-party dictatorship, whether personalist or collegial, is surely neither peasant nor proletarian. When Chiang drove them from the cities, the Communists had to look to peasants for rank-and-file supporters and soldiers.

* The English translation of *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, 5 vols., is untrustworthy in detail because of Orwellian revision, but it suffices for the gross general line.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

But peasants have never touched the reins of power in Chinese Communism, and the peasantry has had no more influence over the Communist leaders than a flock has over a capable shepherd. These leaders never acquired a peasant outlook. On the contrary, it was their boast that the party had learned to swim in the sea constituted by the peasantry. It never occurred to the Communists to tolerate a society in which parties and peasants would swim alike in the same sea, where political activity permits alternative organizations and choices —also to peasants.

Of still more limited significance—except for purveying to the ignorant—is Mao's hundred-times-repeated claim that the new China is "under the leadership of the working class and the Communist party." Where two are named, one suffices. The working class, as distinguished from the Communist party, has no political weight in the new China. The government-appointed chief of the Chinese trade unions, Lai Jo-yu, could say explicitly, in 1953, "It is not permissible to express dissatisfaction with the party either openly among the members or at trade union meetings." But the symbol, the working class, does apparently still play a self-justifying psychological role among Chinese Communists. Mao writes:

> The people's democratic dictatorship needs the leadership of the working class, because only the working class is most farsighted, just, unselfish, and richly endowed with revolutionary thoroughness. The history of the entire revolution proves that without the leadership of the working class, the revolution is bound to fail, and with the leadership of the working class, the revolution is victorious. In the era of imperialism, no other class in any country can lead any genuine revolution to victory.

How lavishly incense is here burned before the shrine of the abandoned Marxist idea of the historic role of a self-determining working class! Where fair is foul and foul is fair, the Chinese may yet, on a memorial to Mao, one day inscribe the epigram of Marx, "The emancipation of the working class is the work of the working class itself."

Nevertheless, it would be quite wrong to make for ourselves an image of the Chinese Communist leaders as people intellectually capable only of self-deception. They are much more considerable personalities than that. Five months after the occupation of Peking, Mao reviewed the long road behind, and then he was, in part, both perceptive and balanced:

> We had plenty of invaluable experiences, and the following were our three main experiences: (1) A party with discipline, armed with the theories of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin, employing the methods of self-criticism, and linked up closely with the masses; (2) an army led by such a party; (3) a united front of revolutionary strata and groups led by such a party.

Properly translated, Mao's summation will stand.

The disciplined party is the primary instrument. In 1937, there were only 40,000 members. But on its 40th anniversary, in 1961, the number was announced as 17 million—about one in forty of the population. Under the hierarchical control of his superior, the party cadre has the last word in all matters, to every person. In spite of civil war and party purges, the top leadership has survived from the first years of the party's existence. The four with greatest authority (Mao Tse-tung, Liu Shao-ch'i, Chou En-lai, and Chu Teh) are intellectuals and soldiers who have been close associates from the beginning. The decisions of these party leaders are law.

But theirs may not be a law more willingly accepted than the rule of other dictatorships which have prevailed in Asia and Europe in our time. Outward discipline is greater than has been achieved in any other modern society, but inward conformity is not complete. If consent were more uncoerced, repression would not need to be so total. In May and June 1957, during the Hundred Flowers episode, silence was briefly pierced, and the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

world could hear something of the pent-up distaste with which the Chinese Communist party is regarded by many among the Chinese people.* I quote one voice, Ke P'ei-ch'i, a faculty member of the Communists' prized Chinese People's University:

> . . . the party members and cadres . . . used to wear wornout shoes but now ride in luxury cars and wear woolen uniforms. . . . When the party wants to use a person, he is highly prized even if he has murdered friends, comrades and people within the party . . . the common people, with good reason, have come to distrust the Communist party . . . the masses want to overthrow the Communist party and kill the Communists. . . .

Such voices cannot be enumerated. They were quickly silenced. In September 1957 the Communists were executing student demonstrators, just as the Kuomintang had.

THE CHINESE Communists resemble the grosser European communisms and fascisms in bragging about being free of any reluctance to engage in terrorism. No sentimentalists they! These non-sentimentalists apparently did not find enough Historical Reality in the victory which came in 1949 through the disintegration of the enemy and with little occasion for killing. Instructions were accordingly given in 1950 that land reform must not be carried out by peaceful means. There must be violence. Many landlords must be killed. And great numbers of people must put their hands to the killing. Otherwise blood would not run between past and future. The revolution would not be Real. Where the local people were too placid, as in Manchuria, the party transported bands of hooligans from village to village, to get the killing started. Chou En-lai, who bears a great reputation in the world for gracious manners, was chosen to explain: "No exploiting class voluntarily makes its exit from the stage of history, and the Chinese landlord class, which has a history of several thousand years, is no exception." It must, under no circumstances, be permitted to be an exception!

Before the enemy is killed, he must be labeled. *Counter-revolutionary* is the best label, but *reactionary* is enough. And the best execution is in the public square, after a mass trial, in which hundreds of accused are disposed of in lots, and a crowd shouts, "Kill! Kill! Kill!"

We do not know the numbers killed. Mao has been quoted as saying that 800,000 were executed between 1949 and 1954. Others have estimated the executed, in those years, as between one and three million. We do not know. And equally little do we know the larger numbers taken for forced labor. Fragmentary reports provide glimpses into a secret police network and a labor camp system possibly larger than the Russian under Stalin. But all precision is lacking.

What we do know, with all particularity, is that Chinese Communism makes more exacting demands on its subjects than has any other modern totalitarianism. All others preserve a place for the apolitical; they demand outward obedience but recognize some limits to the securing of inner assent. Not so Chinese Communism. It demands not only obedience but also enthusiasm. It demands proof that the leadership of the Communist party and the instruction of Comrade Mao are *gratefully* accepted. It will not tolerate a qualified pro-Communism. So we find the distinguished sociologist and pro-Communist Fei Hsiao-t'ung being compelled in 1957 to denounce his own critical frame of mind and to thank the party for ". . . clubbing me in order to awaken me in good time. . . . I hate my past. . . . I confess my sins. . . . I resolve to accept the education of the party. . . ." For the process by which this abject surrender is achieved, American professional psychologists have found the gracious name "coercive persuasion." But such persuasion

* A good brief account is given in T.H.E. Chen, *Thought Reform of the Chinese Intellectuals*, (Hong Kong, 1960).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cannot take its first step unless there lurks in the background the power to inflict imprisonment, torture, and death. Nikita Khrushchev has given us the ultimate explanation and it is simple:

> And how is it possible that a person confesses to crimes which he has not committed?
>
> Only in one way: because of the applying of physical pressure, torture, bringing him to a state of unconsciousness, deprivation of his judgment, taking away his human dignity.

No one has detected in the Chinese Communist leadership reluctance to take away human dignity.

III. China's Long-Range Economic Prospect

Now, after a mere thirteen years of Communist rule, China retains much of her traditional Asian poverty. Under any government, she will remain poor for a long time, not only by American standards, but also in comparison with Japan. Her population is now probably over 700 million, and it is increasing by 15 or 20 million a year. Gross national product is somewhere in the range of $100 per capita (on a purchasing power basis).

Japanese population is now near 95 million and gross national product over $500 per capita (on a minimizing, exchange-rate basis). In the past decade, the percentage growth in per capita income has, I believe, been decidedly higher in Japan than in China. And Japan may very well continue to advance at the faster rate for a long time. (The so-called "dual economy" of Japan has a large labor reserve.) Japanese natural resources—land and minerals—are relatively more meager than Chinese. But the quality of Japanese economic organization and entrepreneurship is higher. And, especially since the failure of her imperial effort, Japan has increasingly chosen the path of an industrialization dependent on world trade.

China has chosen a quite different economic path—one might call it the way of Stalin. We have no basis for surmising when, if ever, Chinese economic development, proceeding along this special way, will match the economic development of Japan. At best, the time required will be decades.

Of the Chinese population of over 700 million, some 75 or 80 per cent today earn their living primarily from agriculture. In the United States, with a population of 187 million, the corresponding share is about 8 per cent. The Chinese farm population is therefore easily 35 times the American. Yet the farm output of China is possibly the smaller. Much of the work for American agriculture has been transferred to the factory—making fertilizers, pesticides, tools, machinery, power, etc. In China this transfer is far off, even where (as in fertilizers, pesticides, and tools) it would make economic sense now. The Chinese Communists have not put industry for agriculture among their first priorities. In this respect, China and Israel may be regarded as the two poles of economic development policy.

Without constructive relation to China's need for higher production is the four-act drama of social conflict which has been fought in her countryside. These acts may be called: land reform through killing landlords (1950–52); coerced formation of collectives (1956); herding collectives into communes (1958); and the zigzag away from communes (since 1959). The retreat from the communes has apparently not yet succeeded in overcoming the stagnation in farm output that followed their establishment. For four years now, Chinese agricultural stagnation has been so pronounced that the government has found it necessary repeatedly to adduce the explanation of natural calamities—droughts, floods, typhoons, plagues—in a degree which independent observers have not confirmed. Much of this stagnation apparently has social causes, rather than natural ones.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

For 1961, the government confessed agricultural inadequacy by purchasing abroad more than six million tons of grain, some milk powder, and some sugar. And in 1962 China is importing food again, though, up to now, on a lower level. Reports of food shortage have multiplied; the government has announced more natural calamities; and, for a time, refugees (mostly *with* exit permission) pressed more numerously at the border with Hong Kong.

This continuing food shortage has yielded a flood of crocodile tears. The refugees at Hong Kong were made the occasion for an orgy of commiseration. And indeed some were hungry, more fearful, all happy to get out. But they were not starving. In all past Chinese food crises, millions starved. Under the Kuomintang, at times of food shortage, the bodies of the starved lay on the streets of every city and by every roadside. The Communists have achieved greater equality in sharing scarce food supplies than has previously been known in Chinese society.

Most of China is mountain or desert. The area suitable for crops is smaller than in the United States, and China's endowment of good range and forest is miniscule compared with North America. The Chinese now cultivate around 275 million acres and, by double cropping, plant perhaps 385 million.* (In 1950 the U.S. total was 485 million, including cover and pasture.) Chinese yields are not uniformly high. She is the world's largest producer of rice and sweet potatoes, second in corn and cotton. But for none of these are her authenticated yields per acre more than two-thirds of the average achieved in the United States or Japan. And it will not uniformly be economical for China to incur the costs required for the highest yields. Even an agriculture as skilled and abundant in instruments as that of the United States would earn a miserable livelihood extracting from the soil of China an output adequate for a population approaching four times the population of the United States. Chou En-lai has said that it is the plan of the party that 80 per cent of the Chinese people shall work in agriculture. This is a plan for poverty.

In a more rational world economy, China might export manufactures requiring little capital and much labor, largely to North America and Western Europe, and she might import grains. This exchange would permit productive use both of China's labor and of the rich land surpluses of North America and Australia. Even for the late 1960's, this trade might reasonably involve China's importing annually perhaps 30 million tons of grain, with a value around $2 billion. But the world is not moving in this direction. In a silly hour, Mao stigmatized such trade as colonial dependency. And many American protectionists would, no doubt, reject the exchange, as exposing the United States to a double peril—Communist and yellow.

IN INDUSTRY, the way of Stalin means three priorities: industrial materials, machines for the making of machines, and munitions. The chosen time span is three Five Year Plans, ending in 1967. Then China is to have laid the basis for a modern economy. But Mao is, for the present, less ambitious than Khrushchev. The USSR is to surpass the United States; China will pass only Great Britain!

Where none existed, pride is naturally taken in the first. The Chinese show visitors their steel mills and metal-working plants with something of the pride of the early Israeli *kibbutznik* in his cowshed. And there is something of the same defensiveness. Who will now deny that a Chinese can make steel—or a Jew tend a cow?

In coal, China has certainly achieved something. She has become one of the big three, with the U.S. and the USSR. But

* These figures should be understood to be very rough. Chinese rural statistics for the 1950's have been well described as 30 per cent deliberate fraud and 70 per cent disinterested guess-work.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

China has not become a modern country in energy supply. Coal is a poor third—after oil and natural gas—in U.S. energy consumption, and the USSR is moving the same way. Chinese petroleum production for a month may now be about equal to U.S. production in two days. And China has no significant production of natural gas, where American output is larger than all of China's coal, in thermal content. China's latest reported electricity generation is for 1960; then it was given as 58 billion kilowatt-hours. That was half the electricity output of Japan and 7 per cent of U.S. generation.

Enthusiastic fellow-travelers have reported, like a well-rehearsed chorus, that New China smells everywhere of cement. Yet Chinese cement production (1960) of about 12½ million metric tons is not larger, per capita, than India's. It is only 55 per cent of Japan's cement production, and it is less than is produced by each of Great Britain, France, Italy, and West Germany. Any of these European countries could be hidden in a corner of China. Yet one does not recall travelers' reports from these smaller countries being loaded with the smell of cement.

Similarly in steel production. China's output is impressive by the standard of Asian poverty. Her 18½ million metric tons of ingot steel (1960) was nearly six times India's, but it was 4 million tons less than Japan's, 6 million less than Great Britain's, 16 million less than West Germany's. And *some* consideration must be given to the size of the population. Chinese use of steel per capita in 1960 was only 27 kilograms; Japan used 208 kg., the USSR 296 kg., and Sweden 545 kg. China's is not yet a steel-using economy.

In industry, the announced Great Leap Forward of 1958–59 was apparently followed by a great stumble and sharp retrenchment. Then, some time in 1959, it became settled Chinese policy to withhold systematic economic information. Perhaps it was felt too mortifying to claim again later, when it was indeed achieved, what had already been claimed, to the sound of trumpets, in 1958–59. Moreover, statistical facts had been misused by "rightists": they would get no more ammunition. Therefore in 1959 the statistical corps was sternly re-educated in "the partisanship principle." (For some, a tour of duty in the coal mines served as a useful propaedeutic.) Statisticians were to avoid ". . . an objectivist tendency devoid of political viewpoint or class platform." Above all, "In accordance with the partisanship principle, all statistical personnel must place their work under the absolute direction of the party. . . ."

THE difficulties in industry were sharpened by the fact that the prolonged agricultural stagnation coincided, in time, with the withdrawal of Soviet aid. China had, of course, never received really sizable *financial* aid from abroad at any time. The little state of Israel, with its 2¼ million people, has received more "unrequited imports" since 1949 than have the 700 million people of China. But, until the summer of 1960, China did receive highly valuable technical assistance. Chou En-lai acknowledged in 1959 that China had received 12,300 technical experts from the Communist bloc. China also received mountains of technical data and blueprints. Some 7,000 Chinese technicians were trained in the USSR. Then, in the summer of 1960, all this came to an end. It is unlikely that the large Soviet aid agreements of August 1958 and February 1959 were ever executed. The Chinese were left to see what they could indeed do themselves alone.

By the end of 1960, Chinese industrial policy had accomplished a sharp about-face. (The "right deviation" having been disciplined, it became safe to adopt much of its policy.) The slogan of "leap forward" was indeed retained—like that of the communes—but it was a tattered banner. The new key words were "consolidation," "readjustment," and "quality improvement." On December 31, 1961, Po

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

I-po, Director of the General Office of Industry and Communications, sang the new song: "The capital construction front and the production front of industry have been appropriately *shortened*" (italics mine). And he added, ". . . the enterprises, by rationally organizing labor, have released a large number of workers in support of the agricultural front. . . ."

For these workers, unemployment became the great problem. Millions were directed to return to agriculture, where nobody welcomed them: there were already too many mouths to feed. The government therefore urged discharged urban workers to become pioneers: "Go, reclaim the hills." The Communist leaders had been complaining for years of the "blind movement of peasants to the towns." Now they announced, in 1960, the Chinese cities held about 115 million people. That would mean perhaps 45 or 50 million employables. The government did not need so many. Let them go back to agriculture. True, the rural area had itself already perhaps 225 to 250 million employables. In the countryside, however, people were less immediately a government responsibility.

But, for the longer run, if the popular standard of living is among their concerns, the Chinese leadership will have their fill of economic problems.

IV. Foundations of United States Policy Regarding China

Chinese Communist slogans frequently run in numbers. They have "the three-anti," "the five-anti," "the four together," "the three red banners," and many more. Perhaps it is because of my exposure to such numbered slogans that I find it helpful to think of the foundations of United States policy regarding China in the light of four themes: The Open Door, The Collision Course, The Doctrine of Non-Recognition, and The House of Cards.

The Open Door. The words refract the light of the 18th century. If we would do justice to generous origins, it is to that age that our thought should first turn. And to its liberating catch-phrases, *laissez faire* of course, but more particularly *laissez passer.* Let man pass free! The robber-baron shall not bar, nor shall the tollgate stand across the way. No monopolies! Let every man follow the labor of his choice. Let him be free to produce, to trade, to invest—to create. All this from the 18th century, and called to service again by American Presidents and secretaries of state—and specifically in connection with China. Is not this Open Door a principle in which the United States can take pride, for its past, and make a ground of conduct for the future?

No. When, in August 1949, Secretary Acheson issued his China White Paper, he did indeed claim United States espousal of the Open Door as the first evidence of generosity in the long history of United States policy regarding China. But the Secretary's statements on the Open Door belong to that activity which endeavors to serve the present by rearranging the past. A generation of American historians had already put shade where the Secretary proclaimed light.* First, the Open Door is not a doctrine for which Americans can claim any originality; Secretary Hay bought discarded British clothing, from an unauthorized peddler. Second, responsible Americans always knew the Open Door doctrine had not accomplished much in China; Theodore Roosevelt conveyed their realistic conviction when he wrote: ". . . the 'Open Door' policy, as a matter of fact, completely disappears as soon as a powerful nation determines to disregard it." Third, President Taft developed the Open Door into a cover for pushing American investments into China, even when (as often) the bankers did not wish to go, and the Chinese did not want the money; however this pressure—and the

* Their best statement is still perhaps the fine book of A. Whitney Griswold, *The Far Eastern Policy of the United States,* first published in 1938 and reissued without change in 1962.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

work of subsequent administrations—accomplished, in economics, nothing: American trade and investment in China remained negligible. Fourth, the libertarian aspects of the general Open Door philosophy were never applied to Chinese in the United States; Chinese accordingly resented—and continue today deeply to resent—the racial discrimination and persecution to which they were subjected by Americans. (President Theodore Roosevelt, the great figure of progressive Republicanism, regarded the Chinese as the very epitome of a degenerate yet dangerous race.) These four deficiencies were acknowledged by the Western critique.

But a more unqualified devaluation of the Open Door idea comes from Chinese sources. These quite simply reject, root and branch (and, as I think, in part irrationally), all the conventionally attributed benefits of foreign trade and, still more, of foreign investment. They argue that foreign enterprise was no good to China: it disrupted Chinese agriculture; ruined traditional handicrafts; prevented the growth of Chinese-owned industry; and drained China's wealth through remittance abroad of profits. This total rejection of the Open Door is not only a Communist position; the rejection is shared by a great variety of Chinese. As I can quote only one voice, I choose Fei Hsiao-tung, a scholar and so little a party man that he had to be brainwashed after the Hundred Flowers. Writing before the Communists took power (in his *China's Gentry*), Fei says:

> Straws of various sizes thrust into rural areas suck out the wealth of China into these ports. . . . The producers of goods for export do not get back an equal value in imports. . . . The force dislodging the rural industries is both powerful and deeply penetrating. Behind it are big battleships and guns, the "imperialism" of well-organized industrialized countries. . . . Under the present system . . . the countryside continues to support those who consume modern manufactured goods . . . without gaining any benefit from modern industrialism for itself. . . . China is being constantly drained of its wealth.

In this Chinese view, the Open Door is a charter not of liberation but of exploitation. The wisdom of the 18th century is named foolishness and hypocrisy.

The Collision Course. In the official view, after the Open Door, the second guiding star of long-term United States action, in the Far East, has been the policy of maintaining the territorial integrity of China and of defending its sovereignty from foreign encroachment. Much here turns on the distinction between policy and preference, indeed between policy and wish-fancy or daydream. I define policy as an intended course of conduct for which one is prepared to concert the related means. By this definition, the maintenance of the territorial integrity of China has only episodically been a United States policy.

I make nothing important, in this matter, of the one American aberration in the direction of seizing Chinese territory. In November 1900, the United States did make an effort to obtain from China a naval base and territorial concession at Samsah Bay, in the province of Fukien, across from Formosa. A Japanese protest ended the matter. The United States concealed what it had attempted till 1924. But this episode had no sequel, and it reflects no substantial continuing purpose. The United States has never wished to hold Chinese territory. (Even contemporary Formosa is not, I think, an exception —though few mainland Chinese would agree.)

More significant is the occasional cooperation of the United States with other powers in facilitating their violation of the territorial integrity of China and encroachments on Chinese sovereignty. In assisting Japan (in Korea and south Manchuria) before World War I, the United States was actively cooperative. Similar facilitating initiative, regarding Manchuria, was extended to Stalin by Franklin D. Roosevelt at Teheran and Yalta. Other trespassers on Chinese sovereignty—Britain in Tibet, Czarist Russia in Mongolia,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

or France in south China—were rarely regarded with more than tolerance. These abridgements of Chinese territorial integrity were, for the most part, accepted by the United States sorrowfully, as the way of the world. Almost all of the time, the United States did desire that the territorial integrity of China be preserved. Frequently the United States did speak for this object, did exhort in its favor, and did reprove other powers who endeavored to dominate China.

But, if we would understand what we are, we must not falsify the record of what we have done and not done. And we must not conceal from ourselves the long continuity of character, as displayed in action. On July 3, 1900, the United States government dispatched its first circular to the powers urging the preservation of "Chinese territorial and administrative entity." Japan inquired whether the United States was prepared to join in securing observance of this principle, and she received the classic reply: the United States was not of a mind ". . . to attempt singly, or in concert with other Powers, to enforce these views in the east by any demonstration which could present a character of hostility to any other Power." Copies of this classic should have been kept on hand in the State Department; they could have been used unchanged nearly forty years later. On July 19, 1937, as Japan moved to take over north China, the United States issued another circular acclaiming the principles of 1900. And, on July 20, the United States was invited to join Britain and France in mediation, to restrain further Japanese advances. Hull refused flatly. He would make no joint representation, and he would not say what the United States might do in the event of further Japanese advance.

The developments from the renewed Japanese invasion in 1937 to Pearl Harbor also did not establish the territorial integrity of China as a United States policy. There is no evidence that the United States would have gone to war if Japan had merely taken Chinese territory. Indeed, just ten days before Pearl Harbor, General Marshall and Admiral Stark addressed a memorandum to President Roosevelt in which they viewed the enlargement of the Japanese position in China as the alternative, among probable Japanese actions, which should cause the United States least concern.

The deeper lessons of the years that led to Pearl Harbor are lost if that time is pictured as one of American policy, initiative, and activity. It is hard to believe that any sincere and intelligent person, who knew United States government in those years, could fall into such an error. The government of the United States did not act; it reacted. Routine held, and imagination failed. To the prevailing American mind, the larger aspirations and more violent means then proclaimed by the Japanese did not make sense. The bold and violent and adventurist were too uncomfortable to be acknowledged fully. The United States government did not take the measure of the mind and intent of the Japanese government, and it did not initiate commensurate policy. It did not carry out a policy to preserve the territorial integrity of China—or any contrary policy. The United States maintained a collision course that lay across the path of Japan.

Non-Recognition. The fitting complement of the collision course was—and is—the philosophy of non-recognition. Withhold recognition from the devil, and he may go away! The more sober and older American view had acknowledged the devil's presence in more places. Henry Clay said, in 1818: "As soon as stability and order are maintained, no matter by whom, we have always considered and ought to consider the actual as the true government." Woodrow Wilson set a new course, with a self-righteousness which continues to be non-recognition's unfailing companion: "We dare not turn from the principle that morality and not expediency is the thing that must guide us and that we

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

will never condone iniquity because it is most convenient to do so. . . ." Refusing to condone iniquity, the United States would not recognize bad Mexican governments; Bryan warned the Japanese in May 1915 that the U.S. "cannot recognize" various agreements in China; and, for sixteen years, the United States withheld recognition of the super-bad government of the USSR. Henry L. Stimson, in 1932, again found the moral course in non-recognition. By enunciating this doctrine, Stimson convinced himself, and many others, that he had done something important—spoken for the good cause, given Satan his right name. But his principal accomplishment, like that of his predecessors, was to blur the true alternatives of international policy—resistance or accommodation.

Moral approval is of character or conduct. International recognition need be only of political facts. The facts that recognition must acknowledge are: the existence of a state; the identities of its officers; and the area where its rule runs. Recognition need signify no degree of moral or political approval, and indeed it communicates such approval at grave peril. Even the perfunctory diplomatic euphemisms that conventionally accompany the occasion of recognition are best thinned out, lest they be misunderstood. Surely the United States is not involved in approving the regimes of the USSR and Yugoslavia, or of Spain and South Africa, because we recognize their existence as states? Bitter as the act may be, we cannot usefully deny the formality of recognition even to victorious aggression or established tyranny —unless it is an aggression we intend currently to repel or a tyranny we are taking action now to overthrow. Recognition always adds some facility in communication, some chance in accommodation. Non-recognition is sterile.

The foreign policy of a mature people will acknowledge that there are evils beyond its remedy. But it will not deceive itself by withholding the formalities of recognition from evils with which it must live. And a foreign policy worthy of a mature people will acknowledge also that there are other evils that can be reached and remedied—it may be by acquaintance, understanding, and accommodation, and it may be by resistance, force, and violence. In these situations, too, there will be no gain from the powder-puff of non-recognition.

The House of Cards. The three previous themes, whether declared foreign policies or life-styles of operation, come to us from many decades. The House of Cards is a new motif. Like the others, it has in part generous origins. It bespeaks the era of the United Nations, a proclaimed general order of law, wide territorial perspectives, where small peoples once disregarded come also into consideration. And it speaks of tremors running through the whole earth, of a world public opinion, of the world-wide clash of social systems, and of a generous concern for the weak. Where all was previously isolated, all is now made one. If the Chinese prevail by genocide in Tibet, the veil of the temple is rent, and the world order is broken to bits. None will ever again put trust in law or limit or in the protection of any power or association! The House of Cards comes crashing down.

It is on the borders of China particularly that the theme of the House of Cards has riotous play. There we have not only a Tibet but also a Laos, a Cambodia, and many another somewhat larger but little more powerful. It is therefore particularly on the borders of China that sanity resides in the ability to draw distinctions of greater and less, bearable and not to be borne, even among evils. An all-or-none politics makes impossible that little of reason and value we may otherwise attain. Acceptance of the theme of the House of Cards, among the American people, is therefore profoundly disturbing; it suggests deep weaknesses of mind and character, manifesting themselves in

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

an unwillingness to make controlled, limited political and moral distinctions. The wide reception of the theme of the House of Cards testifies to an inner disquiet, which can boil into mad outbursts of violence or dissolve into rigid, immobilized fear.

V. Communist China Enters World Affairs

Hate America is today one fundamental element in the politics of Communist China. I find it false to confront this element after dealing with the particular conflicts between the United States and China since the proclamation of the People's Republic of China on October 1, 1949. *Hate America* does not, I believe, derive primarily from these conflicts. Mao, I suspect, and perhaps Liu Shao-ch'i, already held this tenet, comparatively full-blown, when they arrived in Peking in 1949—just as Hitler held *Hate the Jew* before World War II and before he knew Bolshevism. In this matter, scholars have been quick with names, and they have come up with some big ones—ethnocentrism, xenophobia, wounded racial pride, Marxist Messianism, and even the secular impulse southward of the Han [Chinese] peoples. These names do not meet the test of sufficient reason: what they point toward has been present where *Hate America* (or its equivalent) was absent.

Marx also will not help us here, nor even Spinoza. We must set aside all historical determinisms. Idea and will—value and choice—come in irreducibly. The Communist leaders of China, out of a mixture of conviction and policy, chose to inculcate the idea *Hate America* among the Chinese people. Their totalitarianism is on a much higher level of painstaking thoroughness, in remolding thought, than was Hitler's. The Communists have also now been in power in China longer than the whole duration of the Nazi regime in Germany. Comparison of whole societies is hazardous. Yet I venture the opinion that the idea *Hate America* is now more deeply anchored in Chinese minds than *Hate the Jew* was in German minds at any time.

For a Chinese today, a personal relationship with any foreigner is dangerous. (Technical experts from Communist countries report themselves to have lived in China in total personal isolation.) Attachment to American persons or ideas is catastrophic. A Chinese suspected of such attachments will be designated a counter-revolutionary. He is guilty of "worship America," "pro-America," or "afraid-of-America." To avert the worst, the suspect had better make abject confession promptly and engage in vigorous self-criticism. Self-defense will be called resistance, and—if persistent—will lead to death. But even the suspect who yields immediately will not be let off until he demonstrates enthusiastic espousal of three official positions: "hate-America," "despise-America," and "belittle-America." Relapse into old errors will bring prison or a labor service perhaps worse than prison.

America is represented as vile but not strong. No need to fear. Fortunately, ". . . the U.S. imperialists with all their viciousness and ferocity are only paper tigers. . . ." Chou En-lai is reported (by an eyewitness, Chou Ching-wen) to play particularly on these themes. The Americans are low, cheap types. "We must constantly attack them, scold them and threaten them into confusion." Then give them one hard beating, and they will come begging to be let off. The American enemy is persistent and contemptible, but he is not formidable.

It would be wrong to conclude that *Hate America* is now lodged, for all time, in Chinese minds. What one Chinese leadership has chosen to implant, another may, one day, find the conviction or policy to uproot. But, for the next years, it is unlikely that any force from abroad will succeed—over the head of the Chinese gov-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ernment—in reaching large numbers of mainland Chinese with images and conceptions that will displace those of hate and contempt which the Chinese Communist leadership has chosen to instill.

KOREA IS a tribulation for those who believe in the consistent cleverness of the Communist leaderships. At the end of 1949 and early in 1950, Mao was in the Soviet Union. In January, many governments announced recognition of the People's Republic. Amid these recognitions, Secretary Acheson, on January 12, 1950, made a speech defining the defense perimeter of the U.S. in the Pacific. That perimeter, Acheson said: ". . . runs along the Aleutians to Japan and then goes to the Ryukyus [and] from the Ryukyus to the Philippine Islands. . . . So far as the military security of other areas in the Pacific is concerned, it must be clear that no person can guarantee these areas against military attack." Secretary Acheson thereby announced that the U.S. defense perimeter excluded Formosa. The United States would impose no barrier against a mainland Chinese effort to end the civil war by occupying Formosa. But Acheson also excluded Korea from the U.S. defense area. And there the Communist leadership's judgment of priority—or their coordination of action—slipped badly.

Had the Chinese moved first against Formosa, they would have encountered only the demoralized forces of Chiang Kai-shek. Victorious in Formosa, they would have had no surviving competitor for the name of China. Then they could proceed slowly, step by step, to mediatize their small mainland neighbors—leaving these neighbors the outward insignia of sovereignty, while depriving them of its reality. But the Communist leaders of China and the USSR failed to put first things first—or they did not act together. On June 25, 1950, before any invasion of Formosa, they opened military action against South Korea. Heavy offensive weapons were used, to assure a quick victory. But by June 27 President Truman had determined to defend Korea. Moreover, gravely disturbed by the apparent universality of Communist offensives, Truman reversed U.S. policy: he ordered the U.S. Seventh Fleet to block military movements across the Formosa strait. From the Communist point of view, the timing had gone all wrong.

When the Korean war was over, the United States had, in South Korea, total responsibility for survival but no means of development. United States net financial aid to the Republic of Korea (26 million people) is now about $5 billion. Nonmilitary aid continues at about $225 million annually. Economic improvement is visible only to very sharp eyes: statisticians put it under 2 per cent per capita annually. Dictatorship headed by civilians has been succeeded by dictatorship of military officers. The political program, as elsewhere, is anti-corruption and anti-Communism. Public morale is suggested by the attitude of a Korean student in Washington, who—like many another of the brighter foreign students in the United States, from poor countries—obviously did not intend to go home. When asked, "Why don't you go back to Korea?" he replied, "Because I do not believe in transmigration of souls. If I had many lives to live, I would give one of them for Korea—but not this only one."

The Chinese also have reason to regret the Korean war was ever started. They demonstrated military capability; in November and December 1950, they outgeneraled MacArthur and outfought his troops. But, when the war was over, they had gained nothing they could not have had better without the war. Their offshore position was frozen. They continued to share influence in North Korea with the USSR. And they were privileged to sustain this balance of influence by providing the fewer than 9 million people of North Korea with several hundred million dollars of financial aid for economic development—an amount not incommensur-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

able with the total financial aid provided the 700 million people of China by the Soviet Union!

THE KUOMINTANG survives on Formosa (Taiwan) because of the Communist folly of starting the Korean war—that and American resistance. But let us not call this Free China. They hold freedom in little regard who so take her name in vain.

After the Kuomintang killed some 10,000 people from the Taiwanese leadership element, in the spring of 1947, the quiet of repression was established. Some two million mainland Chinese came to live among nine million Taiwanese. The natives spoke south Chinese dialects or Japanese; the mainlanders made Mandarin official. A military force of about 600,000 dominated the island. Its officers were mainlanders, but in 1954 conscription was established, and Taiwanese became privileged to fill out the aging ranks. Government remains, as it was on the mainland, the personal appanage of Chiang Kai-shek. In March 1960, a constitutional prohibition was "suspended" to permit Chiang to continue as President. Legally he rules by wide decree authority, factually by total power. The press is controlled. Strikes are prohibited. Genuine opposition brings arrest for treason.

The Kuomintang official slogan in Taiwan is: "Overthrow the Communists, Resist Russia, and Return to the Mainland." From across the water, the Communists have been declaiming, for thirteen years, "We shall certainly liberate Taiwan." Between two large military demonstrations, in 1954–55 and 1958, the Communists tried even sweetness. In 1957, Chou En-lai appealed alike to the Taiwanese and to Taiwan's military guests: "All decent Chinese should unite as patriotic members of one big family and together fight against and crush the schemes of United States imperialism."

The native Taiwanese has seen the Japanese go. Chiang would take him to a mainland in which he has no interest. Mao offers a liberation worse than the present servitude. Perhaps never in his lifetime will he be free of alien occupation.

But his economic condition has improved. The Americans induced Chiang to carry out land reform. First, rent was reduced—to 37½ per cent of the yield of the main crop. Then land was purchased by the government and resold on credit, so that now about 85 per cent of all farm land is operated by its owners. Agricultural productivity was always higher than on the mainland, and it has continued to rise faster than population growth. Moreover, U.S. aid has dribbled down. Since July 1945, the U.S. Treasury has provided Chiang over $5 billion. Military aid now still runs around $150 million and non-military $120 million per year. Also, some Chinese with business ability came to Taiwan. (More preferred Hong Kong.) Industrial production is three times pre-war. On a per capita basis, Taiwan produces (1960) about one-and-one-half times the cotton yarn of mainland China, four times the electricity, and six times the cement! By the standards of the Far East, Taiwan is not poor.

WHEN THE Chinese People's Republic was proclaimed, there were two prominent views of the probable character of China's relations with the Soviet Union. We may call them the known thesis of Acheson and the suspected thesis of Mao. Acheson, we know, announced that the Chinese Communists were front-men for the Russians. They had yielded to Russia the substance of Chinese sovereignty, and they were about to cede Chinese territory —in Manchuria, Mongolia, and Sinkiang. Mao, we may suspect, thought the shoe was on the other foot. He would lead the Russians a merry dance! As he said in 1949, ". . . in an era when imperialism still exists, it is impossible for a genuine people's revolution to win its own victory

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

without different kinds of help from the international revolutionary forces." Moscow was the first center of the revolution; let it be forthcoming in supplying "the different kinds of help"!

Liu Shao-ch'i made it quite clear, in November 1949, that the Chinese comrades were prepared to supply the brains. Others might know something about Europe, but Mao's great mind had found the road for Asia and Africa. First, in each country, there should be created a united front of all ". . . who are willing to oppose the oppression of imperialism and its lackeys . . ."; this front must be under the leadership of the Communist party. Then, wherever possible, "It is necessary to set up . . . a national army which is led by the Communist party. . . . This way is the way of Mao Tse-tung . . . for winning emancipation by the people of the colonial and semi-colonial countries. . . ." With Chinese vision ("a new contribution to the treasury of Marxism-Leninism") and Russian resources, Communism would rapidly make a clean sweep.

Acheson was proven wrong first. What the Chinese paid Stalin was principally adulation. A song reported to be among Mao's favorites goes as follows:

The eastern sky reddens,
The sun rises,
And in China Mao Tse-tung has come!
He strives for the welfare of the people.
He is the Great Savior of the people!

When Mao went to Moscow in 1949–50, there appeared everywhere in China a picture of the "Great Meeting" of Stalin and Mao, and the song was reportedly amended: *"Mao Tse-tung! Stalin!/They are shining as bright as the sun in the sky!"* However, sharing equality with the sun was a small price. An agreement was concluded, in February 1950, diminishing Russian rights in Manchuria; Stalin would not require of his party comrades as much as President Roosevelt had arranged for him to get from Chiang. At the end of 1952, these rights were in fact relinquished, apart from Dairen; that went at the end of 1955. Meanwhile, after the death of Stalin, the joint Sino-Soviet companies which operated in the Chinese borderlands—and were suspected to be instruments of Russian penetration—were terminated. The Russians sold their stock to the Chinese. The Chinese had turned out, very quickly, to be anything but complaisant Russian front-men.

But if Acheson was mistaken, Mao was more profoundly so. The Russians did not prove themselves effective instruments for the finer Chinese brains. The Russians failed to get China into the United Nations; they failed to assist in the liberation of Taiwan; and they failed to provide the Chinese any substantial financial assistance. When the Russians could not get the Chinese into the UN, they did show good faith by stamping out of the Security Council. But that boycott only enabled the United States to annex the symbol of UN sponsorship in the Korean war. After seven months' boycott, appreciating that they had made a tactical error, the Russians stamped back in—but they could still do nothing for the Chinese. Similarly, when in 1958 the Chinese—for the second time—beat the drums for an attack to liberate Taiwan, the Russians announced, with great solemnity, that the Soviet Union would certainly be found a faithful ally of China—if the United States were to attack the mainland! That was surely sealing non-cooperation with insult. (A less humorless Washington might have offered, in the spirit of the famous tender of Bismarck to Gorchakov, to issue a stamp bearing, in Chinese characters, the inscription "Khrushchev protects China.")

But perhaps most disappointing, the Russians never provided China any development finance worth mentioning—no grants and paltry loans: $300 million in 1950, another $130 million in 1954, and about $320 million in 1961 (as the funding of trade debts). Perhaps—though this is not clear—there was an early loan of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a billion dollars or more in military supplies. But all together, chicken feed. The Chinese themselves provided *grants* to North Korea, North Vietnam, Mongolia, Hungary, Cambodia, Nepal, Ceylon, and Egypt. These added up to far more than all the economic development loans China got from Russia. What parsimony; what uncomradely behavior; what a disappointment! And it was climaxed in the summer of 1960, when the Russians withdrew all (or practically all) their technical experts and reportedly ordered their men not to leave in China even the blueprints of uncompleted projects.

This failure to secure Russian support for large ambitions had one curious consequence. It convinced some that the Chinese Communist leaders are distinctively *cautious* people. (How this awakens memories of that State Department scholarship which, in the 1930's, spoke of the extreme caution—indeed the long, hesitant sequence of advance and retreat—which characterized the history of Japan from 1895!) But, in their differences with the Russians regarding world affairs, so far as we know, it has always been the Chinese who were the adventurers. In one or two other matters, it is true, the Chinese were the more conservative. They objected to the severe downgrading of Stalin. Had not Mao matched with him and the sun? And they objected to extreme derogation of established leadership status. During the Great Leap Forward (1958–59), and even subsequently, Mao was the object of a personal adulation quite out of fashion in the Soviet Union.

That was a time when (April 1958) Mao found it most fortunate that China was "poor and blank," adding, "A clean sheet of paper has nothing on it, so that the newest and most beautiful words can be written and the newest and most beautiful pictures painted on it." Mao prided himself on calligraphy. But also on economics. Marxism, he announced triumphantly, can grow grain. And he predicted (November 1958) that the 1958 grain harvest would be 100 per cent higher than 1957, while 1959 would again be 100 per cent higher than 1958. Khrushchev can perhaps be forgiven for conveying some suggestion, during this period, that he thought Mao deranged.

VI. Power and Abstention in East Asia

China's frontiers on the east Asian mainland do not harbor a Sweden or a Turkey, nor even a Finland or a Poland. Take the measure of what is absent. *Sweden:* a mature democracy; an advanced economy; capable in self-defense; neutral of any alliance, but not neutral in preference for democratic societies. *Finland:* less fortunately situated and less independent than Sweden; bent to give the USSR every reassurance regarding foreign relations; but retaining democratic institutions, and not an associate for any Soviet military initiative. *Turkey:* only episodically a democracy, but a popular national state; united in fear of Russian aggression; a slow-developing economy, unable to bear the cost of modern defense; joined in NATO, and contributing massively what it has—reliable manpower. *Poland:* a Communist government, but preserving national distinctiveness; permitting criticism that does not challenge the foundations of Communist society; paying its debt of neighborhood and comradeship by speaking frequently for Russian positions in world affairs indifferent to Poland's interest, but not an associate for any aggressive military adventure.

The four include neutral, dependent, allied, and Communist. If only the east Asian mainland were peopled with societies and governments equal to the least of these!

Among east Asian countries, only the island nation of Japan can usefully be drawn into close comparison with the four above. Japan moved easily into modern nationhood, repelling foreign

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

political and economic penetration, but avid in acquiring Western knowledge. Elsewhere, in east Asian societies, compelling allegiances were attached to family and local groups, not to the larger states imposed by the Western imperialisms. Absent larger unities, resistance to the West could not succeed. Emancipation from traditional Asian values and ties commonly yielded a materialistic and amoral (elsewhere Levantine) individualism. Mainland east Asian societies remained, therefore, dominantly traditional and morally fragmented. But their urban centers contained elements thinly modern and morally pulverized. During and after World War II, the Western imperialisms were expelled from these mainland societies also—first by imperial Japan. In this process, Asians learned again how much is decided with guns. And then Communism solidified its appeal. Where other modernisms bred individualism, it taught organization. Where others relied on argument, it taught the use of guns. ("What good are your better arguments," the Vietnamese boy asked, "when they shoot you anyway?")

From moral fragments and sand, were formed the new states of the east Asian mainland. Other cements failing, force was used: governments everywhere (except in Malaya) became more or less military dictatorships. Up to now, these dictatorships have uniformly failed (even to the extent that Turkey, for example, has succeeded) in creating popular national societies. None has found the spirit that can breathe life into dust. And they are far from having learned the skills of modern economies.

JAPAN IS the great contrast. Always a strong national society, she now possesses far greater sources of power than were in the hands of the imperial Japan which overturned east Asia two decades ago. In economic development, Japan is accomplishing what China is only advertising. In 1951, Japan (aided by a generous occupation) threw off the consequences of defeat and attained an output surpassing the pre-war. Eleven years later, in 1962, Japan's output is about 2¾ times the pre-war. Since 1951, population has increased by only one-eighth, but agricultural product has risen by two-fifths, and industrial production has quintupled! The representative Japanese urban wage-earner's household now has an annual income over $1,500. And the transformation is continuing. In the years 1956–61 alone, one farm person in every five left agriculture, and one person for every previous four was added to non-agricultural employments. One third of the total national product was invested, and without inflation: both wholesale and export prices remained stable. Doubling the national income again in a decade is now taken to be a conservative objective.

All this undeniably meant great social turbulence. But it has been accomplished —and is being carried further—without massacres or concentration camps, without thought control or political dictatorship, without even the acquisition by any foreign interest of a single control point in the Japanese economy. Here, and not in Communist China, is the great Asian model of Permanent Revolution.

But, while Japan has added greatly to the basis for power, power itself she has relinquished—one might say rejected, especially power's military form. The defeat of 1945 was a shattering experience for a people which had not previously known defeat, as a national community, though privation and defeat were well-known to it, as personal experience. Having once been a symbol for militarism, the Japanese have put away military things. In 1941, Japan had larger—and, the Japanese say, better trained—armed forces than Communist China has today. She had an army of 2½ million men, a navy of 320,000, and an air force with about 4,800 first-line planes. Today the total military force numbers under 240,000 men. And, on balance, as of now, the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Japanese do not wish to have larger armed forces.*

Shock of defeat and occupation; the sight of Americans everywhere on the frontiers of China; and continuance of American military bases in metropolitan Japan: these three have combined to foster a distinctive Japanese outlook on east Asian conflicts. And this outlook extends to military preparations and world politics generally. Abstention. "Count me out!" Israel and Japan are the starkest contrasts. To go from Israel to Japan is to leave a community which considers itself beleaguered and does not dream of questioning that military preparations are *for us,* for our defense, our survival, our living as we wish. It is to enter a community which has no fear of attack, but does have a strong suspicion that all the expense and discomfort and danger of military preparations is *for them*—for the Americans, who are selfish, who view Japanese with condescension, and who endanger the country with their military bases. An able student reports Japanese members of Parliament (left-wingers, it is true) to have asked him, rhetorically, "What threatens Japan?" and to have answered their own question, "Only American insistence on our rearmament, which antagonizes Russia, China, and even South Korea."

For the affairs of east Asia, the Japanese once claimed preeminent responsibility. Now they are conditioned to play the role of very small boys indeed. In Japan, as frequently elsewhere, American military bases, in metropolitan territories, undermine the moral and political foundations of the alliance with the United States. But, particularly under Japanese conditions, the shield afforded by American bases also indulges the conviction of automatic security, and it greatly strengthens tendencies toward abstention. The Americans, in their bases, are safe targets for Japanese criticism. And, so long as the Americans are here, why bother one's head about supposed dangers from China or Russia? The treaty under which the U.S. was given the right to maintain bases in Japan until 1970 threatens to become a Maginot Line, constituting the greatest barrier to the constructive rethinking of Japan's abstention from international responsibilities. The treaty thereby contributes weightily to solidifying the United States role of solitary policeman in east Asia.

SINCE 1949 the United States has been continually in conflict with Communist China in the Asian ruins of the French colonial empire. In Vietnam, the Chinese lent their strength boldly. The Vietnamese resistance forces, under Ho Chi Minh, may then have been—I think they were—drawing support from an anti-colonialism which was not, for most of its followers, primarily Communist. But the key Vietnamese leaders were Communist militants of old stamp. Ho Chi Minh had been in on the foundation of the French Communist party in 1920, and he had joined the Borodin mission to the Kuomintang in 1924. His chief lieutenants were Communist graduates of French prisons who had also been colleagues of Mao, Liu, and Chou in Canton and Yenan and Moscow. In December 1949, the Chinese Communists established themselves on the Vietnam frontier. Then they moved swiftly to accord recognition, in January 1950, to Ho Chi Minh's government. The USSR was second. That was extending a helping hand promptly to trusted party comrades!

Already in 1950, the Vietnamese comrades showed they were a good investment. After receiving training and equipment from the Chinese, they—for the first time—dropped guerrilla tactics. They went over to the offensive and defeated the French, in a series of engagements all along the northern frontier. In 1950–53, intelligent Vietnamese, in the resistance,

* See the very informative little book by D. H. Mendel, *The Japanese People and Foreign Policy* (1961).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

certainly learned—if they had not known before—that Ho Chi Minh and his lieutenants were leading as distinctly a Communist movement as had Mao and *his* lieutenants a few years earlier. In 1953, the intellectuals of the Vietnamese resistance, in the north, had their brains washed, according to the Maoist prescription, and this Chinese-style thought reform was so productive as to yield materials for tens of thousands of published copies of confessions. The artillery for the Vietnamese victory at Dien Bien Phu (May 1954) came from China. A responsible eyewitness (Gérard Tongas) has testified that half of the soldiers who marched triumphantly in Hanoi, on October 10, 1954, were Chinese.

Since the summer of 1954, when Vietnam was partitioned at the 17th parallel, sincere Western democrats have increasingly suffered pangs of conscience regarding the government of South Vietnam. They discovered, to their dismay, that Ngo Dinh Diem's regime bore a distinct family resemblance to Chiang's government on Taiwan and to the successive dictatorships in South Korea. Diem's rule is neither popular nor efficient. There are no civil liberties. In family nepotism, Diem matches Chiang, but not in land reform. And the economic development of South Vietnam does not compare remotely with that of Taiwan; in that, Vietnam is more like South Korea. Some $2 billion has been transferred to Vietnam by the U.S. in seven years, but there is no economic development to show for it. Indeed Diem's regime cannot even maintain security on the roads at night—in this being like Sukarno's Indonesia. Diem also tolerates no serious political opposition; tens of thousands—some say 40,000—are held in concentration camps, for "political re-education." The regime fights rural guerrillas with torture of suspects and destruction of whole villages.

Americans may well feel shame that Vice President Johnson goes to Saigon to pronounce such a regime "a bastion of freedom and progress" and to liken Diem to Churchill. And General Maxwell Taylor evokes sad memories of departed French generals when he says that political and economic reforms may indeed be needed in South Vietnam, but they can only follow pacification. Such words appear already on many tombstones.

After what we know of oppression and revolt in South Vietnam, it may come as a shock to learn, from our best witness,* that it is to the south that the miserable people of North Vietnam look for deliverance. In North Vietnam, the Communists (particularly from 1956) introduced a Chinese-style totalitarianism. Following specific Chinese guides, they carried out a Mao-style land reform, through mass hysteria and executions. Where there were no large landlords, they invented "cruel" landlords, so the mass trials would have enough people to kill. Less efficient than the Chinese, they have attempted the same total control of action and thought. And they have been rewarded with hunger, terror, and resentment. China and Russia continue to indicate appreciation of the importance of the Vietnamese front by a scale of financial aid very unusual in the Communist world. North Vietnam has received, since 1955, grants and credits in excess of $900 million, of which more than half from China. Professor Tongas summarizes his comprehensive eyewitness knowledge by saying that North Vietnam is a hell on earth. It is then one of the chambers of hell which the great Communist powers claim specially as their own.

ON THE east Asian frontiers of China, "the way of Mao Tse-tung," as proclaimed by Liu Shao-ch'i in November 1949, prevailed only in the ruins of the French colonial empire and in North Korea. Elsewhere (in Burma, Malaya, Indonesia, and the Philippines) Communist warfare was defeated. On his way home

* Gérard Tongas, *L'Enfer Communiste au Nord Viêt-Nam* (1961).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

from Geneva, after concluding the 1954 partition of Vietnam, Chou En-lai visited both Nehru and U Nu. With each, he joined in putting forward principles of peace—*Five Principles* as they were called:

> Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty; nonaggression; noninterference in each other's internal affairs; equality and mutual benefit; and peaceful coexistence.

These *Five Principles* were hailed as reflecting the mature policies of the thoughtful, statesman-like New China. They constituted the central ideas of the 1955 Asia-Africa conference at Bandung. There Chou En-lai vied with Nehru and won the popular award. How undogmatic this spokesman for the New China, how concerned for peace, how reasonable, good-humored, and altogether charming!

But in 1959, in perhaps the most interesting episode in the struggle against the "rightists" who had opposed the Great Leap Forward and the People's Communes, Marshal P'eng Teh-huai (then Minister of Defense and a member of the Politburo) was dismissed and imprisoned.* With him was removed, among a long list of others, a Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Chang Wen-t'ien. In March 1960, special party meetings were called to denounce Chang as " . . . a right opportunist who had propagated the erroneous view . . . that peaceful coexistence in accordance with Five Principles and Bandung should be the basis of China's foreign policy. . . ." Chou En-lai remained undisturbed, Prime Minister and number-three man (after Mao and Liu) in the hierarchy.

Poor Chang Wen-t'ien! Had his pacific views been erroneous also at the time of Bandung? Or had they become erroneous only somewhat later? My own guess is that to hold such nonmilitant views—except as a means to deceive innocents—embodied mortal party error, in mainland China, from the beginning. It may be long before we know the history. But the present position we *do* know.

* See on this the very informative essay by David A. Charles in *The China Quarterly* of October–December, 1961.

VII. Palliatives and Doubtful Reconciliations

One China and one separate Taiwan: power sets the limit, and a choice among evils. For many decades, Americans imagined there would one day be a great, united China, and it would be *ours*. Then came the Communist take-over. And Americans—even the more clear-sighted—could not quite forbear the dream. Two Chinas then, and one of them ours! But the world did not accommodate itself to vagrant dreams. There is only one China, and it is *theirs*.

Two million mainland Chinese and their 9 million hosts on Taiwan: that does not make a China. Neither, however, does it make a luncheon morsel which we are permitted to offer the tiger, in reasoned expectation that, having eaten, he will first sleep and then wake as friendly as a house-bred pussycat. No, he will probably rise strengthened and contemptuous.

So far as can be known today, Taiwan has no considerable number of people who desire to be absorbed in Communist China. But, in time, they should be asked. A fair plebiscite would help clear the international atmosphere. And, after the plebiscite, there should be a reasonable interval—surely not less than a year—in which any that choose could leave.

Military considerations, so far as a layman understands them, need not be decisive. Communist China will, no doubt, in the next years, acquire nuclear weapons and some means, however primitive, of their delivery. China could then devastate Taiwan. But, similarly, mainland China could be devastated, by nuclear weapons, *from* Taiwan. As this is a game at which two can play, both would better desist. For occupation of Taiwan, Communist China lacks the requisite naval and air forces. And she is, I believe, quite unlikely

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to acquire such forces in the next ten or fifteen years.

For the United States also, Taiwan is not an indispensable military position, even from the most conventional point of view. In World War II, the United States and its allies reconquered the whole western Pacific without occupying Taiwan. In the years up to 1950, the highest United States military authorities found repeatedly that Taiwan was not indispensable to American defense. Military action is increasingly at a distance. What was dispensable in 1950 is doubly dispensable now. If the Taiwanese wish, and China agrees, Taiwan can be independent, and it need not serve as a base for United States forces.

Pinpricks, but dangerous ones, are the tiny islands of Quemoy and Matsu. To Chiang's forces, holding these islands sustains the illusion of steppingstones for the reconquest of the mainland. To the Communists, the islands are a cosy target whenever they wish to kick up a fuss. On this issue, Senator John F. Kennedy once wrote perceptively: ". . . Quemoy and Matsu . . . are in effect, by laws of geography, hostages held by Mao Tse-tung . . . our commitment there gives Peking an ever-ready occasion to put on the pressure, to take it off, to bring us to the brink of war. . . . It is a dangerous mistake to leave such a temptation standing." President Kennedy has not yet found the decisiveness to act on the Senator's understanding. At worst, failing agreement, Chiang could be put on notice that, after a reasonable interval, the President would simply announce that the government of the United States will no longer assist defense of these islands.

When the islands of Quemoy and Matsu are abandoned, the mainland Communists will, no doubt, exult and rant and brandish their weapons. "By the strength of my hand I have done it, and by my wisdom, for I have understanding; and I have removed the boundaries of peoples. . . ." But we must not be deterred from doing a reasonable thing because it will elicit a fool's boast.

EXPERIENCE provides no ground for confidence that the government of the United States will have any considerable success in fostering democratic governments in the east Asian countries now dependent on the United States for survival. I mean Taiwan, South Korea, and South Vietnam. The governments of the little states of the Caribbean and Central America have lived in the shadow of the United States much longer, and under far better conditions for the penetration of American example and influence. Yet those American governments have not become stable democracies. How then should United States influence and example accomplish more in east Asia, under conditions of latent or overt civil war? We may rather expect the doctrine of non-intervention to continue its service as our liberal figleaf, justifying intervention, with American government money and influence, to sustain these morally fragmented and dictatorial regimes. These are our associates against Communist China. In mainland east Asia (Malaya apart), there is no other kind.

American democracy is an inheritance, not a philosophy. Perhaps because the American democratic inheritance lacks concepts, it has little power of adaptation to other cultures. And many Americans have always doubted that democracy is something that can be learned by inferior peoples. Inferiority is not limited to Africans or Asians. In the late 1930's, I was in a position to observe some dealings of the government of the United States with Italy, and I could only conclude that most of the higher officers of the United States government who were concerned with those matters, at that time, thought that Mussolini's Fascism (as distinguished from German National Socialism) was not too bad—a good enough system of government for Italians. Vice President Johnson's recent plaudits to Diem's govern-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ment, for freedom and Churchillian leadership, are not freak events, nor are they personal aberrations. In democracy, as in other matters, the first thorough examination must be of the therapist, before attention is directed to the patient. Doctor, heal thyself!

If we had conviction and determination, we would still lack much in capacity and welcome. To my observation, U.S. government representatives, in the poorer countries, are almost never sufficiently saturated in the local cultural and social situation to be qualified to contribute importantly to the understanding and resolution of fundamental social, economic, or political problems. And, alas, in those rare cases where Americans do have this qualification, they are still almost never, in the poorer countries, admitted to the local trust and confidence needed for effectiveness. The American is not a countryman, nor a comrade; fortunate that rare one who is, for a time and in some limited context, regarded as a colleague.

We come to the painful question of food for China. I make a confession: it is a question I would prefer to evade. I am not satisfied, in my own mind, concerning the answer I give it. But the question cannot be evaded. President Kennedy confused the issue by saying that the Chinese had not asked for food from the United States. In so speaking, the President utilized the privilege of high office to make a statement that was formally correct but substantially misleading. The Chinese *had* availed themselves of intermediaries to explore whether the United States government would be inclined to supply them some food. The Chinese made no direct, official request, and—after some American hesitations—they were given no indirect encouragement.

Maimonides has told us that charity does not await the request and is best given where donor and recipient remain unknown to each other. So community and self-respect are preserved. And to what purpose would we supply food to the Chinese under conditions which denied a common humanity? Mao already thirteen years ago made a hero of Chu Tse-ching, a university professor, bitter against U.S. support for Chiang Kai-shek, who preferred to starve (in August 1948) rather than accept U.S. relief food. Something in this is history, something legend. But how far both history and legend are from the mentality of the United States Congress, which insists that every relief package be profusely labeled as the gift of the generous American people!

And yet I cannot separate myself as far as I might like from these Congressmen. The Chinese Communists are perfectly capable of using an indirect, unofficial supply of food as a further occasion for attack against the United States. "What vile creatures, these American imperialists! They are so avid for money they will sell even to their bitterest enemies. We *never, never* asked them for food. But they found some dirty money grubber through whom to sell it, for a profit!"

For this reason, though troubled in mind, I see some merit in the policy that the Chinese government be required to ask for supply assistance before American government food is made available to China. Once an official request is made, there need be no niggling concern over labeling. The truth will out. And quantities of the order of 10 million tons of grain could be available immediately. Only the United States has such quantities. And yet these are trifles in the perspective of a contribution to the alleviation of hunger and the gain, however remote and problematical, of some increment of good will, some marginal enhancement of the probability of peace.

The government of the United States should now, I suggest, publicly tender formal diplomatic recognition—without euphemisms and without conditions—to the Communist government of mainland China. Recognition should be limited to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the territory which Peking in fact governs. American and Chinese Communist representatives have been meeting occasionally for a decade, at Panmunjom, Warsaw, and Geneva. As recently as July 23, 1962, the United States again joined the no-government of China in signing a *Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos*. When we have swallowed so many camels, why strain at a gnat?

It would, however, be the utmost silliness to believe that American diplomatic recognition will provide an open road to accommodation, peace, and friendship. The Chinese will not first jump with joy and then promptly agree to exchange embassies and consulates, to provide visas for journalists, to welcome private travelers and merchants, etc., etc. The government of China has a great investment in *Hate America*. For thirteen years, this government has devoted its talents to building a wall of misinformation and hatred between the Chinese people and the United States. The Chinese government invests further in this wall, day by day. At best, therefore, the Chinese authorities, if they see a balance of other advantages, may allow a small crack in their precious wall. The crack would certainly consist of nothing more than agreement to exchange of embassies. Then it would be for the United States to devote patience and ingenuity to widening this crack, to the end that some Americans might gradually attain, with some elements of the Chinese people, what degree of understanding and fellowship is possible between societies in such different circumstances.

But, for Mao and his lieutenants, the Stalin who accepted Roosevelt's recognition in 1933 was a sissy (more classically, an opportunist). The greater likelihood is that the Chinese would reject the U.S. offer of diplomatic recognition. Wishing to hold whatever they have won with guns, the Communists demand also to be given what they have not won with guns —especially Taiwan.

In 1949 and 1950, fourteen non-Communist governments recognized Peking. The Chinese agreed promptly to establish diplomatic relations only with six. The other eight got a cold shoulder. The British government, having recognized Peking on January 5, 1950, found itself consigned to "doing ante-chamber," and, formally speaking, the British are doing ante-chamber in China to this day.* Their Foreign Office man in Peking is only a "Negotiating Representative": in Chinese eyes, he is still *negotiating* for the establishment of diplomatic relations!

In response to a United States public tender of diplomatic recognition, Mao might well accord the U.S. much less than he gave Great Britain—perhaps only a public curse. But even such an exchange would help set the international realities in a clearer light.

WHEN MAKING its public tender of diplomatic recognition, the United States should, I suggest, also indicate that we will no longer oppose the admission of China to the United Nations. An American spokesman has indeed said, with indignation, that China must not be permitted "to shoot its way into the United Nations." Pray, sir, why not? If a nation can shoot its way into existence, why not into the United Nations?

Responsible international political action requires that the United Nations be utilized for a number of highly important purposes: in all cases, communication, exchange of ideas, and exposure to the molding force of opinions; where the great powers can agree, contribution to the maintenance of peace; where great power rivalry does not preclude, assistance to the poorest countries. All these purposes would be aided by universality. The membership of the UN already includes every type of state; it would better include every state, without exception.

No illusions: admission of China to the

* On this, a good account is Evan Luard's *Britain and China* (1962).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

UN will not revitalize that association. The instrument of collective security and collective action that was envisaged in the Charter of the United Nations is now largely paralyzed. Paralysis grows out of the lack of unanimity of the great powers. And this absence of unanimity is not casual or coincidental. It does not reflect some secondary deficiency of skill or ingenuity. It is the consequence of the profound conflict of one great group of powers with another. The Communist group seeks, by varying means, to extend the Communist system, as opportunity affords, and it correspondingly clashes with the other great group of powers that seeks to support and strengthen non-Communist societies.

Presence in the United Nations of China, the second great Communist power, will add reality though not harmony. At the worst, two shoes, instead of one, will be banged on the same table.

VIII. American Initiatives and Chinese Responses

In our fashionable quasi-military language, present United States policy toward China is named Containment. If the aspect of coalition were given unwarranted prominence, this policy could also be named Balance of Power. Three other courses offer themselves as more fundamental. I give them names: the policy of Escalation; the policy of Camp David; the policy of Greater Asia.

Escalation is the bolder brother of Containment. (Both brothers have many admirers in Washington.) If we play for small stakes, all can play. If we fight with sticks, all can fight. But let us increase the wagers, raise the weapons toward the ultimate. Then the poor and weak must drop out. Perhaps they will even drop out without wagering if only we bluff hard—double the bet and threaten to redouble without limit. So, the Chinese may fight successfully by arming guerrillas to infiltrate South Vietnam. Very well, then *we* will arm insurgents to attack North Vietnam. But what if the Chinese prove more willing to lose infantrymen than we? Then we must escalate higher. Perhaps we will get our Kuomintang allies to shell the Chinese mainland from Quemoy. But what if the Chinese simply shell right back? Well, then we must escalate still higher. Let us get the Kuomintang air force from Taiwan to bomb Amoy—or Canton. When the mainland Chinese air force is engaged, it will encounter a superior air force from Taiwan. At last, escalation will have reached a level where *we* are superior. The Chinese will now have to back down. And we have won. (If, at this point, the mainland Chinese *do* get their big brother to use a nuclear weapon and destroy Taiwan, the game has been misplayed. The referees call a halt. A new Taiwan is produced, so that the game can be replayed without the over-escalation error.)

Camp David is an application of the Balance of Power: a cruder name would be The Russo-American Alliance. This need not be conceived as an alliance for all purposes. It might be limited to cooperation in restraining Chinese adventures. Both the U.S.A. and the USSR are much concerned to avoid nuclear warfare; the Chinese are relatively inclined to disparage the new dimension introduced into warfare by nuclear destructiveness. Both Americans and Russians are sharply aware of the danger that local wars may escalate into a general war; the Chinese first systematically minimize the likelihood of a general war and then add, "Well, if a general war must come, let it come. We are not afraid of it. Only capitalism will be destroyed." To celebrate the thirteenth anniversary of the foundation of the People's Republic of China, on October 1, 1962, Chou En-lai issued an advance statement of bitter recrimination against the USSR, for its coddling of Yugoslav revisionists and American imperialists. These are certainly grounds of Russo-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

American understanding and relative Chinese isolation.

But, alas, what Americans call adventures, the Russians do not necessarily regard as adventures—and vice versa. Camp David was followed by the U-2 incident. Who was then, in Russian eyes, the adventurer? And when the United States sent military supplies to the Royal Laotian government, the Russians—perhaps even ostentatiously—flew in military supplies to the Pathet Lao. The Russians continue to identify themselves vigorously with the world-wide extension of Communism, and this is not mere rhetoric, though the Russians do accept a slower pace and a lower level of risk than the Chinese.

Particularly in east Asia, there may be as many occasions when the Russians will side with the Chinese as with the Americans—and Russian hearts may even more frequently be with the Chinese. No responsible statesman will neglect the restraining influence of Russian power, where that influence is to be had. But, in a larger sense, I believe, Camp David is a mirage—at best, a temporary mutual indulgence of illusions. There is, I think, no basis in broad, continuing purpose for a Russo-American alliance.

A NEW MODEL Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere is a serious idea. In the past, the Chinese Communists were difficult also in relations with Japan. But now, after Americans and Russians have failed, the Japanese feel they may be able to work better with the Chinese. Race and culture are on their side, and the Chinese may now appreciate the need to be more equable. No one should underestimate the seriousness, for China, of the breach with the USSR. The Soviet Union has ceased assisting China's economic development. From 1960 to 1961, Soviet exports to China fell from about $800,000,000 to $360,000,000. Soviet supplies of machinery and equipment fell from about $500,000,000 to $100,000,000; this reduction was, for China, a catastrophe.

Japan could supply China much of what was previously received from the USSR. More problematic is China's ability to export enough to pay. Exports may take time to develop. But all that is best left to the commercial judgment of the parties.

What is most disturbing is the attitude of official Washington. Japanese who have spoken, in Washington, of possible revival of trade with China have been warned and threatened, both in the Executive branch and by senior members of the Congress. But surely neither the United States nor the world at large profits by isolating China from Japan. Nothing is gained by the United States playing dog-in-the-manger. And why should Americans be so cowardly, so lacking in faith in their own values, as to believe that moral and political influences will run only in one direction?

If a new model Greater East Asia is to be created, the Japanese must take on far more than an enlargement of their merchandising territory. They must resume the care of their own security and bear their share of responsibility for the peace of Asia. Only after some years of experience can it begin to be clear whether they are prepared to carry these obligations. But the years will not begin until the termination of the present unequal treaty providing for United States bases in Japan. That treaty, now scheduled to run until 1970, is a misfortune for both parties. I suggest, therefore, that the government of the United States now promptly initiate discussions for the termination of the treaty.

In this, I am by no means suggesting termination of the United States alliance with Japan—provided Japan also wants it. Let Japan and the United States remain allies. But let the Japanese control and operate any military bases in their country, just as the United States does in ours. This does not mean that Japanese bases need be quarantined against American access—if the Japanese want us there.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

It might be desirable, in execution of the U.S.-Japanese alliance, for a handful of American liaison personnel to be stationed at Japanese bases. And there might be special readiness arrangements for shared use of bases by U.S. elements in case of hostilities. There is no reason, between allies, why the bases should not accommodate visits from U.S. ships or U.S. planes. These bases might also be used—if the Japanese agree—for mutual supply, repair, and temporary sojourn. But each base should be entirely manned and operated by Japanese and under undivided Japanese authority. The reality of national differences and national sensitivities should be recognized.

Clearly, however, the Greater East Asia of the future, if there is to be one, cannot be an *east* Asia. It must go south to Pakistan and particularly to India. For this more serious purpose, the West must restrain its present *Schadenfreude* over the clashes between India and China—a malicious pleasure at injury which the Indians have perhaps earned, but which helps nobody. If frontier differences could be composed, there might, after some years, be created the foundations of a Greater Asia, as a concert of its own nations. Japan and China and India might be its great powers. That would be something quite different from the Co-Prosperity Sphere of imperial Japan, which was an Animal Farm of one equal and many less equals.

For a realistic chance on a true Greater Asia, the United States would be well-advised to pay a great deal. Surely this Greater Asia would emerge in life as something other than the poet's imagining. It might well be cemented by deals of which the United States did not approve. But even a very rough and imperfect concert of Asian powers would be better than the present. The United States plays unamiably and uncomfortably its role as the last Western imperial power in mainland Asia. (The British positions in Hong Kong and Malaya are not positions of power. And Russian Siberia is not regarded, by contemporary Asians, as intrusive.) It is unwise to look forward to a long future as solitary policeman in alien communities. In my judgment, though these states are not pillars of a House of Cards, it would not be wise for the United States to withdraw military support *today* from South Korea, or Taiwan, or South Vietnam. But Americans should surely work for a Greater Asia of a kind that might, one day, permit the farthest military outpost of the United States, in the Pacific, to stand quietly in the American state of Hawaii.

WE ARE required to endeavor, but we cannot be obligated to believe, lacking reason. I do not believe the Communist China of 1962 would respond cooperatively to American conciliatory initiatives. I do not think the government of China would meet the government of the United States half way or even a quarter of the way. Hate is too deeply anchored, as the only appropriate sentiment. War is too firmly clutched, as the only appropriate technique. "Political power," Mao has said, "grows out of the barrel of a gun." Mao makes no distinction of domestic and international political power, and he is not spoofing. For the present regime of Communist China, peace is a continuation of war by other means.

From direct American conciliatory approaches to China, which I favor, I see today little expectation of substantial political achievement. Perhaps hate would be somewhat tempered or confused if the United States were to offer to supply China food. But, even after such an offer, I doubt that there would be an affirmative response, from the government of China, to a U.S. tender of diplomatic recognition, without the surrender of Taiwan. The Chinese would probably accept admission to the United Nations—if it were accompanied by their acquisition of the position now held by the Kuomintang. But this admission would, no doubt,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

strengthen the conviction of the Chinese leadership that they had indeed shot their way into the organization: their strength and threats had eventually broken the way open—against the quaking hearts of paper tigers.

The indirect approach may possibly be more productive. "The stone the builders had rejected became the corner-stone." Perhaps the Japanese are qualified for this role. Were they permanently disabled by the experience that culminated in Hiroshima? Now we cannot know. But we do know that, in accommodation with China, America has failed, and Russia too has failed. The Japanese may fail also—or may be prevented from even trying. Then all major paths to conciliation are closed.

In December 1958, in the full enthusiasm of the Great Leap Forward (but when the second attack on Quemoy had already failed), Mao gave his manic summation of the international situation, which was then repeated over and over again by his lieutenants: "The enemy rots with each passing day, while for us things are daily getting better." What would happen on the happy day when things got still better had been made clear, in May, by General Liu Ya-lou, Commander of the Air Force and later a Vice Minister of Defense:

> American imperialism is nothing; its only advantage is to have more tons of steel. . . . [When] we can use atomic weapons and rockets made by the workers, engineers and scientists of our own country . . . another new turning point will probably be reached in the international situation. . . . The revolutionary movement in the world in general and Asia in particular will advance with more vigorous steps.

The correct time perspective must not escape us. In the summer of 1959, when the bubble of the Great Leap Forward had already burst, but the news of its bursting had not yet reached the West, C. P. Snow could write, "But for the task of totally industrializing a major country, as in China today, it only takes will to train enough scientists and engineers and technicians—will, and a few years time." With this statement, Snow earned a tall dunce's cap, in a corner beside Mao. China will not be "totally industrialized" even in many years more. Nor will China, in a few years, have great long-distance military striking power, across water. In warfare, it is improbable that China will be able to do in the 1960's what Japan could do in the 1940's. But China will, no doubt, soon be able to produce nuclear explosions. And, as the 20th century moves toward the 21st, long-range missiles will probably also come into the range of Chinese production. Then, if not by stupidity or mischance sooner, the United States will have with China a great nuclear war, unless far-reaching accommodations have been worked out sooner, with accompanying changes of spirit.

It is perhaps a noble illusion that an honorable peace will come if only we rectify *our* errors. But it is nevertheless an illusion, and one that can bring death. The continuance of peace between China and the United States, during the rest of the 20th century, depends on changes in China as well as in the United States. And we cannot be confident that those changes will occur.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

OSCAR HANDLIN

JEWISH RESISTANCE TO THE NAZIS

EVEN AFTER the extermination camps were liberated and the full extent of the Nazi murders began to emerge, the world at first refused to acknowledge that so many millions could have been systematically slaughtered. When the evidence became unassailable, men still refused to believe that other men, like themselves, had operated the gas chambers and crematory ovens at Buchenwald and Auschwitz, had scheduled the trains for Maidanek and Treblinka, had compiled the lists of deportees in Lodz and Budapest. By stripping the Nazis of humanity, the rest of mankind seemed to believe that it could absolve itself from guilt and free itself of the nagging question: would anyone have acted differently in the same situation?

Recently, however, the desire to escape responsibility for the catastrophe has taken a new turn: these incredible events, it is said, happened, in part at least, because of some deficiency in the people who suffered from them. The victims themselves were at fault and contributed to their own destruction.

A few years ago, Bruno Bettelheim, in *The Informed Heart,* applying this new assumption, charged that the family of Anne Frank had failed to estimate and face their situation realistically, thus in effect surrendering passively to disaster. Similarly, during the Eichmann trial, the suggestion that the Jews who lost their lives were somehow inadequate was frequently brought up by young Israelis. Why, it was repeatedly asked, did those people not resist? Could a relatively paltry number of executioners have led so many millions to slaughter if the victims had not gone meekly? And did not the failure to fight back reflect some inner weakness in the group? The usual answer given to these questions was that the Jews of Europe had been so conditioned by centuries of accommodation to the persecutor that they had lost the ability and the will to defend themselves against attack.

This idea has lately received full expression in Raul Hilberg's *The Destruction of the European Jews,* an excellent work in other respects. Hilberg, after a detailed examination of how the Nazis managed the enormous job of murdering six million people, concludes that collaboration by the victims was an important element in the success of the genocidal project. "The reaction pattern of the Jews [was] characterized by almost complete lack of resistance." Failing in the attempt to avert hostile action by petition or evasion, they relapsed into "automatic compliance with orders." Over "a period of centuries the Jews had learned that in order to survive they had to refrain from resistance." Having "unlearned the art of resistance, they repressed their knowledge

OSCAR HANDLIN is professor of history at Harvard and director there of the Center for the Study of the History of Liberty in America. He is author of the Pulitzer Prize-winning *The Uprooted;* and most recently co-author, with Mary Handlin, of *The Dimensions of Liberty* (1961).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of the true situation" and deceived themselves with the illusion that nothing would happen to them. Even at the edge of the grave, when it was no longer possible to sustain any illusions, their sole concern was "to make the ordeal bearable, to make death easy." The Jewish "victims—caught in the strait jacket of their history—plunged themselves physically and psychologically into catastrophe. The destruction of the Jews was thus no accident." Reviewing the book in the April 1962 issue of COMMENTARY, Professor H. R. Trevor-Roper accurately summarized and accepted Hilberg's conclusion. The Jews, wrote Professor Trevor-Roper, "went like sheep to the slaughter. . . . Obedient to their leaders and to their own habits of mind [they] collaborated in their own destruction."

Ironically, then, we have come full circle. The beasts of Buchenwald and Auschwitz were not alone to blame for the inhuman deeds they perpetrated; the incomplete men who were waiting to be victimized were also partly to blame. We arrive thus at the comforting notion that the catastrophe was a unique and exceptional product of the convergence of those destined by their nature to be executed with those naturally destined to be their executioners.

By defaming the dead and their culture, this interpretation completes the process of destruction begun by the Nazis, reducing two thousand years of experience to ashes and adding Jewish history itself to the list of the destroyed and the forgotten. Apart from its impiety, the Hilberg interpretation is dangerous because of the false assurance it offers that good fighters can never become victims, and that those who are not "beasts" can never become executioners. Yet if there is a lesson to be salvaged from the Nazi period, it is that all of us are potential victims and all of us potential executioners.

It is simply not true that the Jews did not resist; there are ample instances of their capacity for fighting back. Nor is it true that greater, or more persistent, or better organized efforts of resistance would have staved off the catastrophe. Some Jews fought back; others were unable to; still others did not wish to. But every bit of evidence we have shows that the degree of resistance made no difference whatever in the outcome; the extent of destruction was determined by altogether different causes. Nor, finally, is it true that those Jews who, in *some* places and at *some* times, actually did fail to resist were "sheep-like" in their passivity; to the edge of the burial pit they brought a certain view of life and of the world and a faith that deserves at least to be understood.

THE PICTURE OF the meek, abject Jew, cringing in his cowardice, comes largely from German sources. Nazi officials and soldiers were genuinely convinced of its accuracy; but they were deceived by a trick of perspective. The Jew who cowered in terror they could easily recognize as a Jew. But the Jew sniping in the forest, or tearing up a railroad track, or strangling a concentration camp guard was perceived by the Germans as a Communist or a Pole or a Frenchman.

There is nothing surprising in the variety of responses that the Nazis elicited from the Jews of Europe. These people, after all, were not so homogeneous as their former enemies or their present critics believed. Through the gates of the concentration camps passed Hasidim wearing kaftans, fiercely urbanized intellectuals, Zionists, Socialists, Communists, and petty traders and laborers from the hamlets and cities of Eastern Europe. They met, as strangers, the assimilated and converted, the half-Jews and *Mischlinge* from Central Europe, along with the thoroughgoing Westerners of France and the Levantines of Salonika. All were different, given a common identity only by the Nazi race laws which, however, were not enough to make them react in similar ways. Their responses, before deportation and after, ranged from helpless acquiescence to de-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

termined resistance, and conformed to the variety of their characters and situations.

The Jews of Western Europe, who after a century of emancipation, had on the whole become full-fledged participants in the culture around them, resisted the German invaders in the same manner and at least to the same degree as their non-Jewish fellow countrymen. Yet that fact offers no clue to their fate under the Nazis. There is an instructive contrast, for example, in the cases of Norway and Denmark. Both countries had very small Jewish populations; in both, the surrounding population was sympathetic; and in both, Jews participated in the resistance. Yet about half the Jews of Norway were deported and destroyed, while all those in Denmark were saved.

OR AGAIN, one may compare the experience of the Jews of Holland and of Belgium. In the Netherlands a well-settled, thoroughly integrated Jewish community approached the crisis with the wholehearted support of the population, of the most influential sectors of local society, and of the royal government. As the resistance developed, Jews took a part in it, although they were not identified as Jews any more than they had been before. On the theory that resistance mattered, the Dutch Jews should, therefore, have fared well; indeed in the myth-making process of recent years, the statement is occasionally made that they survived as they deserved to. The truth is that they suffered as much as any European Jews; resistance helped them not in the least. Fully 115,000 were loaded into those grim cars that came back empty from the East; fewer than 20,000 survived. On the other hand, Belgian losses were much less severe—25,000 of a total of 90,000. Yet the Jewish communities in Belgium were much less established, contained a large component of recent refugees, and had fewer connections with their surrounding society. Furthermore, the Belgian resistance was much less active than the Dutch.

Finally, there are the cases of France and Italy. During the four years of German occupation, about one-fourth of the Jews resident in France were deported and executed. But if we look at the timetable of this operation, we can see that it had very little relation to the factor of resistance. The German deportation program in France did not get under way until the summer of 1942; and it was not until the following winter that the toll began to mount. That it did so was certainly not due to a decline in resistance; quite the contrary, this was precisely the time when the underground gained strength. In Italy, we find a similar situation. Active anti-Jewish measures became effective there in the fall of 1943; and 1944 was the year of heaviest losses. The deportations were a product of the years when the Fascist regime had fallen, when the Germans occupied the country, and when the resistance was gaining steadily in strength. In both the French and the Italian partisan movements, Jews were prominently active; their participation in the *maquis* was proportionately far greater than that of the general population. José Aboulker in Algiers, André Manuel in London, and Jacques Bingen, de Gaulle's representative in the Occupied Zone, were among the best-known Jewish leaders. And in Paris, Lyons, Toulouse, and Nice active networks of Jews were engaged in sabotage and espionage.

I do not mean to suggest that the mounting tide of resistance provoked the Nazis to retaliation. But the facts do indicate that the Jews were not destroyed because they failed to resist. Indeed, everywhere in Western Europe the explanation of passivity crumbles as we examine the evidence. The attitude of the Jews had no effect on the extent of the catastrophe. Rather, it was *the intensity and character of the German occupation that determined how many would be sent to their doom.* The difference between Denmark and Belgium on the one hand, and Norway and Holland on the other, was

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that the former were ruled indirectly through uncooperative intermediary governments while the latter were directly administered by the Nazis. In France and Italy the decisive dates were those at which the Nazis decided to dispense with the sensibilities and the inefficiencies of the Pétain and Mussolini regimes and put their own officials in charge. Dr. Hilberg states the matter clearly: "In general, the extent of Jewish vulnerability in a western territory varied with the degree of German control that was exercised therein."

The holocaust, then, was a product not of the Jewish response or of the Jewish situation, but rather of the powerful engine of destruction the Germans controlled—a bureaucracy of uniquely remorseless and irresistible efficiency. The historical developments that gave the German bureaucracy this unique character were skillfully traced by Hans Rosenberg a few years ago in *Bureaucracy, Aristocracy and Autocracy*. Dr. Hilberg's volume exposes in meticulous detail its elaborate structure; and the Eichmann trial revealed the workings of a mind trained to be a cog in it. What was created in the German bureaucracy was a powerful mechanism for carrying out orders from above—any orders. Its closely articulated chain of command; the habits of unreflective, unquestioning obedience; the respect for authority; the insistence upon the single-minded, unswerving, and polished expertise in the accomplishment of the prescribed task—all these qualities, distilled over generations, produced the apparatus that destroyed the Jews.

Conceivably that apparatus could have been used for good as easily as for evil. It would obey any commander—unquestioningly, unhesitatingly, and with utter efficiency. But it was its destiny to fall under the control of people who were literally mad; and it responded blindly to their instructions. By 1939, totalitarian *Gleichschaltung* had removed any possibility that brakes could be applied at home. Nor, once the war began, could public outrage abroad influence the course of things in Germany. Hitler could do what he wished, absolutely. And he was determined, for reasons which were totally irrational, expensive, and contrary to the interests of the state, to liquidate the Jews. At his command, the bureaucratic engine was set into motion, and thereafter it moved automatically toward its prescribed goal.

It is difficult for anyone who values rationality and order to credit the utter subjection of men and of all humane standards to the imperatives of the machine. One tends to echo Elie Wiesel's eloquent plea: "Someone should have stopped it. There must have been something they could have done!"* Yet in the end, it was only another apparatus of power, more imposing still, that brought the Nazi juggernaut to a halt and then destroyed it. And much of the experience of those years will have been in vain, if men ever again discount the dangers of a mindless bureaucracy armed with the instruments of modern power.

II

THE CONCLUSION that has emerged from our analysis of the fate of the Western Jews is confirmed in an examination of the far more complex situation of Eastern Europe. There, too, the extent of the destruction was determined by the efficiency of the German bureaucracy rather than the passivity of the Jews. By 1939, this homeland of Yiddish culture, from the Baltic to the Black Sea, was torn by the effects of a half-century of violent political, social, and economic change. The fact that the millions of Jews in the region differed markedly among themselves complicated their encounter with Nazism. Yet the essential element in their relation with power was the same as in the West; where the German bureaucracy moved in to exterminate them, it succeeded in doing so, and whenever the or-

* In "Eichmann's Victims & the Unheard Testimony," COMMENTARY, December 1961.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ganizing of deportations was left in the hands of the local authorities—even where these authorities were highly anti-Semitic —the number of Jews murdered remained relatively low.

In Rumania and in Hungary, ancient local traditions of anti-Semitism and powerful fascist movements seemed an immediate threat to the Jews, who were, moreover, decisively isolated from the rest of the population. The million and a half Jews in those territories had little reason to expect aid from governments in which the Iron Guard and Arrow Cross were influential, or from peasant communities hostile for centuries. And the Jews did suffer much from native persecution and discrimination, from frequent acts of violence, and deprivation of their civic rights. Yet both countries, for a considerable period, retained their independence and their freedom of action, and neither would accede to the German demand for a final solution. During that interval the Jews were spared. Indeed, Rumanian procrastination until the summer of 1944, when the advance of the Russians persuaded King Michael to desert his German allies, saved the lives of many thousands. The Hungarian Jews were less fortunate. They too survived until 1944, while the government proved unresponsive to Nazi suggestions for quick action. But in March of that year the German occupation of Hungary, brought about by a deteriorating military situation, sealed the doom of the Hungarian Jews.

In neither Rumania nor Hungary was there an effective resistance, either Jewish or non-Jewish. But that was an altogether subsidiary element in determining the fate of the Jews, which was primarily a factor of the extent of German control. Significantly also, in Croatia, where Jews were active in the resistance, they were unable to slow the pace of deportations once the Nazis overcame the scruples of their Italian partners.

In Russia, the situation was totally different. Held back west of Leningrad and Moscow, the German armies pushed southeastward across White Russia and the Ukraine to Rostov, through regions that had once been great centers of Jewish settlement. With these armies came the mobile killing units that indiscriminately murdered some half-million people in less than six months.

The Jews of this area had been weakened by two decades of emigration before the German invasion. Since the Revolution, the great opportunities lay in the cities, particularly in Leningrad and Moscow. The most progressive elements had left the *shtetl*—the young, the modern, the party members, the ambitious, and activist. The old villages which had lost much of their economic function were left primarily to the helpless, the old, the lethargic, the Orthodox, and those hostile to Communism.

THESE JEWS were blinded by a tragic confusion. Disposed to regard the Communists as their enemies, for decades they had been accustomed to thinking of the Germans as their friends, as in the First World War. Most important of all, they were completely misinformed about the situation in the West. News from abroad was always slow to reach them, and after the Pact of 1939, the Soviet authorities, anxious to remain in Hitler's good graces, deliberately deceived them as to the nature of Nazism. It is easy to imagine the sardonic amusement with which German dignitaries found themselves welcomed by the Jews of White Russia and the Ukraine as liberators. "The Jews are remarkably ill-informed about our attitude toward them," wrote an officer from White Russia. "They do not know how Jews are treated in Germany, or for that matter in Warsaw, which after all is not so far away."

However, in estimating the degree of Russian Jewish resistance, one must allow for that trick in perspective to which we referred earlier. The Jews who served in the Red Army and who fought side by

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

side with non-Jews in Communist party cadres and partisan units were not visible as Jews. Only those trapped helplessly in their *shtetlach* and unable to strike back were identifiable. But a more careful analysis, such as Moshe Kaganovich made shortly after the war, shows the prominent role of Russian Jews in the struggle against the Nazi invaders.*

Poland supplied the most complex context for the Jewish tragedy. That extraordinarily vital society embraced a great variety of Jewish types. As in Russia, the young and the mobile were drawn to the cities where we see them in many guises: "enlightened" middle-class people with eyes turned to the West and frequently attracted by Polish nationalism; secular-minded intellectuals; laborers largely under the influence of the Socialist Bund; members of the numerous branches of the Zionist movement; and some Communists. Deep in the villages there survived large numbers of the most traditional and most Orthodox Jews, often still attached to a Hasidic court, always resistant to every element of change. The rural areas were therefore deprived in large part of any leadership potential, and were poorly prepared to respond to attack.

The serious business of extermination began late in 1941 and moved into high gear the next year. But by then two insidious developments had fatally weakened the Polish Jewish communities. In 1940, the Germans began systematically to crowd the Jews into a limited number of small ghettos. The residents of these densely packed slums not only were clearly marked out for any subsequent attack, but also were steadily weakened by harsh living conditions, shortages of food, disease, and a high rate of mortality. Perhaps the miserable men and women herded out of their villages into these ghettos should have revolted at once. There were, after all, some three million of them and only a million German troops in Poland. True, the Germans were well armed and the *Sitzkrieg* in the West and the pact with Stalin in the East gave them the leisure to deal with dissidents. No doubt, the martyrdom the Jews were ultimately to earn would, by some standards, have seemed more gracious if it had been administered by machine guns rather than by Zyklon-B. But rebellion at that point would have called for foreknowledge of Nazi intentions, and in 1940 even Hitler had not decided what the final solution would be. Down to the summer of 1941 there was still, for example, serious consideration of the plan to deport all the Jews of Europe to Madagascar. The choice at that moment was, therefore, not between the bayonet and the gas chamber, but between the uncertainties of incarceration and the certain death of disobedience. Most Jews chose the former, and entered the ghettos where they would remain tragically vulnerable to future assaults.

At the same time the Jewish capacity for resistance was further sapped by events in the areas of Poland occupied by the Soviet forces. The Russian invaders were eager to remain on good terms with the Nazis and had their own designs on the provinces they held. To eliminate any communal organization that might compete with the Communist party, they arrested Jewish socialist leaders like Henryk Ehrlich and Wiktor Alter and deported thousands of potential troublemakers to Central Asia. As a result, when the Germans arrived in 1941, the Jewish communities were even less prepared to defend themselves than they had been two years earlier.

NEVERTHELESS, the Germans did meet with resistance—as everyone knows from the celebrated desperate outbreak in the Warsaw Ghetto. But this uprising was far from the complete reversal of Jewish attitudes Professor Trevor-Roper believes it to be. Other uprisings took place in Vilna, Bialystok, and Cracow. Furthermore, a considerable number of Jews

* In *Der Idisher Ontail in der Partisaner-Bavegung fun Sovet-Russland* (1948).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

escaped from the ghettos to operate as partisans in the forests and swamps of the East. Dr. Yechiel Atlas, Hirsch Kaplinsky, and the Belsky brothers led units made up wholly of Jews. Others merged with bands of Poles and Russians to fight against the common enemy. In one form or another these efforts continued until the end of the war.*

I have no wish to exaggerate. Most Jews were hopelessly unprepared for combat. Some thought only of personal advantage, or they temporized, or evaded the issue, or deluded themselves. The Jewish communities were not well organized and often dissipated their strength in factional struggles. All too frequently the non-Jewish population was hostile or apathetic. Nevertheless, the evidence shows that some Jews did resist. How many? As many as among other peoples who were subjected to direct Nazi occupation. And what difference did it make? None whatever. No more than in Hungary in 1956, when civilians threw themselves against tanks, planes, and cannon.

The answers remain the same when we shift our attention from the individual national situation to the concentration camps where Jews from many nations were mingled. Manifestly, the earlocked Galician scholar, the Amsterdam lawyer, the tough from the streets of Warsaw, the tailor from Paris, the Red Army officer, the member of *Hashomer Hatzair,* and the Oslo shopkeeper—all retained beneath the common identity that the Nazis had forced upon them crusts of habit and attitude left from their earlier lives. As individuals, they were cowardly, brave, generous, selfish, loyal, treacherous. But there was nothing in their character that led Jews to accept their fate with greater docility than other people. We know now that some Jews in the camps revolted. There were uprisings and escapes from Treblinka, Konin, Sobibor, Trabnik, and even Auschwitz. There were not enough to make a difference; and it is doubtful that anything these starved and tortured people might have done with their stolen razors, knives, and small arms could have made a difference. But the point remains, the Jews were no more tractable than any other groups of people.

IN THIS CONNECTION, a word must be said also about the *Judenräte,* the organized leadership of the Jewish communities that worked with the German authorities. I make no pretense to resolving the problems of conscience involved in their collaboration. The Rumkowskis and the Kastners assumed a heavy responsibility in sharing Nazi power; they alone knew in their secret hearts to what extent they were moved by genuine concern for the people they led, to what extent by ambition, greed, or selfishness. But it takes dogmatic assurance to assert that the Jews would have been better off with no leadership and no organization; and this was the only leadership and the only organization the Germans would permit.

At any rate, collaboration—of which Hilberg and Trevor-Roper make so much—was not a Jewish but a general European phenomenon. Every village official from Norway to Sicily, from Holland to Greece, was confronted with a similar moral decision. Wisely or foolishly, bravely or cravenly, they had to choose between order and no order, and the only order to be chosen was Nazi order. The charge that Jewish tradition specifically directed collaboration is untrue; one could as readily find injunctions in the Talmud against the surrender of a single soul to the enemy. The pattern of behavior of the *Judenräte* was not uniquely or characteristically Jewish; it followed from the same response to the terms of German occupation that was made everywhere else.

But what of that awesome moment at the edge of the grave when all hope is lost and man is seconds away from extinction? Why, we are asked, did not the Jews, who now had nothing whatever to lose, turn

* See Meyer Barkai (ed.), *The Fighting Ghettos* (Lippincott, 1962), a recent account.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

upon their murderers and carry at least some into the grave with them?

The Japanese suicide; the Indian who will not flinch under torture; the chivalric gallantry of the desperate fighter in a lost cause; the disdain of the aristocrat who lays his head on the block; even the jaunty walk of the gangster on the way to the electric chair—all these are recognized styles of the dignified death in circumstances which leave no doubt that the moment of death is at hand. In all, there is an element of defiance: *though you kill me, I am not destroyed.*

Now there were Jews who went to their death in the camps and the ghettos in some such style of dignity: by suicide, unflinching under torture, gallantly resisting, walking into the gas chambers jauntily or with disdain. Others died with no dignity at all, in flight or in fear. But many Jews also went to their death with dignity of a special style, not so easy to recognize. Hermann Friedrich Graebe, a Nazi eyewitness, writes in blank incomprehension:

> The father was holding the hand of a boy about ten years old and was speaking to him softly; the boy was fighting his tears. The father pointed to the sky, stroked his head and seemed to explain something to him.

Is it so hard to imagine what the man was saying there, at the brink of the pit just before the shots rang out?

I do not wish here to defend the world of Orthodox East European Jewry; in its own terms, it needs no defense. But it would be tragic if destruction of this world were to lead also to a misunderstanding of its nature.

The father did not leap like a beast at the beasts who were about to shoot him down. In his world, there were at that moment better things to do. It was not timidity or stupidity or passivity that dominated the mood of those at the edge of the grave, but religious faith. They believed deeply that their Father and King had created an orderly universe, by His own will and for a purpose known only to Him. It was by His design that the events of human history unfolded. In His wisdom, he brought suffering to the earth as well as joy, pain as well as pleasure. Since the most ancient days, their God in His wrath had also visited trials without end upon those He loved best. And now again they were being cruelly scourged. In this final extremity, when life itself was all but lost, they could still cling to their redeeming faith, not by lowering themselves to the level of their persecutors, but rather by lifting up their eyes to the Lord and giving witness to the excellence of His creation.

WHAT OTHER posture could then have been more dignified? That it should be utterly incomprehensible to a later generation is the ultimate irony of the martyrdom of East European Jewry.

The old tradition of *Kiddush ha-Shem,* of Sanctification of the Name, was an expression neither of cowardice nor of passivity. Nor—so long as hope remained—did the tradition enjoin quietism. Life was a great good, worth fighting for, but the tradition recognized that there were moments in history when the individual was helpless. And it refused to concede that such moments could be taken as evidence of purposelessness or irrationality in the universe. It insisted rather upon establishing by the faith of martyrdom the glory of the divine scheme that events seemed to deny. This is not an experience that men of the 1960's seem willing, anywhere, to emulate. But it is still worth understanding.

Neither fighting nor praying could avail to save the individuals the Nazis captured and murdered. The Nazi state could be destroyed only by a still greater and still stronger accumulation of power. There must be something in this experience from which a world still dominated by power can learn. But nothing is learned from blaming the catastrophe on its victims.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

DAVID T. BAZELON

THE POLITICS OF THE PAPER ECONOMY

FROM THE early English colonial corporations through the period of railroad building and the growth of Standard Oil *et al.* to the present era of immense corporate enterprise, business activity has always tended to be a form of government. *Business is the politics of production.* But business is a fairly irresponsible form of government since ostensibly it is bound only by its own self-interest. Also, it is unfortunately authoritarian: we have *two* governments in the United States, only one of which is clearly subject to political action of the electorate.

Given our commitment to technology, this second non-democratic government is necessary. And it is not such a bad government, in the sense that it still works pretty well, and without undue reliance on police power. But from the point of view of the development of a viable democratic culture, it is a disaster. The second government governs mostly by denying its own existence—which requires immense ideological distortion—and by additional domination and perversion of the entire national culture, which it finances. It directly attacks and covertly undermines its weak sister, the official government, on a continuing basis. If the traditional state exists by virtue of a domestic monopoly of armed force, then our second form of government exists through the exercise of a monopoly of effective fabrication.

To the extent that we have achieved a rational organization of our economy, private government has been permitted to control most of the process. Organization is the heart of the problem of building the modern world and making it habitable. When science is applied in the world, as technology, it requires drastically new forms of social organization. The effective technology then leads to more people living longer—what the newspapers call the "population explosion"—which again requires a heightening of organization. The organization is more important than the paper representing it legally; the term for understanding an organization is hierarchical power, not ownership; exit the sway of property, insofar as property remains private.

The essence of organization is the new power it creates—power to accomplish the task which led to its establishment, and power over the individuals who make up the organization. But organizational power is not simple and does not rely much on direct physical force. Where, then, does the power of organizations come from? It is, simply and magically, made up of *shared weakness.* In organized life, no single individual is permitted to do anything or control anything which by itself would keep him alive. The power thus abdicated individually is agglomerated into

DAVID T. BAZELON here completes his three-part series on our Paper Economy; parts I and II appeared in September and October respectively. The three articles together will form the core of Mr. Bazelon's new book, which Random House will publish early next year under the title *The Paper Economy.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a centralized fund—the organization. But then the problem becomes to avoid making the individual so weak that he can no longer manage to accomplish his iota of organizational work; indeed, there is even a danger that he might cease being a viable individual altogether. To forestall this is the function of morale or ideology: having been destroyed as a physical unit capable of self-accomplished survival, the individual is resuscitated by the firm assurance that in return for surrendering his power to it, the Organization will assume the obligation to keep him alive.

Anti-Planning

Organizations exist by virtue of planning. Planning is the essence of technology, if indeed there is any real difference between the two. It is simply effective thought and appropriate implementation on a grand scale (effective armies have always done it).

But "planning" is a dirty word in the United States of America. A "planned economy" is a standard term of abuse in our newspapers and other cultural institutions. The term is used not to refer to General Motors, the Department of Defense, the AEC, the NASA, or even the FRB or any of our major planning agencies. It is used to refer to: (1) any change in our system; (2) any recognition of what our system is; and (3) foreigners. Why this nastiness?

Planning is thinking: proposing one plan or another, differing as to objectives and techniques—all this will be recognized as part of thinking by anyone who has ever indulged. The anti-planners are anti-thinkers, or vice versa, because and to the extent that planning involves central, official, legal authority. For them, planning by non-federal financial, industrial, and even governmental units is either all right or is called by some other name, depending on the mood. But each time the slightest increase in federal planning activity takes place, it is seen as the beginning of the end. Mere mention of existing federal planning powers—especially in a conversational tone—is nerve-racking, in bad taste, and may ruin the whole day.

What the anti-planners really want is not that there should be no planning, but that planning should be carried out by and largely for the benefit of "private" financial and industrial institutions, not by the federal government or for the benefit of the general citizenry. But their problem is that separate institutional plans, in order to work effectively, need to be integrated on a national level. They have no solution to this problem beyond military spending. I imagine they are bothered by this very dangerous deficiency in the system they run, but they are not willing to reveal their concern in public.

In short, it is not a question, in the modern world, of planning or not planning. It is only a question of who does it, how well and how soon and for whom.

What is technology? It is just brains. We have reached a point in history where the noodle has finally come into its own: it now counts for more than force—indeed, effective force is now entirely dependent upon it.

The more recent wonders of technology are discussed currently under the heading of "automation." This word today summons up visions of the push-button factory and consequent unemployment. In fact, if the term is even assumed to stand for no more than a part of the promise-and-threat of modern know-how and can-do, it portends a great deal more than that. Because unless the managers can figure out how to move the huge quantities of goods that automation will create, it will turn out to be as great a threat to them—and their system—as to the production workers. *Automation is a non-stoppable process from raw material to consumer*—it will not spend itself until society is nicely organized into one well-meshed, producing-consuming unit. Automation is *not* a new way of making money—quite the contrary, it is the *best* way of making

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

goods. And it also carries forward irresistibly the managerial revolution and its instrument, the New Class, for, as Peter Drucker says, it "requires trained and educated people in unprecedented numbers."

Automation, the new technology, strikes at the most vulnerable aspect of the Paper Economy—the preference for paper over things. And it also reveals another great structural weakness, the lack of organization among firms and sectors of industry on any but a primitive buy-sell basis, which makes price more important than product, and inventory the greatest danger to business-like behavior.

(A word about Russia: *Automation is the Soviet Union's secret weapon.* Whatever may be wrong with that society, it does not have our problem of being unable to accept technology and its imperatives. The USSR is willing both to produce goods to its capacity and to train its people to carry out this production. That is power—the primary power of the modern age. The Communist party is not in business to make money.)

Our Depressing Capacity

If the automated future looks black under the aspect of the horrible blessings of technology, our currently under-used capacity is in itself quite gray enough to depress any reasonable citizen. Just how much underproduction we typically experience is arguable: during the 1960 campaign, the Democratic Advisory Council and Leon Keyserling pointed to a short-fall during 1952–59 of $175–200 billion of production, and the Republicans countered with statistical juggling and undignified arguments about "growthmanship." But note the following points, which do not rely on freshly persuasive statistics: (1) the immense promise of unleashed technology is not in dispute; (2) we know what we did during World War II; (3) the meaning of our frequent recessions is only too obvious; and (4) the discrete instances of unemployment of men and machines are too numerous and too definite to be ignored or taken as exceptions.

The most obvious and widely discussed example is steel. Operations at 75 per cent are considered "normal," and the steel industry would have been pleased most of the last few years to rise to this low level. The steel executives fight with great determination to "raise productivity"—they literally lust after all technical innovations. But to what avail? *They replace existing facilities which have never been used to full capacity with new and better installations which also will never be used fully to make steel.* What really motivates the steel executives is for *their* company—with which their lives are identified—to possess the best up-to-date factories and to be a well-run organization. *They are not motivated to produce steel:* that is inventory, and it can ruin you.

What is true of steel is true of many other industries. Also, steel is too "pure" an example—because you don't reach the question of the *purpose* of the product. The steel that could be and is not produced could be and is not used by a lot of people, without getting into the what-for. A good "un-pure" example would be the automotive industry, which produces more cars than we need, and makes them to last not so long as we need them. For me, the following is a truly breath-taking statistic: in 1960 the American people *junked* 4,340,873 automobiles.

GM could make a great deal of almost anything we decided we needed or wanted —it has the *capacity,* roundly considered: it could, for example, make enough decent buses to carry our migrant farm workers to and from their various enslavements—*and* enough trucks to deliver our farm surplus to their dinner tables. It did, in fact, make half of the machine guns we used in the War.

The wonders of war—what Veblen called "this diligent pursuit of disaster." World War II was our most important national experience—indeed, I would

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nominate it for the title of "most creative mass act in the history of the human race." That was when industrial technology came into its own: immense purposive production, organized on a mass scale—and superbly accomplished, from the initial meeting of man and machine with matter to delivery of the product to the ultimate consumer. And no paper stood in the way, at any stage of the process, including the free delivery. Magnificent. And utterly mad.

Why is war so wonderful? Because it creates artificial demand (artificial within the terms of the Paper Economy), the only kind of artificial demand, moreover, that does not raise any political issues: *war, and only war, solves the problem of inventory.*

In the past, it was expected that the resources devoted to war would be recouped by plunder in the event of victory. It was a speculative business venture, financed by daring entrepreneurs, with the price of the goods to be collected after effective delivery. Modern war is no such rational thing. *The goods are given away.* Payment for them would ruin the recipient: *vide,* German reparations after World War I.

From 1940 through 1944, physical output increased 57 per cent. At the end of 1944, the navy had 46,000 ships, not counting little ones—32 times its 1939 size. In three wartime years, we produced 44 million tons of merchant shipping. From the middle of 1940 through 1943, $62 billion worth of war facilities were built. And 96,359 planes in 1944—16,048 of them heavy bombers. While all this was going on, production of consumer goods also increased—from $122 billion to $145 billion in the period 1940 to 1945. And there you have the amazing story, the most revealing one that can be told about this nation of ours, and its nutty economy.

We most urgently require two things—a higher order of organization, and a better running criticism of it. The first will inevitably come about because of the imperatives of technology, and it is desirable, given the benefits it will bring; but it will come about exclusively under military jurisdiction if the issue is not made active within the arena of domestic politics.

A New Criticism

As to our other great need, criticism, the grand principle is this: wherever there is power over people, the people under it are entitled to have a political relation to it. Everyone is concerned about the fate of the individual, his liberty and freedom, in a society of big organizations. The danger comes from power overwhelmingly larger and greater than the individual's potential force of assertion. The whole justification for the historical institution of private property, as idealized by Jefferson *et al.*, was to ensure the individual's liberty vis-à-vis the state, because at that time it was thought that only the state—and perhaps the church—were great threatening powers. This suggests our most pressing intellectual need, namely, to identify *existing* power centers. It might be convenient if the individual were always threatened by the same enemy, but such is clearly not the case.

We must therefore train ourselves to identify the existing power centers throughout American society, and then periodically to review the exercise of these powers by the stewards thereof. You cannot prescribe for, you cannot even discuss freedom meaningfully, unless you first identify and analyze the locus of power. And how much is necessary. And how much of it can be made responsible—that is, responsive to something other than itself. *There is nothing to be free from* except arbitrary exercise of power by unwarranted power-concentrations.

We have no assurance that knowing the truth about the powers that dominate us will make us free, but it can certainly make us more noble in our degradation. And it may do much more than that. It may finally disgust us with the garish ir-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

responsibility of our institutional elites—and lead us back to politics.

The beauty of the Simple Truth in these circumstances is that the individual *does* have the power to do something about it—namely, he can find out what it is and state it in a clear, loud voice. Jefferson told us to be vigilant, but there is no point in being vigilant about the 19th century. He suggested vigilance because there was in his time no automatic mechanism to ensure liberty. There still is none. Our modern vigilance can well begin with simple awareness of where the power is and what its nature is. The idea that power exists only in the state and is always bad there, and that either it does not exist in non-state institutions or is always good there (or both, since our business leaders are nothing if not intellectually greedy), is a calculated deceit, turns our vigilance into hysteria, and misdirects most of our political effort.

Liberty, Etc.

Liberty is something people want or else they don't get it. And liberty is *not* the absence of power—either in oneself or in others. Liberty is a special kind of control over power. That is all liberty or freedom ever could have been—*a kind of power over power.*

This issue of freedom—or "the problem of the individual" in a mass organized society—is not dealt with adequately by reliance on that noble 18th-century opposition to central public government. The consequence of unduly limiting the role of government in a society like ours is that more and more of its functions get to be exercised by private centers of power, or inherited by the military. Big government, in fact, is required to make the corporate system work; and beyond that, to keep it decent. In this whole ancient anti-state attitude there is today hidden, but only half-hidden, a contempt for and disbelief in the forms of political democracy. Under this view, power in a government controlled by voters is more to be deplored than power in a corporate system which is not so controlled.

The problem of the individual should not be confused with the problem of the corporate system, because we have already made our commitment to the latter: the very *size* of the population is based on the technology the corporations administer. What is so puzzling about our situation is that, having made this great sacrifice, we do not insist on getting anything like the full benefit out of it. That benefit—meaning material security, an acceptable standard of living, and sufficient leisure—would in itself go a long way toward solving "the problem of the individual."

The first step is to ensure that big industry produce all the goods it is capable of producing and that these be distributed to people who can use them—both here and abroad. This cannot be done without a more rational organization of the entire industrial setup, especially in its relation to governmental authority. Here, the more severe problem is our attitude toward the paper. It is our money/paper religion that is sapping our strength: we will have to put ourselves into the hands of the heretics, who will lead us out of the paper wilderness. This is not as painful as it sounds, once it is realized that we have it in our power to re-enter the Garden of Eden—if our full productive capacity were unleashed, there really would be enough to go around for everybody.

In America, don't look for things to be called by their right names. Our conventional distinction between "private" and "public"—whether of property, power, or politics—is intellectually nothing but high comedy. In a society ruled under the proposition that money is more real than the things it buys, it would be expecting too much for the important powers, interests, and circumstances to travel the streets undisguised. But there is a serious danger in all this gay fabrication. Politics, for example: after a while, you don't just fail to tell the truth (that's an ordinary

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

part of the game): you lose the capacity to recognize it (and that is an essential cultural failure).

Traditional Mindlessness

The worst part of this is the ideology of our advertising culture, paid for by business and inextricably wedded to the paper-happy giants. In a secular society, and especially this early existentialist version, ideology is necessary to rulership—as necessary as guns. Now, while it is quite true that the worst thing that has happened in this excessively secular century of ours has been the use of guns to enforce rigid ideology, the uses of ideology (and the means of enforcing it) are not to be understood solely by reference to this circumstance. In America, for example, our consumer-oriented groupism and accompanying ideological conformity go a considerable distance toward achieving effects similar to state-enforced ideology in Russia. What we have here seems to be something that might be called "voluntary totalitarianism." (Freedom that people do not care to utilize is not really freedom: it is imperfect organization: certainly someone will come along and view it that way.) We are becoming so deeply ideologized that the issue of the necessity of guns has not had to be met.

Scholars have investigated and noted the gnarled historical roots of specific totalitarianisms. Well enough. But it can be argued that generic totalitarianism originates not in the past but in the future, in the technological future. What science has done—and clearly before we were ready for it—has been to transform traditional social existence into a permanent administered social revolution. The dynamic of this process is so imperative that guns are not a necessity, merely a convenience.

There is not much to say for big business from a cultural point of view. But one's feeling about this, and also the animus generated by contemplating all the lost opportunities, should not lead one astray. Private government has created our productive society, with public government as a decidedly junior partner. If the corporate and financial powers had been legitimate, if we had known what they were doing to the traditional property system, we might very well not have allowed them to do it so effectively.

In any event, that is all in the past, and we have now gone about as far as we can with our frightening heritage of mindlessness. What happened was something like this: While the intellectuals and other ideologists on all sides were word-locked in the capitalist-socialist debate, the non-owning and non-theorizing managers were effecting the revolution which created our present system. This group was able to come to power and accomplish its task because the social mind was off somewhere else and didn't notice them for what they were. Unfortunately, the managers thus came to be terribly dependent on this convenient mindlessness, which is why they try so hard to perpetuate it. But the system they created can no longer be run: (a) by themselves, without sharing power; and (b) mindlessly. There must be ideology: and it will be an increasingly awful one if our business rulers persist in their devotion to the early mindlessness to which, it is true, they owe a great deal.

The current collapse of traditional economic, legal, and political theory affords us the greatest possible opportunity to abandon our historic mindlessness. The fact that the concept of private property no longer explains anything of importance allows us without embarrassment to contemplate creatively the legal disorder encompassing the current disposition of material things; the unabashed failure of the image of free competitive markets returns to us one of the great issues of history in a pristine form—the grand *quid pro quo* of human exchange and relation; and the rediscovery of the existence and importance of private governments gives us a hungered-for chance to spell out a reasonably descriptive political theory.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

I have used the term "politics" very broadly (out of necessity it must be redefined for the modern organized world) to refer to the relations among people in groups wherever there is an issue of power. Under this definition, activity can be political and politically significant even (especially?) when there are unwilling and unaware parties to it. *To the extent that organized administration replaces received tradition in determining behavior, the term "political" replaces the term "social" or becomes equal to it.* (More and more frequently in our world, tradition does not play its customary role but is merely another given element available for exploitation by one administration or another: traditions of all kinds are being chewed up in the maw of administration.)

Democracy in America

Those who do not believe our democracy is in decline rely on (or are victims of) the pervasive popular meaning of democracy—that is, the absence of obvious tyranny. What autocracy we have, and it is considerable, is so much a part of the system that it is no longer noticed; for the rest, substantial comfort is taken from the 22nd Amendment and its sparkling guarantee against monarchy. And behind these considerations lie the most convincing assurance of all: we *must* be a democracy since we obviously have no effective leadership.

Democracy has been understood in an absurdly negative fashion as non-rule by non-leaders. But just as freedom can no longer be conceived (much less preserved) as disorganization, so democracy itself is about finished under the definition of non-rule. Very simply, it makes dictatorship much too attractive, not to say inevitable. *Modern society unled is a terrible danger to every member thereof.*

Whenever anything happens politically in America, it happens first in the Executive, then in Congress, and when the change has already been effected politically, the deal is concluded by shaking the dead hand of the Judiciary. The key to this impossible system is the middle term, Congress: the proper job of the Judiciary is to formalize accomplished political facts, and slow or fast, it always finally gets down to business; and the Executive can initiate as it will, but always without real structural effect until it has carried the Congress, usually by the lowest possible means. The issue is that Congress of ours —and never more so than today.

While Congress has lost the power which it had in the 19th century to rule affirmatively, it is perhaps exercising the greatest power in its history these days in its role as *non-ruler*. The basic pattern of checks and balances in our system does not really operate between the different departments of government, but between the banks, the industrial leaders, and the official government when it is effective. Briefly, the present role of Congress is to represent business and financial interests, the non-governmental powers, and through this representation to hold down the power of the national executive.

In the public sphere, non-rule by non-leaders; in the private, autocratic baronies; and the effectiveness of public government sabotaged by mediocre personnel whose mediocrity is ensured by low salary levels. In truth, the dominance of private autocratic government is ensured by scores of such measures which have been incorporated into our political system. This internal subversion is the *essence* of our system, and there are three big props to it immediately visible: (1) the downgrading of all real political activity—"politics is dirty"; (2) the disastrously unrepresentative nature of our basic democratic instrumentality, the Congress; and (3) the lack of respectable class and elite leadership. Of these, the first is comic, the second is disgusting, and the third is tragic. The lack of respectable class and elite leadership is the important, truly shameful factor, *the ultimate American tragedy.*

Politics is dirty, Congress is undemo-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cratic, our class leadership is inept. The Soviet confrontation is bringing on a great domestic crisis. Without a major creative effort by our elite groups this will become an *undirected* crisis, with consequent polarization (the cadres of the Right have already begun to form). And in the wings, the inevitable-unless: military dictatorship as the response to a series of international failures, and as an alternative to surrender.

Congress—especially the House of Representatives (which is a kicker, since the Senate, not the House, was intended to be the fraternity of old fuds)—is our most significantly reactionary institution. Which shows how far things have gotten out of hand. The backward quality of Congress is easily noticeable; so also are the reasons. It over-represents white farmers, hardly bothers with Southern Negroes at all, and makes a joke of affording fair representation to the 70 per cent of the population which is politically so misguided as to live in cities and suburbs. In a recent Congress, a Representative from San Diego had a constituency of over a million, while a fellow from a rural district in Michigan represented less than 200,000 people.

Yes, Leadership

But the quality of political activity and of the Congress is just a backdrop for—indeed, it is the result of—the quality of our class and elite leadership. These people—the rentiers always excepted—know how to do what they do, and they do it energetically. Considering how little tradition sustains them, the performance has a substantial amount of what we might as well go ahead and call dramatic magnificence. But as a cultural enterprise—a nation and a people relying on and utilizing a continuity of culture, class and otherwise—the United States is a farce and a failure: it never got off the ground.

Until immigration was stopped after World War I, we were in essence a frontier town—the greatest ever, to be sure—but hardly a nation: more a gang with a raw style for exploiting a continent, the elements of which style had been drawn together hastily (mostly for the benefit of farmers and conspicuous spenders) from polyglot European sources. The best that can be said for our current *national* culture is that there are a lot of things to eat, and a lot of distractions for the period when you are not eating them. This is the creation of big business, both the ingestibles and the distractions. It ought to be ashamed of itself.

Our leaders have misconceived their function: *they are leading a great nation, not a couple of million guys-on-the-grab.* The constituencies have been improperly identified. Also, to concentrate so much on money when there is no scarcity of the things money buys, is either: (1) incredibly piggish; (2) based on a disastrous misunderstanding of what money is; or (3) as I have argued, deeply derived from a historical backwardness which resists the finer meshing of our two spheres of government, the "public" and "private."

Whatever its source, the cultural quality of our leaders has been a telling factor. Take General Eisenhower, for example: he seems really to have believed in what he called "fiscal integrity" (meaning an unwillingness to try very hard or disturb the paper system very much to achieve full production)—it was not just a slogan whispered in his ear by George Humphrey. That is why he bought Mr. Dulles's policy of the "bigger bang for a buck." But when you are all done with the story of the standstill foreign policy, the inept handling of recessions, and the golfing jokes—the main achievement of the eight Eisenhower years still stands out in shining relief: the New Deal was not repealed. This means that it never will be repealed without a convulsion bigger than an election. Rearguarding, yes; old-style reaction, no. *The true non-leader leads neither backward nor forward.*

President Kennedy is not a born non-leader—he is the squirming victim of a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

system of non-leadership. Our current President is operating under the ideology of executive efficiency and shrewdness, with nothing much else to boost him along. If he fails, we will have then experienced the failure of the best, most important, most readily available executive elements in our society in a position and with the desire to use the power available to it.

President Kennedy has an almost unbelievably fortunate background of qualifications for an American leader. If anything, he is overqualified for the job, having inherited and been trained to an excess of political and other practical savvy. Indeed, he is so clear-headedly unprejudiced that he is rather difficult to understand. He obviously is not a believer in the rags and tatters of New Deal ideology which he uses carefully to get votes. He speaks most feelingly of "responsibility"—not Eisenhower's fiscal responsibility, but some kind of social or at least executive responsibility. Anyway, he is shrewd: the historical point to be determined is whether he is shrewd enough. Or more profoundly, whether American society has already, *sub rosa,* achieved what it needs to achieve and now lacks only some vital shrewdness to bring it into the kind of existence which is apparent as well as real. *Has the managerial revolution progressed to the point where a bunch of fast, shrewd managers can make the resulting social order work satisfactorily?*

With this equipment, acting on a concept of leadership for which he was perhaps overtrained but which happens also to be the best such concept readily permitted by the system, how will Kennedy deal with the coming crisis? Is he capable of developing a liberal managerialist ideology which will inspire both the managers and the managed?

The answer rests with him. The issues comprising the crisis will most likely have been met and passed, however well or poorly presented to the people, before he leaves office.

The Military Illusion

If the crisis were simply military in nature, we would know just what to do. We would do what we did in World War II, what we have always been prepared to do —flip over the ace in the hole, straighten out the world in short order, and get back to being Americans again as quickly as possible. But the crisis is very obviously not military: we may be able to deter the Communist nations from a nuclear attack by our military might, but we cannot deter them from Communism either by our military might or by war itself. To deter Communism requires: (1) an alternative to Communism; and (2) the application of our great power to the support of that alternative. This is war, but a new kind of war; it is a social revolutionary war, with only minor military engagements.

As soon as one gets past the military illusion, one is confronted with an amazing realization: what is called for is to "mobilize" the nation to fight a social war which will go on without interruption for decades, and in which neither the method nor the objective is primarily military. And then the awareness slowly grows: *that means permanent structural changes in our own society.* To "mobilize the nation" for such an engagement means to initiate a domestic social revolution. Or, if you see it as I do, to quicken the pace and intensify the conscious direction of the domestic revolution that we have in fact for some time been undergoing. No wonder jaws fall agape and there is quick retreat to the security of the military illusion: *It is required that the most conservative nation in the world devote its great power to leading a world social revolution —beginning at home.*

The world revolution is simplicity itself to define: the members of the human race have decided that they don't want any longer to live miserably and die young. They are convinced that the means are available to achieve this objective. This is quite a decision: it is, from here on out,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the alpha and omega of world politics. We notice it less in this country because it has progressed so far here—because it is in our bones.

The issue between ourselves and the Russians is the direction and character to be given to the development of the world revolution. If the issue were their espousal of this revolution and our resistance to it, we would lose—hands down. Their greatest achievement to date has been to peddle this characterization of the conflict successfully—so successfully that even some of our own people believe it. We have unfortunately assisted them in this by emphasizing the military aspect of the conflict. But the only function of the military is for one side to keep the other side from resolving the issue by military means, which is not itself a resolution.

The Paper Economy, Finally

The main point for us to understand is that the crisis of the world revolution is for us primarily a domestic crisis. The revolution in its technical aspect has progressed so far here that we have been able to indulge ourselves inordinately in misrepresenting its character, and thus in postponing our response to its social, organizational, and ideological aspects. We have overplayed the golden opportunity to kid ourselves. The resulting confusion I have called the Paper Economy. This charming, bubble-headed system is certainly good enough for us, we are convinced; but clearly it is not good enough for the rest of the world—and the rest of the world is fairly well convinced of that. Moreover, we cannot lead the world away from Communism by offering it a state of confusion, even though we ourselves may have prospered under same.

The Paper Economy is inadequate in confronting the world revolution both practically and theoretically. Practically, because it does not make available our full productive power for waging the social war on a world scale—the power that was unleashed in another kind of war in the early 1940's. Theoretically, because it cannot comprehend this war except in military terms. Notice the close connection between the two: the Paper Economy survives at all only because of military production—structural and dynamic advantages (rather, necessities) are achieved in this way that would be impermissible in any other way. The same military motif which is the best "resolution" we have been able to find domestically also dominates our conception of the foreign aspect of the problem. In both spheres, the military gambit can in fact be nothing more than a holding action subject to slow or fast but certainly inevitable attrition. Or disaster: in the world, by nuclear war; at home, by military dictatorship.

The validity of the perspective I have been presenting, incidentally, does not depend on anyone, including myself, liking it. That technology-too-soon has brought about the administered revolution for the modern world is no source of satisfaction to me. Managerialism elevates the administrative intellectual, with his vulgar scientism and half-mad functionalism. I am proud to be an old-fashioned humanist out of the mainstream, and personally go to some lengths to preserve as much antimacasser and overstuffed irrationality as I can safely manage. But like de Tocqueville viewing the march of democracy some time ago, we must see the whole thing as inevitable. As much as we may be revolted by the spectacle, we should be disgusted more by the lack of clarity and candor in observing it. Which also, incidentally, is a classic humanist response to major movements of history.

As the New York *Times* says every Sunday, the fate of the free world depends on our domestic political decisions. This is the crisis, and it must be presented to the people by a responsible element of our class and elite leadership, preferably led by the President who represents the best elements thereof. There is no time for anything else.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

MARSHALL SKLARE

THE FUTURE OF JEWISH GIVING

JEWISH philanthropy—so high is its reputation—has come to serve as a model for scholars, professional workers, and civic leaders who are concerned with the methods and problems of charitable fund-raising. Just as Jewish sobriety is frequently studied to illuminate the social etiology and cure of alcoholism, so Jewish philanthropy, which combines the twin principles of voluntarily meeting Jewish needs and generously supporting nonsectarian causes, has provided an exemplary case for those who wish to study or improve the state of American philanthropy.

That Jews as a group are extraordinarily generous in their giving we know from many surveys. For example, in a recent study conducted by Dr. James N. Morgan of the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan, with the cooperation of the National Bureau of Economic Research, it was found that the percentage of Jews donating $50 or more to individuals (chiefly relatives and friends) and to nonreligious charities was higher than that of any other group. Furthermore, the Jewish lead widened in the larger-donation categories, and here the Jewish lag in contributing to churches and church-connected organizations disappeared. Thus, in the category of donations of $250 or more, 25 per cent of the Jews gave to individuals, 18 per cent to religious or religion-connected organizations, and 17 per cent to all other charities. Comparable figures for Episcopalians—whose average income exceeded that of the Jews in the national sample of almost 3,000 households—were 15 per cent, 9 per cent, and 8 per cent, respectively.

Gentile community leaders have long been aware of what researchers like Morgan are presently documenting. Those interviewed in the American Jewish Committee's "Riverton Study," for example, frequently remarked upon Jewish generosity. Samuel Stevenson, a leading local industrialist and an important Episcopalian layman, said about the Jews of Riverton: "In this matter of giving, it's a specific characteristic." A more comprehensive statement was made by Arthur Caruso, a second-generation Italian Catholic and a leading political figure in the community:

> The Jews are by far the most highly organized group in Riverton of all the minority groups, and they have the most intelligent leadership. They're the most active. They're the only group that can really raise money. They have a real program. . . . They have the Jewish Federation, a fund-raising group, they have their own social service agency, and . . . they have the YMHA. . . . Theirs is a day-in and day-out program while ours is only for one occasion. They do it with a trained staff that sets up the program and continues it.

MARSHALL SKLARE, editor of *The Jews: Social Patterns of an American Group* and author of *Conservative Judaism: an American Religious Movement,* is director of the Division of Scientific Research of the American Jewish Committee. He is also on the faculty of Yeshiva University's School of Social Work.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Caruso contrasted Jewish behavior in this respect with that of his fellow Italians:

> I can call ten Jews on the phone this minute and without giving them any big explanation I can get a hundred dollars from each one. I'd have a tough time with the Gentiles. . . . I'll give you an example. We had a drive among the Italian people to help the people in Italy who suffered from the flood. We raised only $7,000. . . . The same effort that it takes to get ten dollars from an Italian would get a thousand from a Jew.

Perhaps the strongest evidence of the Gentile respect for Jewish generosity has come from the financial community. Year after year some of the nation's largest and most conservative banks—such as the Manufacturers Hanover Trust, the First National City Bank, the Bankers Trust Company, the Chemical Corn Exchange Bank, the Chase Manhattan Bank, to mention only examples from the New York area—have extended sizable loans to Jewish philanthropies. None of these institutions is controlled by Jews, and it is doubtful that their cooperation is given out of guilt over their restrictions on hiring or developing Jewish executives. More likely, they are willing to cooperate solely on the basis of their analysis of the facts of Jewish fund-raising—one of which is that since 1946 Jewish federations in the United States have consistently raised over $100,000,000 per year.*

JEWISH PHILANTHROPIC activity has also succeeded in impressing the Jews themselves: of the many Jewish tributes to Jewish generosity Harry L. Lurie's *A Heritage Affirmed: The Jewish Federation Movement in America*† is the most recent and among the most ardent. The implication of Lurie's title is clear: however far American Jews have strayed from Jewish tradition, however much they may be criticized for irreverence and outright secularism, they have still punctiliously observed one crucial religious commandment—the *mitzvah* of *tsedakah*, or charity—whose force in the Jewish tradition is so great that support of the indigent is defined by the tradition as including the wherewithal for those being supported to observe this *mitzvah* themselves.

The federations described in Lurie's book now exist in all American cities where Jews live in any significant numbers. Each federation raises and allocates funds for local, national, and overseas beneficiaries. Called by a variety of names (in Oakland, California, the "Jewish Welfare Federation"; in Tucson, Arizona, the "Jewish Community Council"; in Lafayette, Indiana, the "Federated Jewish Charities")—the federations also vary in their functions according to the size of the local Jewish population, the particular evolution of the Jewish community, and the structure of the general community. In small cities federations may themselves operate social services. In larger cities they generally serve only as fund-raising, coordinating, and community-planning agencies—each local beneficiary having its own separate board and professional staff. In the large communities the range of services the federations subsidize and coordinate may be wide indeed: care for children who are orphaned, delinquent, or maladjusted; recreational facilities like Y's, day camps, and country camps; Jewish education; psychiatric case work for problem families; employment and vocational guidance agencies; general and specialized hospitals; homes for the aged; and Jewish community relations.

Originally the federations were founded to raise funds for local Jewish institutions; at a later period "welfare funds" were established to help finance agencies that assisted Jews abroad and, to a much lesser

* The level of such collections has of course fluctuated: in 1948 collections reached a record-breaking $200,000,000, while in 1954 they sank to a low of $107,000,000 (the total for 1960 was $128,000,000). In spite of such fluctuations the record has apparently been consistent enough to convince even the most cautious bankers that they take minimal risks in advancing loans.

† Jewish Publication Society of America, 481 pp., $6.00.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

extent, the national Jewish agencies. In recent decades amalgamations have led to the creation of one central organization in each city which raises funds for local, national, and overseas needs. The single exception is in New York City where the Federation of Jewish Philanthropies of New York raises funds for local needs, and the United Jewish Appeal of New York—an entirely separate group—runs an annual campaign for overseas agencies and for a small list of national ones. The name of the organization which Lurie headed until his retirement—the Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds—dates back to the period when separate campaigns were held for local and overseas causes, but today the CJFWF serves as the coordinating body of the many hundreds of integrated federations scattered throughout the nation.

All this is developed at length in Lurie's history, along with his testimonies to the ingenuity of the social engineering and institutional framework of Jewish philanthropy. However, in spite of his highly positive account of the federation movement, as well as the other tributes we have been noting, there is evidence enough on the other side to make it clear that a wide gulf exists between the image and the reality of Jewish philanthropy. The truth of the matter is that Jewish philanthropy in general, and the federations in particular, have a host of serious and unresolved problems, and, further, that many of these problems promise to become more serious in the decades ahead.

THE FIRST issue which has frequently been obfuscated concerns the number of Jews who actually make donations. Riverton's Gentile community leaders assumed that all Jews do so, especially to the federation. Even such an acute student of Jewish philanthropy as Lurie reinforces this impression, if only by his failure to discuss the issue. Regrettably, we cannot say precisely how many American Jewish households fail to contribute, for no one has taken the trouble to gather the necessary data. Nonetheless, the limited research that has been done leads to two conclusions: that there are sharp variations from community to community in the proportion of households which have been enlisted in the campaigns; and secondly, that in some of the largest cities only a minority have been enlisted.

The basic distinction is between the small communities and the large ones. In the former it is not unusual to find 80 per cent or more of the potential donors making a contribution. Peoria, Illinois, is a good example: out of an estimated Jewish population of 1,800 there were 615 who gave to the federation's last campaign. Using the rule-of-thumb of 3.5 persons per household, the result suggests that the overwhelming majority of Jewish households in Peoria did contribute and that some of the households had more than one contributor.

But if Peoria does bear out the standard image of Jewish philanthropy, it is necessary to realize that 62 per cent of American Jewry is concentrated in four cities: New York, Los Angeles, Philadelphia, and Chicago. Here in the giant urban centers —where it is considerably more difficult to identify and solicit individual donors and where social controls do not operate as strongly—the situation appears to be quite different from the one in Peoria. Again reliable evidence is meager. Next to nothing is known about the most crucial place of all—the New York metropolitan area where over 42 per cent of American Jews reside. The data that have been given to the CJFWF by the New York Federation and the New York UJA are slight and of little scientific value.* But such evidence as there is in no way con-

* At best the New York situation would pose a difficult problem for the analyst: due to an agreement with the Greater New York Fund, the Federation refrains from soliciting donors whose yearly income is under $5,000; also the New York United Jewish Appeal is known to receive many thousands of contributions under $10, which it does not count as individual donations.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

travenes the standard belief that New York City has the lowest percentage of contributors in the nation.

Useful statistics have, however, been gathered and reported for the three other cities. In Chicago, during 1960, there were 35,326 federation contributors,* including 9,106 donors to the women's division. Estimating the Jewish population of the city as 282,000, figuring that 75 per cent of the women's-division contributors do not live in separate households, and calculating household size at 3.5 persons, we can conclude that only about 35 per cent of the Jewish households of Chicago contributed to the federation.

THE CASE of Los Angeles parallels that of Chicago very closely. The latest available figures are for 1958, when there were 51,881 federation contributors, of whom 15,400 were in the women's division. With an estimated Jewish population for that year of 390,000, and (if anything) a smaller household size than Chicago's, Los Angeles still showed about the same percentage of households contributing to the federation as Chicago—35 per cent. Thus, although we cannot say exactly how many Jewish families in America contribute to these central fund-raising organizations, it would be rash to claim that more than 50 per cent do, and the evidence we have suggests an even lower figure.

Some observers would undoubtedly argue that this evidence is misleading. Though only a minority may contribute to federations, they would contend, many additional hundreds of thousands of households give to national agencies like Hadassah, the Jewish Theological Seminary of America, The City of Hope, or the Yeshiva Torah V'Daath—which run independent campaigns—as well as to a host of local agencies; hence the number of Jewish households not participating in some campaign or other remains negligible.

It is true that the independent campaigns raise sizable sums of money—enough to make the federations worry about the amount of effort and dollars being diverted from their own campaigns. The CJFWF reports that in 1960 some 75 major national agencies raised $57,000,000; a more inclusive listing might find that the independent campaigns raise well over $100,000,000 annually, or about as much as the federated campaigns.† But professional fund-raisers are aware that those who donate more than token gifts to non-federation causes are more likely than not to be federation donors as well. In any case, the number of those who donate only to the independent campaigns is somewhat beside the point, since the local federation drive is still the basis of American Jewish philanthropy and the most important index of its adequacy.

To be sure, the conclusion that the *mitzvah* of *tsedakah* is practiced in a serious way in only a minority of American Jewish households involves a more complicated picture than I have so far been sketching. Some of the large urban centers, for example, achieve much better results than others; and if some miniscule Jewish communities like Peoria's are "good" fund-raisers, others are notably "bad." Year after year, the federations' standard for the nation as a whole is set by two big cities—Detroit and Cleveland. In the fairly typical year of 1958 the federation in Detroit raised $4,904,000, and the one in Cleveland $4,801,000—from moderately sized Jewish populations of 89,000 and 88,000 respectively. By con-

* The term "contributors" refers to a gift unit, not to an individual. For example, business partners giving a company rather than a personal contribution would be counted as a single gift unit. It is estimated that even if the totals were adjusted so as to make allowance for such multiple contributions, the percentage of households contributing would not rise by more than 1 per cent.

† In making such calculations there is the problem of deciding whether to include contributions to synagogues. Should such giving be considered philanthropy? There is also the problem of classifying purchases of Israel Bonds.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

trast Chicago, with more than three times as many Jews, raised only $5,340,000 in the same year; while Philadelphia, with nearly four times as many Jews (331,000) was able to raise only $4,031,000.

That the question is not only one of size is further borne out by the fact that in the same year the federation in Newark—a city with 12,000 more Jews than Detroit—raised less than half as much ($1,994,000). Nor is the problem confined to the Eastern seaboard: St. Louis and San Francisco also compare very unfavorably with the Detroit-Cleveland standard.

WHATEVER THE reasons for such striking differentials among Jewish communities, the level of personal income is not a determining one: there is little evidence that Jewish wealth in Detroit or Cleveland is in any way exceptional. What is exceptional is the general prosperity of the Jews in the nation as a whole. Indeed, contemporary American Jewry constitutes one of the few cases in history where the preponderant majority of Jews have the means to practice the *mitzvah* of *tsedakah* seriously and lack only the will to do so.

Again, the data with which to explore this point is meager, and what has been gathered by the local or national agencies is generally either crude or unreliable. None of the leading Jewish fund-raising institutions—for all their sophistication in modern accounting procedures and public relations techniques—has done so much as the most rudimentary market research concerning either the financial status of non-givers or the proportion of disposable income being contributed by donors.*

The only study that we can utilize is the one commissioned recently by the federation in Essex County, New Jersey, an area which includes Newark and its suburbs. Conducted by the National Opinion Research Center of the University of Chicago, this study is well designed, but has limitations for our purposes: for example, it deals only with those who contribute to the federation, and its findings are tabulated by donation categories rather than donor income.

Nevertheless the situation is clear enough. In Essex County those who contribute less than $100 constitute an overwhelming 87 per cent of all givers. Furthermore, more than half of these "small-givers" contribute under $10. Weighting their sample in favor of those who give $10–$99, the NORC researchers report that the median family income of this group is $13,000 and that approximately one out of four has an income of $20,000 or over. (Since these figures are based upon the respondents' own report of their income, they can be considered minimal estimates.)

How typical is Essex County with its 100,000 Jewish population? Can we learn anything from it about cities like Chicago, Philadelphia, and Los Angeles, which have three or four times as many Jews, or New York which has over twenty-three times as many? The answer is that we probably can. Campaign results in Newark are proportionally not too dissimilar from those in the giant cities of Chicago, Philadelphia, Los Angeles, and New York, and Essex County Jewry also resembles the Jewish communities in the giant cities demographically. It is apparent, moreover, that the high percentage of small donors in Essex County is far from being peculiar to that area. In Chicago 75 per cent of all donors give under $100, in Los Angeles

* The two national studies that have been made are not in any way adequate, though each was conducted by a leading economist—Leon Keyserling and Robert R. Nathan, respectively. Keyserling's —the more recent and thorough of the two—assumes that the median Jewish income is the same as that for the non-farm population as a whole—his reasoning being that very few Jews are farmers! It is widely known, of course, that Jews have a radically different occupational distribution than the general non-farm population, which results in a considerably higher average level of income. Local Jewish population studies conducted by some of the federations are usually primitive in the design and presentation of their research, and even the better ones do not gather data on income or relate it to giving.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the figure is 82 per cent, in Philadelphia 91 per cent. It would be difficult to estimate how the average income of small-givers in the large cities compares with the findings in Essex County; but even if we assumed it to be lower by one or two thousand dollars, we would still have to conclude that the bulk of small-givers contribute modestly indeed—perhaps 0.5 per cent of their yearly earnings. And, as we have seen, they make up the vast majority of the donors.

THESE SMALL DONORS, however, are far less significant to the federations than the "big-givers"—wealthy families having a much higher percentage of disposable income than those in the middle class. Yet we know as little about the philanthropic behavior of the big-givers as we do about the small donors. Our one source—the Essex County study—is of scant assistance because the highest income-category it used was $50,000-and-over. Since a majority of those giving $2,500-and-over are in this income bracket, along with a sizable group of the $1,000–$2,499 contributors, there is no way of calculating a median-income figure for the big-givers. And even if income figures were available, the problem of interpretation would still be considerable—while income may be a good index to net worth among those in modest circumstances, it is less revealing for the rich.

In any case, whether or not the wealthy contribute generously in relation to their income or net worth, the fact is that the drives depend upon them. For example, 2 per cent of the contributors to the Los Angeles Federation account for 52 per cent of the total money raised; in Philadelphia 2 per cent provide 62 per cent, and in Chicago 3 per cent provide 55 per cent.

The reliance upon the big-givers has the benefit of containing the ratio of fund-raising expenses to proceeds, but it makes the over-all fund-raising operation that much more unpredictable. The big-givers tend to watch each other, and in some cities a cut by one may influence the entire group and cause a serious drop in campaign receipts. Then, too, the size of the pledge of the big-giver is not so much determined by what he can afford as by his business mood at the time. Any setback in the economy, particularly one affecting paper profits, is a threat to the campaign's success.

Striking evidence of the dependence on the big-giver comes from the current $104,000,000 building fund campaign of the New York Federation. Under the slogan "Let Us Build Us a City of Life" this campaign is developing a new style in centralized Jewish fund-raising—one that is aimed almost entirely at a select group of wealthy donors. Within a few months the unprecedented sum of $68,000,000 has been raised—and this mainly from a mere 137 contributors whose gifts have been in the $50,000–$2,500,000 range, and who have also been required to maintain their normal yearly contribution to the Federation.

In the giant cities, then, federations are apparently still capable of enlisting the enthusiastic support of a small group of wealthy philanthropists, even if they have not been too successful with the many who are in more modest circumstances. But the brilliant progress of the "City of Life" campaign also suggests that the New York Federation's annual maintenance campaigns have raised relatively modest sums in terms of the potential now being exhibited. Part of the "City of Life" campaign's success comes from its special aura of present prestige and future immortality. In the medical field, for example, there are opportunities for big-givers to name whole buildings or pavilions; or, more modestly, various wings, suites, or floors within buildings; or the donor may, even more modestly, name various laboratory rooms or nursing stations. All of this is very much in contrast to the typical federation campaign in which most of the money goes not into an enduring monument, but toward feeding, clothing, hous-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ing and providing employment opportunities for newly arrived families in Israel; toward paying the rent of local agencies, the salaries of their workers, and so forth.

In general, some special incentive seems to be necessary for a drive to do exceptionally well (the record sum of $200,000,000 raised by the federations in 1948 was unquestionably related to the establishment of the State of Israel). Be that as it may, the best measure of Jewish generosity remains the average campaign. How do such campaigns fare? Ostensibly many do well, frequently coming very near to meeting their goal, sometimes even going slightly beyond it. But does this mean that the drive has actually succeeded? Not invariably, since goals are frequently set with the realities of fund-raising in mind rather than those of needs. There is much resistance to setting "unrealistic" goals: it is feared that if the goal is pegged beyond an attainable figure the morale of campaign workers will suffer and fewer dollars will be raised.

THE PROBLEM of deciding what constitutes need is far from simple and is necessarily subjective. The Zionist-oriented individual will claim that the problems of the Israeli immigrants are the most urgent ones. A typically modern donor may argue that the need for psychiatric social work in the local community should have first call on funds. One with more traditional Jewish interests can regard both types of need as distinctly secondary to those of his favorite yeshivah.

Nonetheless, the most pressing claims have been those made upon the overseas agencies. In spite of heavy taxation in Israel and large reparations payments, along with the vast sums of money raised annually in America, enough funds have rarely been available to meet the needs of the new settlers. The only alternative has been to turn to the banks. Far from being a resource used only in emergencies, borrowing by and for the United Jewish Appeal became standard operating procedure during the 1950's. Furthermore, new debts were incurred before old ones could be liquidated. In spite of all recent efforts at repayment, some $61,000,000 in accumulated debts was still owed to banks at the end of last year, and a new loan of $65,000,000 had to be arranged to meet current requirements.

It is true that these overseas needs are the only ones which have seemed pressing enough to prompt such heavy borrowing. Local and national needs are generally not of the "bread-and-butter" variety and if unmet no one will be deprived of food or shelter. Yet, some national agencies (such as the Yivo Institute for Jewish Research or the Conference on Jewish Social Studies, and a number of others) receive only token assistance from the federations—perhaps $50 contributions from some of the smaller cities, $500 from the larger ones. The result is that some agencies receive too much money to die but not enough to really live and do their work properly. On the other hand, many of the national agencies with affluent local constituencies have hesitated to become federation beneficiaries, feeling that they can do better for themselves by running independent campaigns. And it is unedifying but true that an agency which decides to forgo its own campaign and submit a request for funds must have a group of "big-givers" to back up its request for a subvention. If it does not, whatever the merits of its case, it is unlikely to get very much assistance.

The problems of need and allocation lead eventually to the more crucial question of the total amount available for distribution. In recent years the pressure on available funds has been growing because of such developments as inflation, the demand for more and better services, and the constant increase of professionalization. But during the last decade the federations have only once raised more than $130,000,000, in spite of the justifiable assumption that the amount of income earned by Jews has risen appreciably. When the pie

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

is no larger than before, the difficulty of meeting the increased demands is great enough; but when the pie is even smaller, the difficulty becomes enormous. How should the necessary division be carried out? By giving everyone an appropriately smaller slice—or by selective reapportionment? The argument has generally reduced itself to the question of "local needs vs. overseas needs"—the latter signifying mainly the amount of money which should be sent to Israel.

WHAT WILL THE future bring? The few data available indicate that the problems of Jewish philanthropy are likely to become formidable. One reason lies in the growing influence of American voluntarism which—except in the case of certain small sectarian groups—involves a lower standard of generosity than is customary among Jews. As Jews become more acculturated it is quite possible that they may adopt these general standards, which would considerably diminish the income of their own philanthropies.

The NORC study contains some inferential evidence on this point. While immigrants compose 26 per cent of all the contributors, they provide 36 per cent of the $2,500-and-over contributors. Furthermore, there is a higher proportion of this group in the $2,500-and-over category than in any other. The question then is whether these proportions reflect the greater prosperity of the immigrant group as against the native-born, or whether the former is more "Jewish" and affirms its Jewish heritage in this respect more strongly. The latter interpretation seems the more likely—particularly when we notice that immigrants constitute only a minor proportion of the small-givers—some 18 per cent. Thus the small-givers do not consist predominantly of an unacculturated element, as is sometimes thought, who sit on their wallets because they are alienated from agencies like the federations which raise funds in ways so different from those of the old country.

The median age of small-givers is forty-five, which means that they are neither an elderly group that will soon pass from the scene, nor a group of newly-marrieds who cannot as yet be expected to carry their share of the load. In spite of the fact that they are already in their middle years, however, the income of these small-givers can be expected to grow beyond the present median of $13,000. Only 5 per cent of them are craftsmen or workers; a full 41 per cent are proprietors and managers, and 18 per cent are lawyers, accountants, and physicians. Will the small-givers, we wonder, become more generous as they become more prosperous? Some, of course, will, but the findings indicate that most of them feel complacent about the extent of their present giving, despite the information they receive each week in the federation's newspaper concerning local, national, and overseas Jewish needs. One question asked in the Essex County study was: "From what you've read or heard, do you feel the amount of money raised by the federation is very adequate, moderately adequate, a little inadequate, or very inadequate to meet all needs?" Fifteen per cent of the small-givers replied that the funds were very adequate, 38 per cent that they were adequate, and 18 per cent that they were a little inadequate. Only 13 per cent said that the funds were very inadequate, while the remainder had no opinion.

Further evidence suggests that not only do many donors, particularly the smaller ones, feel that enough money is being raised, but also that some federation contributors would not be adverse to redistributing their philanthropic dollar—and almost invariably they would do so by decreasing their contribution to Jewish causes. This may be merely a way, in some cases, of justifying a reduction in the total amount of giving, by aligning their standards of generosity with those of the general community. Or it may spring from a conviction that general needs are more pressing today than Jewish needs—a con-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

viction that often accompanies the Jew's thoroughgoing absorption into the general culture. But in either event, the result is the same, one which can have serious consequences for Jewish philanthropies in general and federations in particular.

To be sure, Jewish donors still give the major portion of their philanthropic dollar to Jewish causes. In Essex County it varies from 60 per cent for the small-givers to 76 per cent for the big-givers. (These percentages are based on data supplied by the respondents and if anything probably underestimate the amount going to Jewish causes.) Among the host of influences, too complicated for us to unravel at this point, that have created the distribution, must be counted the force of habit ("Put me down for the same as last year"). However, it is questionable that this behavior can be counted on unless it receives relevant ideological reinforcement. In addition there is no longer any Jewish monopoly on hard-hitting campaign techniques, since such techniques are evidently finding their way from the Jewish to the general community. Also of importance is the diminishing incentive that can be expected from the establishment of the State of Israel, whose impact on Jewish consciousness is already noticeably weakening now that the miracle is a decade and a half old.

Other roots of Jewish giving seem also to be withering. In the answers to questions on philanthropy asked of Jewish teen-agers in the Riverton Study, there was a remarkable absence of any belief that Jews must take care of their own because they are under a solemn obligation to do so, or because others will not do so, or because it would be bad public relations if Jews were to have Gentiles help them even if they were willing to do so. Such beliefs, characteristic of earlier periods in American Jewish life, seem outdated to those growing up in a culture whose nonsectarian philanthropies extend their aid to all groups, and whose municipal, state, and federal agencies are more than willing to include Jewish agencies in their grants. In fact it is the Jewish institutions rather than the public agencies, which have been holding back. While the federations have accepted community-chest grants (in some of the smaller communities such grants now meet the major portion of the budget for local needs), they have moved cautiously in seeking or accepting aid from public sources.

The responses of Riverton's Jewish teen-agers should not lead us to assume that the feeling among Jews that they must be responsible for their own is soon to become extinct. But it does seem clear that in the decades ahead giving to Jewish causes will have to be much more a matter of Jewish affirmation than of Jewish defensiveness, and that it will be less the result of habit than of thoughtful decision.

ONE TREND FOR which there is abundant evidence is that Jewish givers increasingly resist the image of themselves as being ethnocentric in their choices. For example, in the Essex County study, donors were asked the following question: "Suppose you had $10,000 to donate to charity this year, how much would you give to each of the groups that usually ask you for money?" In comparing the subjects' hypothetical donations to their present ones, the researchers concluded that ". . . Jewish charities generally lose ground among all [donor] groups and non-Jewish [charities] generally gain. . . ." This, they said, indicates ". . . the cross-pressures of general citizenship appeals."

Recent studies conducted in a number of cities throughout the country by the American Jewish Committee are also instructive on this point. In the typical community about two-thirds of the respondents said that "supporting all humanitarian causes" was essential to being a good Jew while only one-third thought that "supporting Jewish philanthropies" was essential to being a good Jew. What we are observing, then, is a marked shift in attitude, if not yet of practice. Many

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Jews speak in a nonsectarian way but continue to give in a sectarian one.

In all probability the tendency toward supporting nonsectarian aims through sectarian channels will grow more pronounced as time goes on. An elaborate study conducted recently for the St. Louis federation by Social Research, Inc., a leader in the motivation-research field, resulted in findings that led SRI to advise the federation to reduce the proportion of money going overseas, thereby retaining a larger portion for local needs. Their reasoning was that the identification with Israel was weakening. Moreover, none of the overseas beneficiaries conduct nonsectarian programs while some of the beneficiaries in St. Louis do so. The major need —as SRI saw it—was to give the federation a more nonsectarian as well as a more local tone.

But the SRI recommendations went even further. The federation was also advised to look for new local beneficiaries in radically different fields of service, for the motivation researchers inferred that interest in supporting the traditional type of Jewish institution (with its emphasis on welfare) was bound to wane under the influence of the so-called "cultural explosion." In sum, then, the remedy for the federations' problems was to keep more of the money in the local community since givers were coming to feel less solidarity with Jews outside St. Louis—specifically with those in Israel—and to emphasize nonsectarian services, especially in the field of culture ("libraries and symphony orchestras and parks and country clubs").

As much as these recommendations may do violence to the purposes for which federations were established, the SRI researchers may have made a shrewd estimate of the changing values of an increasingly significant number of Jewish donors. The example of Brandeis University, the institution which has enjoyed the most spectacular success in the Jewish fund-raising world in recent years, would seem to support their prognostications. For a variety of plausible reasons, many thought that Brandeis would prove a failure, and yet its great campaigns succeeded far beyond the most ardent expectations. Short of the extended analysis that the subject deserves, we can say that Brandeis has provided donors with the possibility of supporting a nonsectarian cause within a Jewish setting—an inspirational relief from traditional Jewish philanthropies with their stress on clothing the naked and redeeming the captives, as well as their aura of parochialism.

FURTHER EVIDENCE suggests that however ethnocentric and "Jewish" a philanthropy remains in practice, it is the better part of fund-raising wisdom to emphasize that it is also nonsectarian and serves general as well as Jewish concerns (". . . the Jewish community's expression of and contribution to the health and welfare needs of the entire community," as its president recently described the New York Federation). Of course, the reality is that quite a number of the agencies which will benefit from the New York Federation's building-fund campaign (to restrict ourselves to that example) have a policy of taking only Jewish clients, and that some of the agencies which adhere to an open-admissions policy retain a largely Jewish clientele by not locating in neighborhoods which are predominantly Gentile. Thus although the feast is not being served in the same nonsectarian way that it is being cooked, the content of the publicity does demonstrate strong approval of the ideal of nonsectarianism.

This ambiguous orientation is becoming increasingly widespread. It involves a host of significant problems. For now, let us pose only two of them: (1) If nonsectarianism were to be truly practiced as well as preached, in what sense would a federation still be a *Jewish* federation? (2) Assuming that the federations become more nonsectarian, will they become sufficiently so to attract donors whose interests have broadened out from strictly

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Jewish to a variety of humanitarian concerns?

Such nonsectarian donors could move in a variety of directions. They might seek to transform further those federation beneficiaries, such as hospitals and community centers, which are already nonsectarian in clientele and program, by adding non-Jews, for example, to the staff and later to the board. Next the federation itself might be changed along these lines. Or instead of bothering to reform Jewish institutions, such donors might interest themselves directly in existing agencies which are truly nonsectarian or help to create new ones.

THE RELATIVELY modest proportion of Jewish households which give to federations and the modest level of most contributions, the reliance upon a small percentage of big-givers, the inability of the federations to increase their income in the face of rising needs, the ambiguities suggested by the success of nonsectarian-oriented Jewish causes, the increasing acculturation of the giver and his resistance to conceiving of his philanthropy in traditional ways—these are only some of the problems which confront federations in particular and Jewish philanthropy in general. If few of these obvious issues have received thoroughgoing discussion, even more fundamental problems—such as the secularization of Jewish giving and the gradual weakening of its connection with the belief that *tsedakah* is a God-given commandment—have been noticed by only a handful of sensitive professionals and lay leaders. Even when issues do rise to the surface—currently the federations are agitated by the question of whether to support Jewish day schools—they hardly succeed in modifying the incessant note of positive thinking:

> . . . federations have had an eventful and on the whole satisfactory history. They have grown more rather than less important with the years. Given an environment of peace and prosperity, federations will function in the future as a form of Jewish organization adapted to serving Jewish needs according to the requirements of the New World and of democracy. . . .
>
> It would take a radical turn of events, amounting to a revolution in American democratic organization or a world catastrophe, to upset current trends in the development of Jewish federations.

Thus ends Lurie's book. His assurances that the Jewish heritage of *tsedakah* is being affirmed, and that such affirmation is bound to continue short of political revolution or nuclear destruction, is a reflection of the tenor of thinking about American Jewish philanthropy which is encountered in a variety of circles. Such an approach pays little attention to present difficulties and projects an unduly optimistic view of the future. Reappraisal in this field will have its agonizing aspects, but it is necessary if Jewish philanthropy is to deal constructively with the present realities and future problems that we have attempted to sketch.

WE MOURN the death of ALBERT L. FURTH, who, as a member of the Commentary Publication Committee for the past decade, gave so generously of his time, energy, and expert knowledge. His devotion and counsel will be greatly missed.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Cuba—The Wake of Isolation

HANS J. MORGENTHAU

On December 1, 1961, Mr. James Reston wrote in the New York *Times* that "obviously, the United States would not tolerate a Communist regime in Cuba, no matter how freely elected, if that regime allied itself to Moscow and exercised its sovereign rights to maintain a Soviet military base on that island." Obviously, the United States is tolerating exactly that situation now, and the administration is certainly subject to the criticism of inconsistency. Mr. Arthur Krock, commenting in the New York *Times* (September 20, 1962) on the Congressional resolution on Cuba, accuses the administration also of lack of candor: "This fear of being candid with the American people on acts in foreign policy, and their real foundations, pervades the Kennedy Administration. . . ."

In order to understand the significance the Cuban situation has for the United States, it is necessary to perform three tasks: determine the real situation in Cuba; assess the damage this situation has done and is further likely to do to our interests; and evaluate the measures we can take in defense of those interests.

The situation in Cuba is stark and simple: Cuba is being transformed into a military base under the auspices of the Soviet Union. It is misleading to say that the military build-up in Cuba is merely "defensive" and that the more than 4,000 Russian citizens who have recently landed there are "technicians"; and it is downright preposterous to suggest that what is happening in Cuba has no military significance.

To dispose of the preposterous statement first: it is necessary to dispose of it at all because it appeared in the London *Economist,* a serious and rightly respected journal, and because it is typical of that stubborn refusal to look unpleasant facts in the face which dominated British political thinking in the 30's. "The one thing known for sure," declares the *Economist* (September 8, 1962), ". . . is the existence of a tented camp a dozen miles outside Havana containing a sizeable number of healthy-looking young Russians. All else is speculation. . . . Healthy-looking young Americans, after all, have been seen disembarking in various countries since President Kennedy took office; no one has yet suggested that the Peace Corps is a branch of the United States Army." After proposing that the Russians might be "just lathe-operators and tractor-drivers," the *Economist* continues ". . . suppose that the Russians are real soldiers, not just electronics wizards. So what? Whether they are troops or technicians is at bottom immaterial . . . Mr. Khrushchev has decided that Dr. Castro is worth a little more investment, in the form of steel mills and military assistance. But the military assistance is of a kind not particularly relevant to the main danger facing Dr. Castro [internal discontent]; and Mr. Khrushchev is still carefully not offering an outright alliance."

The reference to "technicians" is misleading since it does not raise the decisive question: "technicians" for what? The answer is provided by the missiles and electronic equipment whose arrival coincided with that of the "technicians." A soldier handling modern equipment is bound to be a highly trained technician. But to call him that and nothing else is to deliberately obscure the issue. Since the technical functions these "technicians" are supposed to perform can have no civilian purpose—the means of destruction are nationalized in the Soviet

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Union and Cuba as they are elsewhere—the "technicians" must be members of the armed forces of the Soviet Union.

It is also misleading to dismiss the military build-up in Cuba as "defensive." The quality of a weapon as offensive or defensive is not intrinsic to the weapon but depends upon the circumstances of its use. Certainly under modern conditions of warfare Cuba cannot be an offensive threat to the American mainland, and it can be taken for granted that the Soviet Union does not intend it to be that. To dismiss the military build-up in Cuba as merely "defensive" in view of an offensive military strategy nobody can have seriously contemplated is, however, to miss the point. This point emerges from the political-military context of the Cuban situation.

The nations of Latin America are, in different degrees, in a pre-revolutionary stage. After having had their national revolutions a century and a half ago, they are now getting ready for their social revolutions. The Alliance for Progress is the American attempt to change the economic and social status quo in an orderly and gradual fashion and to direct inevitable change into non-Communist channels. Communism offers the Castro revolution, anti-Western and pro-Communist, as the model to be emulated by the nations of Latin America.

Cuba is not only being offered as the model of that revolution, but it is also—and this is the decisive point for our discussion—the headquarters of its ideological, political, and military propagation. Here the leaders of the Latin American revolutions are being trained; from here agents are being sent into the Western hemisphere, carrying money, weapons, and instructions. This headquarters of the Latin American revolutions, vulnerable as it is in the shadow of the North American giant, must be protected from a more effective repetition of last year's invasion. Hence the military build-up in Cuba.

How does this build-up affect the interests of the United States? It is detrimental to the political position of the United States in the Western hemisphere. It is detrimental to the political and military position of the United States in the world. And it is detrimental to the intellectual and emotional health of our body politic.

Our attempt to stimulate the peaceful and gradual transformation of the social and economic life of Latin America would meet great and perhaps insuperable obstacles even if Cuba did not exist as a revolutionary alternative. However, in Latin America neither the problem nor the remedy is primarily economic; rather it is political in the fundamental sense of comprising the intellectual and moral conditions of public life. Economic and social improvements depend upon a radical transformation of those conditions. Yet those conditions are sustained by oligarchies whose political power in good measure depends upon the maintenance of the economic and social status quo. Will these oligarchies yield to reform, or must they be displaced by revolution?

The American answer has been at best ambiguous, and when the chips are down it has favored the status quo. Faced with the threat of Castro-inspired revolutions, the United States is likely to be forced into a counter-revolutionary position per se, which, by opposing Castro-inspired revolutions, will tend to oppose all revolutions—and social change to boot. Thus it will be forced to play that very conservative role which Communist propaganda assigns to it. Having staked its prestige upon the Alliance for Progress, American political influence in the Western hemisphere would suffer a crushing defeat with the failure of that device. At worst, the Soviet Union, as the mentor and supporter of Castro-inspired revolutions, would take the place vacated by the United States. At best, the Soviet Union, through the intermediary of such revolutions, would compete with the United States for the allegiance of Latin America.

Not only does the transformation of Cuba into a Soviet political and military base challenge American influence in an area which has traditionally been regarded as an American sphere of influence: also, the unwillingness of the United States to react visibly and effectively to that intervention affects our prestige as a great power. For if the United States is unwilling—nobody doubts its ability—to protect one of its vital interests, regarded as such for a century and a half, is it likely to protect interests elsewhere, which are of much more recent origin and much more dubious validity? Mr. Khrushchev, in particular, cannot

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

help but ask himself that question. For Mr. Khrushchev declared Eastern Europe to be a Soviet sphere of influence in which he would brook no foreign interference, and the President of the United States accepted this declaration when he explicitly refused to intervene in the Hungarian revolution of 1956. On the other hand, when Mr. Khrushchev gains a political and military stronghold in our sphere of influence, we reply with rationalizations for inaction. Mr. Khrushchev has told recent visitors that he does not believe the United States will go to war over Berlin. It is not farfetched to suggest that this conviction may derive from, and certainly has been strengthened by, our passivity vis-à-vis the Hungarian revolution and the transformation of Cuba into a Soviet base.

Nor the least of the detrimental effects of the Cuban events has been the stimulation it has given to blind emotions, and the confusion it has wrought in our political thinking. These emotions and confusions center upon the Monroe Doctrine, which is being invoked, reinterpreted, and denied, as theologians do a sacred text. The Monroe Doctrine was a declaration of policy, derived from certain interests and made possible by certain conditions. While some of those interests have indeed survived to this day and others have disappeared, the conditions have totally disappeared. The Monroe Doctrine was the Magna Carta of American isolation. Its rationale was defined on July 5, 1820, in John Quincy Adams's instructions to the American minister to Russia: "For the repose of Europe as well as America, the European as well as the American systems should be kept as separate and distinct from each other as possible." The execution of that policy depended upon three conditions: British interests running parallel to those of the United States, the British fleet controlling the Atlantic accesses to the Western hemisphere, and the geographic isolation of that hemisphere.

Insofar as American isolation depended upon American policy, its end was foreshadowed by the Spanish-American War and the two world wars; it was definitely discarded with the outbreak of the cold war in 1947. American isolation as the effect of the policies of other nations has been reduced to a historic recollection by the modern technology of war—the long-range bomber, the intercontinental ballistic missile, the nuclear submarine, all armed with nuclear weapons. The end of isolation was an accomplished fact at the beginning of the 50's. Yet the illusion lingered on of its continuing reality, of the invulnerable American giant imposing its will upon the rest of the world while exempt from a similar imposition by others. Now the recent events in Cuba have finally destroyed that illusion, and here lies their psychological significance.

What a minority of Americans have known all along, through the processes of reason, the American people as a whole have suddenly and painfully become aware of through an experience of the senses: the visible transformation into a foreign-influenced, hostile political and military base of an island located ninety miles off the American coast. All of a sudden, it has become obvious to everyone that the isolation of America has never been purely a gift of nature, whose beneficial effects could be enjoyed by letting nature take its course and doing nothing. All of us have learned from experience now, what some of us had reasoned out before, that American isolation has always been a two-way street, dependent as much upon the inability and unwillingness of other nations to disturb it as upon American resolution to keep it undisturbed. In the measure that the United States proved able and willing to interfere in the affairs of non-American nations against their will, one or another of those nations was bound sooner or later to interfere in the affairs of the Western hemisphere. This has now happened, and it has made manifest the interconnectedness of American and foreign attitudes toward American isolation, axiomatic for the early American statesmen from Washington to Monroe, and obscured by a century of happy and seemingly natural enjoyment of immunity from foreign interference.

In that awareness of its vulnerability, America has had its moment of truth. All will depend upon how it faces up to that truth. It can lash out against its outward manifestation, expecting to eliminate the cause with the symptom. It would thereby only gain temporary relief for its psychological discomfort. For even if Communist in-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

fluence were to disappear from Cuba, America would remain vulnerable both in its own territory and in its influence throughout the hemisphere. The factors which have made the Communization of Cuba possible would continue to make themselves felt elsewhere in the Americas, likely to produce new Cubas.

The real issue upon which the future of Latin America hinges, then, is its susceptibility to Communization and the impunity with which the Soviet Union has already undertaken to Communize it. The nature of the issue suggests three different kinds of policy for the United States to pursue: the politization of the Alliance for Progress, the containment of Cuba, and the demonstration of American power.

In contrast to our past foreign aid policy, the Alliance for Progress is based upon the sound theoretical principle that economic development depends upon certain political and social preconditions and that consequently aid will be given only if these preconditions are present. However, practice has not conformed to the theory, and under the pressure of incompetent and desperate governments we continue to give aid in order to preserve at least the status quo. Thus we become in spite of ourselves the allies of political forces which are likely to fall with an unviable status quo, and we leave the Communists as the sole effective advocates of change. In order to escape this fatal identification with the status quo, the theory of the Alliance for Progress must be put into practice and aid must be given only to governments which will use it for economic and social change. Only if we can present ourselves to the masses of Latin America as the effective champions of social and economic change will we be able to compete with the Communists.

Such a policy would by itself serve to contain Communism and, more particularly, prevent its export from Cuba. Yet the success of such a policy is bound to be slow in coming and tenuous at best. For whatever the United States does in Latin America, it must overcome the popular stereotype which depicts it as a mighty, rich, and exploitative giant, allied with the forces of the status quo. In the meantime, the United States must take whatever steps are necessary to isolate Cuba physically from the rest of the hemisphere. And, if necessary, it must take these steps unilaterally—which brings us to the last point.

THE UNITED STATES has been strangely ill at ease in using its military power under certain conditions in support of its interests. The classic example is the half-hearted attempt at the invasion of Cuba in April 1961. The roots of that hesitancy are deeply imbedded in the American mind and have been traced elsewhere. On a more superficial level, that hesitancy stems from a concern for public opinion in other countries, a concern largely unfounded. The weak indeed resent the power of the strong, but they also respect it, and they do not respect the strong who do not know what to do with their strength.

The answer to the question as to what we should do with our strength vis-à-vis Cuba depends both on circumstances and a knowledge of details which is a monopoly of government officials. It could take the form of concerted action with Latin American nations or of unilateral action, such as a naval and air demonstration, a blockade, an invasion, or a combination of intermediate steps. But some kind of action it must be. If we refuse to take any action at all because we take the Russian threat of nuclear war seriously, as we did in 1956 during the Hungarian revolution and the Suez Canal crisis, we will hasten and not prevent the coming of a nuclear war. For, on the one hand, no nation will risk its very existence in a nuclear war fought for a secondary interest, and, on the other, as pointed out above, by yielding to such an implausible threat we create and strengthen in the mind of the Soviet government the illusion that we will not resist, no matter what is at stake. But obviously resist we will in defense of our vital interests. Thus a judicious and convincing demonstration of superior power, as Great Britain showed in the 19th century and the Soviet Union more recently, can be the most effective argument not only on behalf of a nation's interests, but also in the defense of peace. It will be heard not only by the governments directly addressed, but it will also be listened to elsewhere, even in Moscow.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Up In Massachusetts

JOHN PHILLIPS

EDWARD M. ("TED") KENNEDY is exactly thirty years old. He is a robust politician. A happy face at a street-corner rally, Teddy Kennedy climbs on top of his high truck-mounted platform, and with his searchlights cutting the night sky as at a Hollywood première, he sings "Sweet Adeline" for the people. He likes people, people like him. In September, Teddy took 69 per cent of his party's vote in the primary election in Massachusetts; we knew from the start he would win (how could he help it?) but never like that. Liston over Patterson. Eddie McCormack, his far more experienced and deserving opponent, is no longer a figure in our politics. It was a triumph so bludgeoning and immediate that the old anomic Irish party that spawned Teddy and his brothers and his grandfathers is dead. "The day of the old-goat politician," a Kennedy Democrat said most assuredly, "is done."

Into the void came a Juggernaut such as the ghosts of the Pilgrims have not before met with in old Massachusetts smothered in history. Now the Kennedys own the state (it can't be said only that they control it) and Teddy is the youngest and biggest. Six feet two inches, he is The Candidate to beat and his publicity is beginning to sound like Paul Bunyan's. The *Ladies Home Journal* quotes his enticing wife, Joan, saying that he has campaigned eighteen hours a day, seven days a week, for two years. *Time* has added half an inch to the size of his right hand, just from the handshaking.

In May when the White Citizens Council in Little Rock sent the first Reverse Freedom Rider to Hyannisport, Teddy Kennedy stood in front of the Family Compound and before his ineluctable audience of radio and television and newspaper photographers and shook hands with the nonplussed Negro. "Welcome to Massachusetts," said Teddy, and in some uncharacteristically vulgar oratory he rung in Plymouth Rock and the state's heritage as a haven for the oppressed and the persecuted; it went like that.

Besides being a human power plant with God-given talents as politician, Teddy is—name, face, and voice—the archangel movie star of the day. This has beguiled most of the working press in Massachusetts and in Washington, while the two big Boston newspapers, though Republican-owned, barely have whispered a word against Teddy, so nervous have they been about a television channel whose license in this election year had not yet, by the time of the convention, been renewed by the FCC, an agency of the Executive Branch. Teddy has all the money he will ever need as well as the connections, the White House telephone, the patronage, the psychic means of suasion: "How are ya? The President was asking about you." No other man can entertain one audience with homey anecdotes of family life, then stoutly refuse to discuss his family before the next. "I don't want to be the Kennedy Candidate. I ask you to make me the Democratic Candidate in November." Teddy has an organization that has worked through the state for more than fifteen years, so effectively by now that it is a fan-

JOHN PHILLIPS, who was born and raised in Massachusetts and still makes his home there, is the author of a novel, *The Second Happiest Day*, and has contributed to various magazines including the *Paris Review*, *Harper's*, and *Contact*. His new novel, as yet untitled, is scheduled to appear next year. This is his first appearance in COMMENTARY.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tastic clam rake for scraping up the ardent voters. He has a new corps of husky men under forty, many of whom look like football players or were football players or still are at heart. College friends, friends from out West have come to "help Ted" in his personal entourage, and in the wards and Democratic clubs many more young men equally husky are "cleaning out the deadwood."

In Springfield, at the Democratic State Convention last June, it was a lesson to watch the Kennedy corps shepherding their faithful right up to the microphones. When a delegation was polled each member was required to declare himself before the television cameras. "Ted will be looking at you," men were told, "and you know who else will be." As if they didn't know, a few oldtimers succumbed to inebriation and would have missed the polling entirely but for the efficiency of the Kennedy workers patrolling the hotels and saloons. "Get those guys back here. Make them vote," the order was from a young man in a shiny blue suit. In a few minutes the old guys were back in the auditorium like sheepish children and encouraged all the way to the microphone. "Awrighty Billy, let's giver the go!"—"I cast my vote for TED KENNEDY!"—"That'sa boy Billy. Gawd bless ya." That is the way to win, the art of the possible. Teddy Kennedy's slogan is: He Can Do MORE For Massachusetts.

Maybe this was not politics at all; it seemed surrealistic, a stereophonic dream in Todd AO. All the talk about issues—the Great Issues and Corruption and Federal Aid to Parochial Schools—in the political reality, these things were meaningless. I wondered if there would be a high-sounding new word for it—*metapolitics.*

THE THOUGHT CAME to me at the Kennedy press conference given the day before Teddy stormed the convention at Springfield. No member of the press foregathered on that refulgent June afternoon over the bowling alleys at the Schine Inn Motor Lodge, just up the turnpike from Springfield, was mean enough to deny that the Teddy Kennedys were a handsome pair. Joan, stunningly turned out in kelly green, a kelly green band through her hair, sat at the table, at her big, young husband's side, and she may have been a bit scared, though it never showed as she smiled. If smiles are masks, Joan may have felt safe behind hers, for it is a thing of joy. It sets off the self-assured youth of her husband.

You've got to look good, the word comes down. Smile for them. Comb your hair. *Look Good.* Practical Politics—as distinguished from politics—means Public Spectacle, in every sense of the Victorian phrase. And if you want to win, you manipulate the Spectacle, you hypnotize. If you don't *want* to win, or if you *can't,* what's the difference, either way you lose. You're Adlai Stevenson. *Who needs you?* Who needs a loser? Professional Losers, like H. Stuart Hughes, Independent, the anti-cold war candidate, and Norman Thomas—who confuse politics with Practical Politics—are worse than Losers. They are Spoilers: by appealing to the "nut vote" they try to spoil it for a man who can win, and the Kennedys will have naught to do with Stuart Hughes and call his candidacy "frivolous." Just to win this race and be the next United States Senator from Massachusetts will call for courage and endurance and hundreds and hundreds of thousands of dollars. And these are but the entry fee, because no matter how ugly you are, buddy boy, you're going to have to *Look Good.*

It isn't easy to promote a candidate as an image while protecting him from his failings as a man. To make a savage grab for power appear as an act of immolation takes a good head. "Massachusetts has been good to me. I have prospered. I owe a debt to our beloved state. I am no longer young, my friends. I ask you to help me pay this great moral debt while I still. . . ." These lines, it should be said, are not stolen from *The Last Hurrah.* The attentive listener can pick them up at most any Democratic political rally—the genius for poetic politics abounds in Massachusetts. "Is it a sin to be a Democrat? At Confession, do I say, 'Forgive me, Father, for I am a member of the Democratic party' ?"

A wise, old Republican, after many years in the Great and General Court of Massachusetts, has this opinion: "The Republicans have a few inhibitions left. I'm sad to say the Democrats have none." The old and waning Yankee Protestant stock still controls the Republican minority, but after one

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

hundred and twenty-odd years the Democrats control both legislative houses. These men descend almost all from immigrant Catholic workers chiefly of Irish, then Italian origins. Though they are constantly warring among themselves, in an election year these three blocs (Yankee, Irish, Italian) close ranks and vote along quite rigid "ethnic" lines which are, to be blunt, the residue of ancestral spite. Politics in Massachusetts, whatever its professions, has in practice always been the systematic organizing of hatreds; that is what Henry Adams thought, and in half a century little has occurred that would lead to mitigating his harsh opinion.

In such an atmosphere, debates on The Great Issues of the New Frontier amount to nothing, except as oratorical exercises and one-dimensional projections of the candidate's Image. If he is aggressively to project his Image, there are some things the candidate must not see nor hear nor speak. These are attended to by others—by a corps of abstract faces not necessarily allied with his campaign. He may not know that they exist, still they serve him in spheres where nobody could *Look Good*. The deals, backstabbings, threats, the seamy covenants and the plots in barrooms, the wild, only half-joking designs for larceny that held the ear of the eavesdropper. Who speaks for the candidate here? *Somebody* talks to the road commissioners, the bookmakers, the titans of the Legislature, the mayors, councilmen, judges, sheriffs, captains or police whose continuing prosperity depends on getting-with-the-Winner long before he wins. There must be some disembodied faces to help the campaign managers browbeat the delegations and dangle the patronage plum over several eager mouths at once; and more faces to assist the vexing nuances of graft—what pay-offs are "legitimate"; when is extortion a "valid political act"? Some faces may be called, for instance, a "Precinct Coordinator," and it is for him, some affable and lion-hearted old knocker of the vanishing school, to keep tabs on old buddies who may have minor patronage jobs or less particular associations with, say, the skipper at the Stationhouse—or Fire House, Customs House, City Hospital, City Jail.

In the end the order slips down from petty crookedness into our munificent and highly esteemed Boston underworld. Puritan hoods are as generous to their friends in the Legislature as any in New Jersey or the West Coast and they rarely forget a face or a name. Like the Kennedys and the Adamses before the Kennedys and many prominent Bostonians, the efficient hoods stay away from the city for considerable parts of their lifetime and return to residences on brief visits when their profession requires. They are a truly peripatetic lot, our good hoods, forever switching from Miami to Vegas to Honolulu, to avoid embarrassing faithful police officials and squeamish D.A.'s, as well as State House appointees to our ephemeral, unutterably boring Crime Commissions and Vice Crusades. It can well be argued that the treasury could not afford to pay salaries to so many gangbusters if it weren't for the inscrutable revenues which accrue from the industrialization of crime. Crime is made the public benefactor. Wheels turn within wheels within wheels in a grand, occult, positively Oriental design. The vision is hardly new. ". . . Boston has carried the practice of hypocrisy to the nth degree of refinement, grace, and failure," Lincoln Steffens wrote. "New England is dying of hypocrisy." But he wrote it in 1931, before either Joan or her juggernaut young husband were born. Lincoln Steffens died, New England died, and these are the children of dawn.

THAT BEAUTIFUL June afternoon over the bowling alleys at the Schine Inn in Chicopee, in the lull before the press conference began, Joan was talking charmingly to the reporters. "We were in such a hurry—" she was saying. The Candidate held onto a table mike with both hands clenched, like Samson straining to bring the Temple down. Actually he was only listening to his wife talk. He made his shy grin, and nodded, slowly with sure charm. Then Joan smiled back at The Candidate while he was grinning at her. For an instant they seemed just too young to be Mr. and Mrs.; they belonged in a 30's movie, a technicolor musical with a campus setting, holding hands on the 50-yard line, Mr. Touchdown grasping the football and she with something like a white wooly bunny rabbit under her arm.

"We were in such a hurry to get here," Joan finished in haste, "you know what we

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

did?" Her mouth made itself into a tiny *moue*. "We snuck through the back door and *came through the kitchen!*" she finished her comment. The reporters in front were wreathed in smiles. "She's a cay-am-pay-nuh," I heard a Boston newshen saying. "She'll make a fine wife for the Senatuh." The Candidate opened the press conference on a note of modest delight.

HE WAS STILL a law student at the University of Virginia when they were married in 1958, so Charlottesville became their first home. But in 1960—the whole family was on the move that year—Joan and he went West—to Colorado, Wyoming, all those places where he worked like a wild man, recruiting. ("Hello, how *are* ya?" "Good to see ya." "Glad you could come.") The Western life was so agreeable they nearly settled in California, only they didn't. They turned around and came all the way back to—of all places—Boston. In Ward 5, the Bluestocking Ward, they bought one of those thoroughly renovated, old-looking, Brahmin-type houses and began to raise babies.

Wild horses couldn't hold him back from serving Massachusetts, the old home state. For a dollar a year he worked in Boston as Assistant District Attorney under the District Attorney of Suffolk County, whose son was lucky enough to have a Washington job with the Attorney General of the United States. Pretty soon a group of older men in Ward 5 invited him to join the reform organization (called COD) they had founded with a view to clearing the Jukes element out of Democratic politics. Well, he was reluctant. The American Cancer Crusade, the Health and Fitness Fair, his reports on the European Common Market, on top of his official duties, kept him on the go. Besides he had a terrific out-of-state schedule of Official and Semi-Official Fact-Finding Trips. To Africa for the President, to South America at Cardinal Cushing's suggestion. And County Wexford, Ireland, Poland, France, and other critical European areas and the turbulent Middle East, and Israel, of course, and to the West Berlin powder keg for a profound gaze at the Wall. Between trips he was available to travel anywhere in the state to meet groups of any size and tell about the facts he'd found. Sometimes Joan was able to travel with him.

ANOTHER LOYAL Massachusetts Democrat, of a very different stripe from the Kennedys, is former State Representative Pasquale Caggiano of the city of Lynn, by profession an undertaker. Even as Joan and Teddy smiled at the reporters in the Schine Inn, this old warrior was already moving into Springfield a few miles down the Pike, asking delegates to get with him. Former Representative Pasquale Caggiano wanted to be Lieutenant Governor—wanted it so badly that when by midsummer he saw his last hopes go aglimmering, he nearly sabotaged the ticket. In the tired Parker House, across the street from the grave of Paul Revere, he called a "press conference" and there announced that a "substantial amount" of money had been offered him, along with "any position I desire in this Commonwealth" if he would withdraw his candidacy. "If pressure and sordid attempts to buy me off continue, I shall be forced to publicize the names of those who wish to deprive the people of their basic freedom—that of choice." The Republicans demanded a full investigation and the Democrats, in a lather, had to take their maverick in hand. Even so they were a long time getting him, he being "under advice of counsel," to specify his charges. "My honor has no price tag," said former Representative Pasquale Caggiano; now that the old Parker House is by way of being a politicians' haunt, the lobbies echo with brave avowals. The Boston *Herald* printed a photograph which shows a determined man of middle years; his jowls and chins, his rotund outline, are like King Farouk's; he wears rimless eyeglasses set in a frame of two-tone plastic and his right index finger supports a cigar like a giant wiener. Pasquale Caggiano, undertaker, of the city of Lynn, is only one of many faces whose destinies must ride with The Candidate.

LONG BEFORE the Schine Inn press conference, I had ventured into the State Legislature where Caggiano used to serve in our capital city of Boston. A hasty visit nowadays can smite a tender heart with terrors. On the crest of Beacon Hill, where John Hancock's pastures were before the earth itself got carted off by his venal heirs in a deal of Federalist Urban Renewal, Charles Bulfinch's noble building stands beneath the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

great gilt dome. State Senate President John E. Powers, a persuasive man passionately concerned with the tarnished honor of our government, said, "John, for the love of God write something good about Massachusetts." Last May Senator Powers told of having seen in front of the State House a Yankee Protestant clergyman mounted upon two large white cubes painted with black dots to look like dice. Some photographers were squatting, aiming their lenses upward at the minister for angle shots of the Yankee crusader. He was, it seemed, the author of yet another puritanic on corrupt government in Massachusetts, to be illustrated by dramatic color photos in a great weekly magazine. Standing on the giant dice, his somber head and shoulders loomed against the gold dome that Bulfinch built, when Daniel Webster was alive, and William Ellery Channing, and our city was the Athens of America.

Damon Runyon—or Bertholt Brecht—should have lived to tell the tales of our boozy crapshooting time. Last winter, Governor Volpe fired the custodian of the State House archives, a former legislator who watched over the scrolls and parchments of the Massachusetts Bay Colony, because he had been making book. This engaging archivist had the honesty to plead that to persecute him was hyprocisy, since he had taken bets for Democrats *and* Republicans.

The man's mistake was getting caught and abandoning the venerable objects, among which subsequently a twenty-two-year-old woman swore that a uniformed officer of our Capitol police force had raped her. The squeamish visitor does well to shun the archives, and to walk with busloads of nuns and schoolchildren through the marble halls upstairs. The Colonial trappings and the Great Mace of the Commonwealth are preserved with the Governors' lances; and the regimental standards dating upward from the War of Independence are cased in glass in the Hall of Flags, where they waked James Michael Curley. On the floor above the Great and General Court convenes. It is one of the oldest legislative bodies in the world.

This Legislature in joint session was reminded, shortly before his inauguration, by President-elect Kennedy, a historian, of Governor John Winthrop's discourse to his fellow immigrants aboard the "Arbella" in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean: "For we must consider that we shall be as a city upon a hill, the eyes of all people are upon us."

Very nice, and hear John Winthrop, in his last years, addressing this very Legislature on the natural liberty (i.e. corrupt nature) of man when not restrained by civil authority: *"The exercise . . . of this liberty makes men grow more evil and in time to be worse than brute beasts. . . . This is that great enemy, that wild beast, which all the ordinances of God are bent against to restrain and subdue it."*

John Winthrop was a Puritan and he died in 1649. In the Great and General Court voices have since been raised that would have him a Yankee pirate and a hypocrite who didn't mean a word of it. "We are a government of men and not of laws," certain of our lawmakers have said. To his eternal credit, Cardinal Cushing has set the great conscience of his office against these men. ". . . individuals who poison politics with . . . corruption. . . . These are genuine subversives who turn to wickedness the good order of society," the Cardinal said in a pastoral letter that would have pleased John Winthrop. When the Cardinal speaks, the Legislature hears him—which is not to say it listens very hard.

A SESSION of the House of Representatives blurs into fantasia on a hot summer afternoon. The great oval chamber where the President-elect spoke is not quite real. The cornice overhead is inscribed all round with the hagiocracy of grand old names—Edwards, Parkman, Endicott, Garrison, Pickering—and the galleries are dull in a sooty light from the vaulted stained glass ceiling. The galleries themselves are strange, being partitioned for Men and Women: a segregation of the sexes that you'd associate with synagogues and mosques. Curving behind the Speaker's platform are the five heroic panels of the mural that Christian Herter's father painted: "Milestones on the Road to Freedom in Massachusetts." Smoking is prohibited, the ventilation is poor; the air is heavy, musty like the attic of an old house. A moiety of the State Representatives have hot-weather head colds or low-grade

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sinusitis so that the haggling, the snarling and whining sounds which arise from the floor are punctuated with nose-blowing. An infectious Dorchester accent (Dow-Aches-tuh) demands higher salaries for women teachers through layers of catarrh; the experience is drugging. Speaker of the House John F. Thompson, "The Iron Duke," is banging the gavel down on a sneaky Yankee Republican attempt to deny the appropriation of public monies for the public welfare. John Thompson will not tolerate the implication that Democrats are thieves. He is a very big man, he speaks out with a roar: "You have got to understand that the Republicans steal through the medium of legislation." Representative Caggiano, the undertaker, used to be down there on the floor, among the hundreds of faces, the vigorous flushed Irish and thwarted Yankee stock turning mean or dotty under their load. They are debating amendments to the new code of Ethics. Observing the wondrous comedy, too innocent a mind is smashed between the hope and the fact, and has a sense of the soul's collapse and unaccountable frustration. In Asia there are ancient lands where moralities are not absolute, and mendacity and decay partake of the substance of culture. Rot gives fermentation and new life; so on through the generations until *substance and energy are themselves produced of rot*. Compare it to an obvious process of bacteriology, a thousand-year-old egg or a ripe Stilton cheese. We shall require ways to overcome that hallucination, and we have Joan.

Not Joan herself, the intelligent, warm, perhaps diffident young woman she privately is. I mean the public Joan who is a creation of the Campaign ("She's a *gold mine!*" an old pol told me) and prey to foolish labels like Green Jackie. *Green* is Boston newspaperese for Irish Catholic: a Democratic ticket that lacks at least one Italian or Jewish name is called All Green, or Too Green. The stylish Kennedy family are called The Green Brahmins, the Green Adamses. Jacqueline Kennedy is Roman Catholic, but she isn't Irish, so she can't be Green: she's Blue, like the blue-blood Lodges. As an old pol told me, Joan was green as they come; so that would make her the Green Jackie.

She was swathed in green. The dress and the band in her hair had the green of the shamrock and of the big signs along the Massachusetts Turnpike, the Mystic River Bridge, the Storrow Drive, the John F. Fitzgerald Memorial Drive, and for sure the Lt. William F. Callahan Jr. Memorial Tunnel—the many-million-dollar complex of ever-collapsing, constantly renovated public works projects which have been a vital force in state politics; something of that was in the rich green folds of her skirt. On her left at the table, talking pleasantly into the microphone, his elegant charcoal suit setting off a necktie of the identical green, was The Candidate.

A young practical politician who has served in the State House said, "I didn't say I'm *for* Teddy. But to be against the Kennedys in this state, that's suicide. . . . You want to know the smart thinking in this town? Teddy gets elected and we don't see him until '64. Then he comes back to get elected and he's gone again for the six-year term. Then maybe he'll be grown up a little and shoot for the moon. What I'm saying to you is these are Kennedys. Period."

So much political expertise is available this summer that it is not necessary to solicit it. A man will stop you on the street to volunteer his robust opinion.

"If the three Kennedy brothers were on a raft in the middle of the ocean and the raft turned over, who would be saved? Answer—the country!" That is a Roosevelt joke, warmed over; it came with a nasty smirk from a retired Yankee businessman, an unreconstructed FDR-hater of whom there are considerable in these parts. From the grim Republican position the shadows fell long and dark: we were hedging in Laos, conceding at Geneva, and the President was losing his temper at businessmen, ruining the market out of spite. Now he was trying to force down the country's throat his brand of socialized medicine. "I call it Kennedi-care, it takes care of the Kennedys, but who's going to take care of us?" No shadows were falling on the Schine Inn; no Republican cracking New York *Herald Tribune* jokes, and yet—

Two or three reporters from out of state started to put some pointed questions. Teddy was unruffled and a bit jovial with them.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

For a minute there, he'd thought that Mr. Mazo was in the room. This brought an appreciative laugh, since Earl Mazo, the admiring biographer of Richard Nixon, had already asked The Candidate some of these questions back in March on the NBC-TV Program, "Meet the Press":

> Mr. Mazo: Will the Democratic party be harmed this year by these scandals?
> Mr. Kennedy: I think the question of whether individuals who have come up, who have been indicted have been Democrats, I think, is irrelevant really. Any more than you can say that because certain of these people belong to a certain racial group or religious group, are from a certain city or town, they are necessarily all evil. I think the question of corruption is something that any individual has to be extremely conscious about and do everything he possibly can to rid the state of corruption, and it is for this very reason that I am interested as well.

In any transcript of the Schine Inn Press conference, much of the rhetoric will read this way. Sometimes the replies came softly and sounded honestly shy, and at others they bodied forth like a response to a challenge. When The Candidate speaks out on the Great Issues, he gives a performance like an athletic event, and your attention is lost in the gymnastic bond-rally style that he practiced back at Harvard in a public speaking course called English N. I had trouble bearing with him through a single clause. Was this what the reporters call "fudging an answer"? Was this what the old pols call "not opening a kisser"?

I believe he said: "I have heard a good many of these allegations. Like you gentlemen, I am anxious to get to the bottom of these charges. But so far I've seen no proof," —something of that sort.

THE ALLEGATIONS, as usual, charged excessive "pressure" on delegates, the threats and bribes and general sordidness which is the business of the faces operating behind a candidate's back. And true to the old political tradition of Massachusetts, Teddy Kennedy was only saying: *Prove It.* If it is a maxim that he who makes charges and does not prove them stands naked and exposed, there is also a corollary that he who proves his charges too readily will get torn limb from limb. There is a plague on Massachusetts of rumors and counter-rumors, of scandal and malignant gossip ("a vote for Peabody is a vote for birth control") all so manipulated that you hardly dare say what you know for fear of hurting somebody. I had not learned this danger, to which in a moment my exasperation would betray me.

"Yes, that's another of these allegations. I am as anxious as you gentlemen to get to the bottom of this. But we have no proof of it," I believe The Candidate was saying.

After three or four of these replies, a petty question in the back of my mind grew so imperative that I raised my hand. The Candidate acknowledged me.

"What about————?" I had a man's name on my tongue, but I couldn't speak. The Candidate turned his solid, young face in my direction and the Gene Tunney shoulders came forward into the lights, the glistening head of hair cocked to one side.

"I shall name no names," I declared in preamble; so from the start I'd made it impossible to say what I meant. I began to speak in strange, elliptic phrases, slithering around the point; I realized how my impulsiveness could bring trouble on a man who really didn't deserve it.

The substance of my question, which I couldn't really ask him now, was this:

Among the delegates of the small Yankee city of ————, six of the nine were committed, I happened to know, to the Kennedys. It was possible that a seventh vote, and possibly a unanimous delegation, depended on the pleasure of the senior member. That loyal old Democratic worker, whose name I could not say, had a young relative who needed a job in the Post Office—a job with the United States government which would not be forthcoming unless, since the young man's driver's license had once, very briefly, been suspended, a minor civil service regulation were overruled. I intended to ask The Candidate what he had to say about this matter. Who in our state politics was better situated to grant this favor than The Candidate who campaigned under the slogan "He Can Do MORE for Massachusetts" and was the younger brother of the President of the United States? I wanted to ask what he had to say about that.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Deals like this, which are the job of the faces, are not rightly called patronage; they are not legal either and in an election year, a lot of moral indignation—most of it oratory—is wasted against them. These little deals are inevitable in any state; and in a state that commences to dwarf the legends of the Wild West, that can boast of the greatest highway robbery—literally—in American history, and whose civic virtue evokes the Louisiana of the Longs, they become monotonous peccadilloes. They are not worth mentioning except to hurt an opponent who may not have time to dig up something worse on you. I like to think that when I raised the trivial matter of ————, in me lay some wistful hope that The Candidate would find a way to relieve himself and me, and—in an impossibly poetic sense—the body politic, of some fraction of the sham that is smothering us together. Out of his rumbumptious good nature, maybe he could answer me: *"LOOKIT, WERE YOU BORN YESTERDAY? What's a lousy Post Office job? Sure it stinks, but can I help it what they do? This thing is like an ocean in hell, and you're in it with us. . . ."* If Teddy, if *any* candidate, would answer that way, he'd have my vote. He could escape to Washington and I'd wish him all the luck —old buddy, buddy.

But all I could see was The Candidate watching me as though to say, *What are you getting at, what have you got?* Maybe I had half finished speaking when he understood and I saw my point score on his open countenance. I haven't the right to guess another man's feelings in one moment long lost in the annals of public relations, but to me Teddy looked pained and aghast, a clean boxer caught in the groin by a vile toe. He fastened me in a blue and heavy-lidded stare, and—with his mouth partly open—he began to nod in the negative well before I reached the end of my aborted, meandering question which had got to sound like a spurious chapter of Henry James.

"That is another of these allegations," I suppose he said. *"We've had no proof of that."* Of course they had no proof, nor would they, last of all from me. Yet a question had been raised at a press conference and with it my career in political journalism mercifully was ended.

Why did I do it? I thought right away; it seemed horrid to have embarrassed him.

"What do you want? He's young, he hasn't had the experience," one of Teddy's passionate defenders argued, startlingly ingenuous. "You don't know what he has to take in this campaign. Every last dirty thing they have they throw at Ted, but he's got guts, he's a guy." There was no dispute of it. Once back in 1960, on a moment's notice and with absolutely no experience, Teddy Kennedy jumped off an enormous bone-crushing ski-jump just to help his brother win the Wisconsin primary. In *Redbook* magazine I had seen a delightful quote from Teddy's sisters: "He's got no complexes, if that's what you mean."

THESE MEN are very bold, very serious, all for one—one for all; they are a tribal force, lineal and collateral. They revere the particular and shun the abstraction, and they have hard minds conditioned to a perpetual skepticism and rarely to an open doubt.

When you are contending with the bold innocence of a Kennedy, the temptation is formidable to recant. I wanted to walk up to The Candidate, shake the big hand and apologize, but it would not have worked. His innocent pained look when he got the sense of my question—*How come you kicked me like that?*—had killed some innocence in me.

The bold innocence of Teddy is something like a miracle. On the Boston Common, where the Shawmut Indians ran, and the child Emerson rolled his hoop, old sleeping bums crawl from under the newspapers when Teddy walks past. For a smile and a handshake they will waddle after him all the way across the top of Boston's brand-new, bankrupt, underground garage, whose six politican managers will be tried soon for a three-quarters of a million larceny, and follow the oriflame of youth along Tremont Street where the Kennedy-for-Senator building stands with a red, white, and blue marquee like a movie house.

Teddy Kennedy working a crowd is a great show. He stops being Teddy and transmogrifies into a natural, a virtuoso, with Nijinsky and Willy Mays. In a plain and very elegant gray suit he marched, a millionaire at twenty-one, through the slums of Charlestown, hardly a mile away from where his great-grandfather Kennedy settled.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

He moved under a blazing sun in the Bunker Hill Day parade, through the Oriental odors of sewage and decay rising off the streets and tenements here and about the oldest corner of Immigrant Boston. Gas lamps on the street corners. Sitting on newspapers spread along the curb, the old women watched the archangel movie star with their chins in their hands. "It's Kennedy. Ah Jesus, see him." Teddy went charging like a fullback into the sidewalks thick with votes. His face was pink, he sweated through his shirt of drip-dry nylon. The children held onto him so tight that he would be carrying three or four of them sometimes, wading through them on stiff knees. He worked the saloons, the variety stores, parked cars, tenement stoops, he grabbed babies and autographed for teen-agers and shook hands. "How are ya? I'm Ted Kennedy and I need your help."

WHEN THE press conference ended, everybody hurried down the turnpike to Springfield. The city had been acquired by the Kennedys. *He Can Do MORE For Massachusetts.* A fleet of Avis cars proclaimed the candidate in iridescent letters on their roofs and bumpers. "The Kennedy Girls," a decorative troupe of volunteers, in blue skirts, red sashes, red KENNEDY hats, they adorned the hotel steps, and the Elks Band played and The Candidate, lifted upon an Avis car, guaranteed them victory, victory, victory.

Teddy was absolutely right. A narcosis, a particular blend of charm and fear, had been put abroad and the Convention was over before it began. It was as though every presiding officer, from the Chairman of the Convention to the chairman of the least subcommittee on procedures, were a Kennedy man; as though every committee were stacked for the Kennedys. "What kind of politician would a man be if he didn't have his committees stacked?" an unwholesome local pundit said from long experience of these affairs. This cynic was not, I'm bound to say, among those judiciously selected correspondents to whom The Candidate's brother-in-law, Stevie Smith, had shown, rather confidentially, his unofficial forecast of the delegate vote—overwhelmingly for Teddy. By this efficient tactic—reporters say it was most effective at the San Francisco Convention in 1960—the assumption of victory was planted well before the fact in influential out-of-state newspapers. Hours before Teddy's name was placed in nomination the veteran correspondent of the Chicago *Sun-Times* stood up in the upstairs bar of the Sheraton-Kimball and told his colleagues that he was going to file for the early edition his story of the Teddy landslide. He was perfectly bland about it. "I guess I'll drop the bomb," he said. Except the bomb had been dropped long back.

The best-informed judgment I had heard was that the word had come down last autumn: if the boy is going to run, he has to win. We can't afford to lose this.

There is a passage in Hilaire Belloc's "Cautionary Tales for Children":

We had intended you to be
The next Prime Minister but three.
The stocks were sold; the press was squared.
The middle class was quite prepared.

"I'm worried about you," a friend was steadily telling me over the Convention days. "You complain about a power play by the Kennedys. Do you think the McCormacks are lily white?" He was a well-placed and capable Washington correspondent, well qualified to upbraid my naivety. For me he became the echo and the paraphrase of a hundred anxious voices that rose as one, last summer, off the New Frontier. "The President is having a bad, bad time with Congress, and he needs every vote he can get. Do you realize the *cultural lag* he's fighting?—those old goats who can't get together on who's senior to who? . . . How is the country going to get out of this paralysis if the President can't get the dynamic support he needs? Get it through your head—politics is not a simple-minded business. There is no Mr. Deeds Goes to Washington," the echo said. "Teddy wants to start his career as high as he can get. He has a perfect right to run, because he can win. Any man has a right to run if he can *win*. It's never the virtue of the situation, it's the *mechanics*."

When would I get it through my head? *Mechanics.* Wandering through the surrealistic boozy night in Springfield, I was considerably depressed. And worse, I'd learned that my unfortunate question had only hurt the delegate whom I had carefully not named. I hadn't thought that a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

veiled reference at a press conference would be manufactured into "news," or that this man would be named and publicly humiliated in a vicious anti-Kennedy newspaper. In this mood I was accosted by two of the finest, most disarming of Teddy Kennedy's thoroughly likable staff. They were fatigued but, not without reason, jubilant. Eddie Martin, who is bar none the best press secretary of any candidate around, swatted me on the shoulder. "Say, Jawn, you threw him a ringer at the press conference. The inside stuff. Hey that was O.K." Swat again.

Next it was the Cousin. The fetching young wife of another of Honey Fitz's grandsons. She had said before the press conference, "Write pretty things about us now." Friendly as ever this time she teased me: "Say Jawn, what kind of question was that to ask my favorite candidate?"

"Oh Your Candidate!" I believe I startled Sally Fitzgerald. The wail went out of me in the hot night air, and relieved of a certain frustration, I was able to go to bed.

Stop Teddy, Stop Teddy, the crickets sing from Cape Cod to the Berkshires. Kennedys, Kennedys, the *gall* of the Kennedys, the Republicans say, they won't get away with this one. The Candidate heeds the sounds not at all. "Saddle up, Joansie!" Teddy tells Joan, in the *Ladies Home Journal.* "We've got a two o'clock tea at Lowell . . . another one at four . . . a banquet in Boston. . . ." And clambakes, Communion breakfasts, he's storming the state. "How are ya? Glad to see ya. Have you met Joan?" "I'm awfully pleased to know you," says Joan.

On a late August night I had a glimpse of her, in the auditorium of the South Boston High School, where we were listening to a kind of debate. Green Jackie sat in the fifth row, beside Sally Fitzgerald, and I watched her tan face as Eddie McCormack, in real Southie style, said hard words to her husband. "You nevah worked for a living. You nevah held elective ahfis. . . . If your name were Edward Moowah (Moore) your candidacy would be a joke. Nobody's laughing. Your name is Edward Moowah Kennedy." She was yet more lovely than at the Schine Inn and her chin tipped up slightly to show the ineffable mold of her cheeks. A faint tightening in her mouth when she heard Eddie, but otherwise nothing. Her husband sat stiff on the debater's stool, his hands clasped. Teddy gazed into the TV cameras like a cadet braced for a hazing. He would not take the bait. When his ordeal was ended, droves of mothers and daughters in the television audience had switched from Eddie, the street fighter, to Teddy, the gentleman. It is widely held that McCormack's attack was a disastrous boomerang and The Candidate, with everything else, had won the sympathy vote.

He Can Do MORE For Massachusetts . . .

These are some events of last summer, about which nobody was able to do very much:

a. On the same afternoon that Joan, Teddy, and the reporters were foregathered at the Schine Inn in Chicopee, back in Boston there was an episode in the Archives section of the State House.

First let us consider the setting. Here are some of the things that are kept in the Archives.

The original Act against Witchcraft passed in Salem, in 1681.

The Act of Atonement for the Trial, Conviction and Execution of Anne Pudeator and Certain Other Persons for Witchcraft—passed by the Massachusetts House of Representatives in 1957, Michael N. Skerry, Speaker.

The remains of the Great Seal of England that was on the charter of the Massachusetts Bay Colony.

Parchment of Treaty with Penobscot Indians: 1752.

Law decreeing 100-pound bounty on Indian scalps, signed by William Dudley, 1724.

Musket used by Major John Buttrick at North Bridge, Concord. April 19, 1775.

The Original Constitution of Massachusetts, Oldest Constitution in the World.

These are kept in the basement floor, near the Archives office, where that golden afternoon, on top of a desk the twenty-two-year-old secretary gave carnal satisfaction to the officer of our Capitol police. He was afterward cleared of her flimsy rape charge which a municipal court judge did not believe.

b. Former Representative Caggiano of Lynn, the undertaker whose honor wears no price tag, lost his last chance to be Lieuten-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ant Governor. The State Ballot Commission ruled that 137 signatures on his nominating papers were forged.

c. Since the Great and General Court adjourned in July, the State House has been rather empty of legislators. Some teen-agers with summer jobs were playing loud rock 'n roll music in the corridors but the Capitol police put a stop to that. In the great heat, office windows are left open, permitting the Beacon Hill pigeons to wheel through the halls. To discourage the birds, it has been necessary to coat the window-sills with a white gooey substance, according to the Boston *Herald*.

d. There is a strangler loose in the city, an authentic sex pervert, who is likened to Jack the Ripper. Since the day of the Schine Inn Press Conference, six old ladies have been choked to death with towels and silk stockings. A recent corpse was found in an apartment on back of Beacon Hill, a short distance from the State House.

CALAMITY AND decay have seldom been so thick as this summer, nor the season so menacing as over the Boston Common on a hot day. The old bums are flopped on the park grass and pigeons fly through the State House. One afternoon I was going to burst if I did not escape from Boston. Heading for the seashore, I came up joyfully from the bowels of our new larcenied, bankrupt underground garage in a skyblue sports car, an Austin-Healy, 3.000, that had a Motorola radio which came on with the ignition. The twin exhausts roaring against the cement, the car mounted the ramp into the sunlight where the great gold dome shone on top of the Hill.

There was a religious program on my Motorola. Rising and falling on Boston, the words of a radio priest:

> "Now that your summer vacation plans are taking shape I don't want to hear any of you come around whining, 'Oh, I'm going to have to break my no-vee-na' as if it were a toy of some kind. . . . No, when you're on vacation remember to take your little book and tune in on our novena broadcast. . . . The summer novena in my opinion is the most important of all novenas . . . *in the summer we live in the time of greatest dangers and moral perils. . . .*"

I took the words to my heart. I had to clutch for an illusion and there seemed to be nothing at all till, like Aphrodite from the myths, Green Jackie slipped into my mind. I saw her as she had been in the great acclamation of Springfield, after McCormack conceded, when standing at The Candidate's side, hemmed round by raddled and venal faces, Joan Kennedy stretched out a hand to thank the Convention. "We want to thank you wonderful people," she told them. "And I know we'll be seeing you again and again and again."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LETTERS FROM READERS

The Gifted Student

To the Editor of Commentary:

. . . Having diagnosed a fundamental malady, Professor Friedenberg ["The Gifted Student & His Enemies," May] is guilty of the psycho-sociological animus which emaciates so much of our thinking and renders it facile. Of course the high school student is ill at ease, but not because of some abstruse sociological etiology with psychological overtones. The distemper is . . . in the gifted . . . student's intuitive rejection of a poorly trained teacher. Yet, the teacher's inadequacy is not due to his fundamentally poor potential. . . . The high school teacher is the victim of his training; the inadequacy of the training produces what one usually encounters in the high school staff: an empty, cipher-like mediocrity. . . . Schools of education which evolved, for the most part, from normal school traditions have blithely built a graduate curriculum based on teaching methods and *ersatz* disciplines. If the high school teacher has had graduate training, it is seldom in English, history, etc., per se, but rather in administration and supervision, or in the synthetic disciplines and artifacts of teaching. . . . The lions among them have had their claws clipped by certification requirements, salary schedules postulated on degrees or equivalency tables, and the continued presence of their tamers as school administrators. But they are still lions.

Francesco Cordasco
Visiting Associate Professor of Education
New York University
New York City

To the Editor of Commentary:

Mr. Edgar Z. Friedenberg's article has aroused a specific animus in this reader. The overriding theme that teachers are gripped in the throes of *ressentiment* to such an extent that creative Johnny Jones, who has discovered penicillin in his marijuana patch, is not really appreciated, or worse yet, is destroyed with benevolence, may or may not be true. Certainly Mr. Friedenberg has failed to establish a case for such.

Mr. Friedenberg offers little evidence to support any of his contentions. It is true that teachers are socially mobile; it is not true that socially mobile individuals are, ipso facto, frustrated and impotent, and thus particularly prone to *ressentiment*. He states that teachers are "academically and intellectually inferior." To whom? To other college graduates? To college instructors? Even Mr. Friedenberg must shudder at the sole use of the Miller Analogies Test to determine who is academically and intellectually capable; and he must realize that some instructors at the Bronx High School of Science *are* more intellectually alive and concerned than some of his own colleagues. . . .

Mr. Friedenberg misses the point that academic norms include provisions for the gifted student and there is nothing that aids the teacher's self-concept or social mobility more than to have graduates of his secondary school achieve success in later life as a result of having been encouraged in school. . . .

This article represents another in the trend of so many articles which bandy the word "creativity" about in the abstruse fashion of "disciplined but impassioned sensitivity," and thus succor the notion that poor grades, cynicism, and contempt are sure indications that creativity is being stifled. The scientific research done on gifted students from Terman to the Fund Scholars indicates otherwise.

Mathew Sgan
Boston, Massachusetts

To the Editor of Commentary:

. . . Who are Mr. Friedenberg's *"ressentients"*? If not the dregs of the graduate school barrel, says the unkind professor, then the sapless sprouts of petty bourgeois social climbers, clinging desperately to the whitewashed rocks of gentility in the social gardens of their betters. It is true that rich men's sons (unless they are rich enough for public service, like presidents and governors), with their fathers' living standards to maintain, probably cannot afford to teach in high school or in college, where the pay is inadequate. But what of the serious, aspiring sons of bookkeepers, candy store proprietors,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

carpenters, clergymen . . . ordinary bright boys who never expected to be Tellers or Bernsteins or Schlesingers or well-to-do, but who, faced with the almost universal necessity of making a living as agreeably as possible, sensibly decided to train a bookish bent, a musical ear, a mathematical flair, in the service of a career that would provide them with a continuation of their familiar living standard in addition to congenial colleagues and one of the few opportunities extant to do daily work which involves—nay, demands—genuine communication and relationship? "Rootless," are they? Aren't they rooted deep in the grime of prairies, pushcarts, police beats? Sons or grandsons, all of them, of people with the guts to get up and move on to a better situation. . . .

A scholar is a scholar and a teacher is a teacher. It is a commonplace that the requisites for the one do not comprise the assets of the other. . . . What is more, no superintendent or principal—or college president either—can hope to assemble a staff by hiring only these rarest of *aves*. Fortunately the secondary school administrator can run a good school anyway, for does not a high school teacher have to be only smart *enough*, knowledgeable *enough*? Like the gifted, off-beat student who is Professor Friedenberg's chief concern in this article, the gifted teacher, too, need not be a person of monumental I.Q., spongy for information. His capacity as guide, catalyst, stimulator, calls for quite different endowments, such as tolerance and humor (which probably got him through those Required Ed. courses that polished off his more neurotic classmates), warmth, patience, and a comfortable recognition of the difference between prestige and rewards of real value. . . .

And the thwarted youngster about whom Mr. Friedenberg worries—what's *he*, besides original and perceptive? Is he, as well, the kind of boy that a teacher, or anyone, *could* honestly like? "It is assumed," reports the professor, in a tone which actually smacks of complaint, "that it is better for the school dance to be one that everyone can afford than one with an especially good band and refreshments." Is Professor Friedenberg quarreling with this assumption? . . . Haven't we intellectual aristocrats mocked and knocked the egalitarian ideal long enough now. . . ? Which would he prefer: *baba au rhum* and a union-scale band in the select society of only the heavier taxpayers' scions (albeit in the public high gym); or oreos and a high school combo with kids from all over the district?

The professor also seems to regret that "boys and girls—with especially splendid bodies [are not] allowed to dress in such a way as to derive any special advantage from them." But what would he advocate as suitable classroom attire—bikinis and ballet tights? Finally he bemoans the "'philanthropic' refusal to allow excellence to get above itself." Does he feel that youngsters *should* be encouraged to get above themselves, then? Isn't it salutary for a cocky kid to learn as early as possible that such traits as arrogance, neglect of common tact and courtesy, and ostentatious learning are acceptable nowhere in the civilized world, except, perhaps, in the tolerant pages of COMMENTARY? . . .

(MRS.) MARGERY SILVER
Wheatley High School
East Williston, New York

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

. . . It ill becomes a professor of education to criticize the high school teacher for academic impotence, particularly when one realizes that it is the departments of education in our colleges that have grabbed off the lion's share of the courses required in the teacher-training program, leaving the teachers-to-be less and less time for "higher study in their specialty." Nor is it common knowledge that teachers have gone out of their way to opt for education courses. . . .

May it not be that the professor of education is projecting upon the high school teacher the *ressentiment* from which members of his fraternity may be suffering? It is well known that all too often professors of education are not held in the highest esteem among their colleagues in the other disciplines. To the frustrated, *ressentiment*-ridden education professor, who has done so little to help the teacher overcome his academic impotence, the high school teacher provides a convenient scapegoat. . . .

ISAIAH HELLER
Boys High School
Brooklyn, New York

MR. FRIEDENBERG *writes:*

Three of the four letters complain that since I am a professor of education, and departments of education have contributed to the conditions of which I complain, I have no right to complain of them. This, apparently, is an extension of the principle of guilt by association, which I cannot accept. I think most education courses are appalling; and the prevailing philanthropic-egalitarian-adjustment ideology of which we have been the source is indeed the *basis* on

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

which *ressentient* practices have been legitimated. My only argument with Mr. Cordasco comes from the fact that he thinks we have been a lot more important than I do. The normal-school orientation has underwritten *ressentient* attitudes and attracted into teaching more individuals who have them; but I don't think it is their source.

Mr. Sgan's position is, I believe, based on the early work of Terman—not just because he mentions only him, but because, reasoning from Terman alone, he would be right. He assumes that the gifted student is included among the high-IQ or academically apt students; and this just isn't the student I was writing about. Before writing his letter, I think Mr. Sgan really did have an obligation to familiarize himself with Getzels' and Jackson's work in their new book *Intelligence and Creativity,* or its replication at Minnesota—even the recent *Look* article would have made the issue clearer. There is a great deal of evidence, unfortunately, that academic norms not only do not provide for "disciplined but impassioned sensitivity" but that such students are punished in school. It is true, of course, that high IQ and creativity are associated, at least in middle-class kids; and that if the IQ is high enough the youngster can protect himself against the hostility his creativity arouses and still meet the norms, though at a considerable price in cynicism. Getzels and Jackson show that the high-creative, low-IQ kid gets ranked as an "overachiever," because he does as well on standardized tests (not grades) as his conventionally minded high-IQ peers whom teachers prefer. The teachers then see him as needing counseling because he is evidently working too hard for his limited abilities. The values implicit in my article are one thing; and anybody can argue about these. But, as of this time, there is a scholarly obligation to be aware of the body of evidence as to just how badly imaginative, divergent-thinking kids fare in school, whether they are bright or not. And when one considers the added impact of cultural differences—i.e.—the way schools treat creative kids who are creative in either a slummy way or a country-club way, neither of which is measured by IQ tests or rewarded by high grades, the picture grows very black.

Mrs. Silver and I have very different values. I judge from the tone of her letter that my article made her very angry; which I take to be better evidence that she understood it than the actual content of her letter provides. If a teacher feels that he has bettered himself by becoming a teacher, then I would say that he has rejected his roots. The question isn't whether his father was a pushcart-peddler or a policeman, but whether he became a teacher because of his interest and commitment to education and the growth of youngsters, or to get away from the pushcart or the beat. "The guts to get up and move on to a better situation" seems to me both snobbish and silly. Being a good teacher certainly does require guts; but I do not think that this is a requirement that the "aspiring sons of . . ."—I shall not quote Mrs. Silver's long list—relish, if their aspirations are what lead them into teaching. Teaching looks safe from outside.

I certainly am quarreling with the *assumption* that the cheap dance is best. This is something the kids should decide for themselves. If they go Galbraithian from time to time and decide that it is neither necessary nor desirable that public affairs be squalid, fine. Her paragraph about "heavier taxpayer's scions; *baba au rhum,*" in its hostility to the rich and the vulgarity of her conception of their tastes exactly illustrates what I mean by a *ressentient* attitude. What I would advocate as suitable classroom attire is what the kids, individually, think they look best in. At present, in many schools ranging from those of Los Angeles County to my own College, they are forbidden to wear blue jeans or well-cut walking shorts. In my judgment, not only is this none of the school's business; but the very desire to interfere expresses a prissiness I would not put up with. To an adolescent, the body is an important and expressive resource. Within the limits of decency—and by that I mean what would be tolerable in any public place—I will defend their right to dress to suit themselves against Mrs. Silver or anyone else. Finally, it isn't true that arrogance is associated with discourtesy. I try to go by Michael Arlen's old definition of a gentleman as a person "who is never unintentionally rude." Both Abraham Lincoln and Sir Winston Churchill have left a record of many arrogant comments, which were not only acceptable but endearing. I like cocky kids, myself; what I can't stand is *nebbishes.* Good manners are those appropriate to an occasion, like Dr. Johnson's well-known table repartee.

As to Mr. Heller's letter, about all I can say is that I am liberal enough in my interpretation of Descartes to accept it as evidence that he exists, for which I am grateful. Otherwise, on the basis of my article, I could have been accused of inventing him.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Future of Yiddish

To the Editor of Commentary:

Lucy S. Dawidowicz's article, "Yiddish: Past, Present & Perfect" [May] gave me great pleasure. Her analysis and understanding, but more than that, her love of the subject, of Yiddish and *yiddishkayt,* are reflected in every line. . . .

The achievement of our linguistic scholars represented by the *Great Yiddish Dictionary* really deserves the highest praise. Mrs. Dawidowicz's presentation of the subject . . . holds out the consolation that things will be better because they cannot be any worse. I often resent the complaint made by sympathizers with Yiddish: how has it happened that a healthy language with so many living branches should decline? But even worse is the conclusion of certain journalistic diagnosticians that the language has already died. . . .

Wolf Mercur

New York City

To the Editor of Commentary:

I am sure your readers will find great interest in the piece by Lucy Dawidowicz on Yiddish . . . I am concerned with the use of the term "mother tongue" which appears in three places in the article. . . .

It is not an accurate jump from the statement that a person's mother tongue is Yiddish to an assumption that the person can read and can speak Yiddish. It can be highly misleading, as is proved by certain deductions made from the Russian census to assume that 470,000 read and speak Yiddish. It is quite interesting to recall that the original phrase was an uninflected genitive and really was "mother's tongue." Of course, the person who answers a census application would not know very much about uninflected genitives and quite unconsciously would really give his mother tongue as Yiddish and not necessarily expect you to believe that he spoke it. . . .

Saul Hayes

New York City

To the Editor of Commentary:

[Mrs. Dawidowicz's] article on Yiddish in Commentary was extraordinarily interesting and illuminating. After producing something as good as this article an author should know that it is greatly appreciated. It certainly was by me.

William Stern

The Workmen's Circle
New York City

To the Editor of Commentary:

. . . Together with many Commentary readers, we are greatly indebted to Mrs. Dawidowicz for her brilliant essay. . . .

Sigmund Gottlober

New York City

To the Editor of Commentary:

Mrs. Lucy S. Dawidowicz's statement, in the course of her interesting essay . . . that there are "two Yiddish dailies" in New York, forces one to question the validity of some of her other assertions.

The Jewish daily *Morning Freiheit,* listed in the *American Jewish Yearbook* among the *three* Yiddish dailies in New York, recently celebrated its fortieth anniversary. It was founded, among others, by one of the pioneers of Yiddish poetry, Morris Winchevsky, whose literary activity began in London in the 80's and by M. J. Olgin, an outstanding figure in the field of Yiddish culture. Sholem Ash, Leon Kobrin, Abraham Raisen, David Bergelson, A. Raboy, H. Leivick, Moshe Nadir, and M. L. Halpern were among the contributors to the *Morning Freiheit.*

The *Morning Freiheit* will hardly disappear because of Mrs. Dawidowicz's strange arithmetic. She has her right to dislike the *Morning Freiheit* if she so chooses, but can her political prejudice be equated with the objectivity required from one who surveys the history and development of Yiddish?

The *Morning Freiheit* is a left-wing Yiddish daily. This may be the reason why Mrs. Dawidowicz does not "recognize" it. . . .

Paul Novick
Editor

Morning Freiheit
New York City

Mrs. Dawidowicz *writes:*

Christian missionaries on the East Side used to publish their proselytizing tracts in Yiddish, but that did not make them Yiddish writers or the tracts Yiddish literature. Just so, the *Freiheit's* use of Yiddish to proselytize for its religion does not make it a Yiddish newspaper.

Nearly all the contributors Mr. Novick mentions broke with the *Freiheit* in a short space of time and were reviled for it. By claiming them now, he is trying to make us forget that. As for David Bergelson, he had no opportunity to break with the *Freiheit.* He was shot, with other leading Yiddish writers, in a Soviet labor camp. Novick was then praising the Soviet Union for its contributions to Yiddish culture.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

More on Goodman

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

I am surprised that a journal of COMMENTARY's standards should allow such a careless, irresponsible, and unchecked opening paragraph as Mr. Paul Goodman's ["The Ineffectuality of Some Intelligent People," June] beginning: "At their meeting in 1960, the American Association for the Advancement of Science resolved that it was the duty of scientists to inform the public of the dangers of bomb testing and heard C. P. Snow predict as a matter of statistical certainty that some of the bombs would go off within ten years. I asked Margaret Mead—I think she was their president at that time—if this meant that scientists working to produce these deadly products should quit their jobs. 'Certainly not,' she said, 'it is their duty to inform the public.'"

This statement bristles with inaccuracies, and demonstrates that Mr. Goodman can hardly have referred to the broadcast for WBAI when he interviewed me at the end of the meetings of the AAAS (of which I was not president) on the position of the Association in regard to scientific responsibility. The AAAS, as an association, did not and does not pass resolutions of the type Mr. Goodman alleges. Moreover, it is an inadequate representation of my statement as to the position then advocated by the Committee on Science in the Promotion of Human Welfare, which had sponsored the meeting on "Science and Human Welfare" chaired by Dr. Jerome Frank. It has been the position of the AAAS Board that in a membership association of the size (over 62,000 members) and diversity of the AAAS, it is not possible, on controversial issues, to get agreement which would be totally representative of the membership. The Committee on Science in the Promotion of Human Welfare, in a statement published in *Science*, July 1960, said: "With respect to the decision-making, the scientist's role is simply that of an informed citizen. Like any other citizen, the scientist is free to express his opinions regarding alternative solutions for matters of public policy and will perhaps join with like-minded citizens in a group effort to foster the solution he prefers. This role does not derive from the scientist's professional competence or obligations but only from his citizenship, and therefore it bears no direct relationship to his professional organizations.

"But in the matter of providing citizens with the knowledge required to make informed decisions on science-related public issues, the scientist and his organizations have both a unique competence and a special responsibility. As the producer and custodian of scientific knowledge, the scientific community has the obligation to impart such knowledge to the public.

"The scientific community has another special competence (which derives naturally from its concern with new and potentially significant attributes of nature), for attempting to detect incipient problems before they become unnecessarily acute."

The position taken is a carefully thought out one on the responsibility of the scientist, as a scientist, and the responsibility of the scientist as a citizen. Its effectiveness is well illustrated by the activities of the St. Louis Citizens Committee on Nuclear Information, and the New York Scientists Committee on Radiation Information. Their understanding is that it is the duty of scientists to put their scientific knowledge at the disposal of citizens, either on request or their initiation, and that it is the duty of citizens, including scientists as citizens, to attempt to make informed decisions on public policy. The position apparently advocated by Mr. Goodman is that scientists, as a special esoteric elite, should band together to subvert the expressed political aims of their respective national communities, and arrogates for scientists a special status which puts them above the law.

IT IS true that the question of scientific responsibility has become badly clouded today. The layman fails to realize that scientists may differ in their scientific appraisal of data, and so they appear to differ in terms that the laymen may interpret as political partisanship or time serving. In some cases scientists undoubtedly do take such positions. When such issues as testing, civil defense, and so on, are discussed in a partisan setting—among the services, between government agencies, or between our political parties—each partisan group expectedly seeks technical support for its position. On all issues that are scientifically unclear, each side of any policy decision can find some support. But it is our hope that if many scientists assume the same active role taken by those associated with these Information Committees, now springing up in many parts of the country, it will be possible greatly to increase public understanding, and to stimulate research on crucial issues.

A useful example is the recent exchange between the St. Louis Committee for Nu-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

clear Information and the Surgeon General of the U.S. Public Health Service. The committee made a careful analysis of the problem of determining the hazard from I 131 in fallout and concluded that the policy of the USPHS (that no countermeasures are needed) was not properly grounded scientifically. When the Committee brought this analysis to the Surgeon General's attention, he acknowledged the correctness of the Committee's view and the need for serious concern over the hazard.

It should be realized that the attainment of a peaceful world within which the human race can be effectively protected from the overwhelming hazards of modern technological warfare is a new problem, one that the human race has never faced before, and one that requires the intensive effort of specialists and laymen alike. The increasing recognition of the catastrophic possibilities of modern warfare give us, for the first time in history, a situation in which peace is not a desirable interlude between wars, but a necessity, the conditions of which must be established. The bomb and its attendant technological innovations in biological and chemical warfare give us an unprecedented opportunity for new types of research and new types of action.

MARGARET MEAD

American Association
for the Advancement of Science
New York City

MR. GOODMAN *writes*:

My conversation with Professor Mead was as I reported it. I had assumed that she was their president. I thought wrong. There was, of course, no general resolution of 60,000, and it was careless of me to write as if the small articulate and "radical" committee spoke for them all, even in its feeble proposition. I gave them the benefit of the doubt.

Professor Mead's present statement about the perplexities of the scientists is profoundly unimpressive. She knows as well as I that in the differing "scientific appraisals" there is a good deal of plain quackery and sleight-of-hand. For example, with regard to safe radiation-levels or the effect of high-altitude explosions, the scientists do not know; their logical behavior, therefore, should be concertedly to advise the decision-makers and the public that it is unwise to act. I have not heard this concert. Conceive if the pure food and drug laws and the building code were administered with equal lack of caution. In another kind of case, would Professor Mead deny that the seismic evidence on inspection has been made the football of diplomacy and mere propaganda? But most important—and this was the point of my essay—do these scientists who in fact appraise the data as very dangerous, then band together and threaten to strike? Certainly I affirm that every person's special knowledge and function, whether teacher, physician, industrial worker, or mother of children, are prior to the law; there is nothing elite or esoteric about this.

I wonder if Professor Mead realizes the colossal cynicism of her last sentence: "The bomb and its attendant technological innovations . . . give us an unprecedented opportunity for new types of research and new types of action." This means that these excellent brains are to be sidetracked into further ingenious investigations, and committee meetings, even though the enterprise as a whole is already catastrophic and will only become more so.

The Two Cultures

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

. . . Reviewing the critical literature on *The Two Cultures,* including Professor Trilling's, "Science, Literature & Culture" [June], I still think the central issue has not been met at all. And, on the surface, there is a good reason for this condition. Neither literary critics nor second-rate novelists nor, for that matter, scientists are generally equipped to handle philosophical issues. Snow's book raises (though not on a profound level) the whole question of the moral neutrality or involvement of science in the determination of values. The important minds who discussed this question around the turn of the century are not Matthew Arnold or Huxley or Faraday but Rickert, Windelband, and Dilthey, whom I strongly suspect neither Professor Trilling nor Dr. Leavis nor C. P. Snow to have read. What it all comes down to is this: can the true, the good, and the beautiful be appropriated through scientific analysis? Do they lend themselves to that sort of dissection? If the answer is yes, Freud is right and we must perish or else cope with living in a meaningless world. If the answer is no, a new foundation for values outside the reach of scientific pulverization must be found and established. I happen to believe that the scientific revolution has never been neutral, that all this talk about science being used for good *or* evil is indicative of shallow learning. It seems to me quite clear (as it was to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Goethe's Faust) that the commitment of Western civilization since roughly the Renaissance to scientific detachment in its comprehension of reality is fraught with invitations to self-destruction, leaving the more obvious benefits derived therefrom out of account for the moment. In demythologizing and stripping of subjectivity, science inevitably presents us with a new picture of reality which cannot help but have a negative impact on poetry, the arts, religion, and all those entities that in the past have helped to make life bearable for Western man. For reasons which he does not give, Sir Charles seems to me correct in affirming a bifurcation. But his diagnosis and evaluation is so lacking in any philosophical sophistication. Unfortunately, though I find myself in sympathy both with Leavis and Trilling, the same must be said for them. Leavis's parochialism and Trilling's broad point of view smoothing over fundamental tensions prevent either from coming to terms with the problem. . . .

GEOFFREY CLIVE
Department of Philosophy
Washington University
St. Louis, Missouri

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Some of the more palpable weaknesses of C. P. Snow's *The Two Cultures* are missed by both Drs. Leavis and Trilling. Whereas it may be true that certain of the literary greats of our century might have provided words leading to Auschwitz, it should be apparent that the physical implementation of Auschwitz and its analogues was made possible by a relentless science and technology obediently suborned to the will of a tyrannical state. Scientists as scientists may be bright, bold, unbiased, and honest, but there is no reason to believe that, as men, they possess virtues of leadership and morality superior to other men. . . .

There are numerous instances in current history where science has been prejudiced to conform to political aims. Within recent years the exposition of Lysenkoism or biological determinism and the negation of quantum mechanics or physical indeterminism by Soviet scientists demonstrate all too clearly that science can be the handmaiden of politics. C. P. Snow himself in his novels has shown time and again that scientists are but men whose considerations, both scientific and social, can be colored by desires for power and prestige. . . .

MEYER M. MARKOWITZ
Ardmore, Pennsylvania

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

In a conversation with Sir Charles, I queried him on the response of scientists, decent fellows that they are, to totalitarianism. What did Lenard, Stark . . . and to a lesser extent Max Planck and a host of others say when confronted with Hitler? To a man, they made revolting unscientific remarks proving they could be as bigoted as the next man and continued to serve their Nazi masters. Who were the scientific counterparts of Thomas Mann and Hermann Hesse? There weren't any. Similarly in the Soviet Union it is the literary intellectuals Pasternak and Dudintsev who are problems. . . .

The fact is that scientists are pampered by all societies today and so see little reason to object to any of them. As these decent fellows see it, the search for truth can go on in the shadow of the gas chambers.

ARTHUR J. LEVENSON
Silver Springs, Maryland

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Lionel Trilling, in his excellent criticism of C. P. Snow's Rede lecture, has replied essentially from "the enemy camp." He defends literature and literary people against Sir Charles's gross generalities. However, Snow is deserving of a rejoinder on his own grounds; the subject of this criticism being Snow's philosophy of science.

Throughout the Rede lecture there runs the thread that science and scientists are good, practically by definition. For example, scientists are less prejudiced, it is implied, and they "respond alike." To show the falseness of this latter point, it is only necessary to couple the names Edward Teller and J. Robert Oppenheimer, Herman Kahn and Linus Pauling. It is also stated that if the West is not to become an enclave in a hostile world, it must bring the fruits of the Industrial Revolution to the poor countries. . . .

It is typical of the shallow thinker to believe that the sole answer to the world's problems is the training of great gobs of engineers and the creation of mountains of vacuum cleaners and dishwashers. The true scientist, I think, would say that the "poor" countries are poor in self-realization rather than material goods, and that science is neutral, not good. The purpose of science is to help us achieve a better understanding of self and the universe; and the application of science should be subordinated to value judgments which are human, not scientific. . . .

ROY G. SALTMAN
Flushing, New York

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

NABOKOV'S ANTI-NOVEL

PALE FIRE. By VLADIMIR NABOKOV. *Putnam. 315 pp. $5.00.*

Reviewed by ALFRED CHESTER

THE NOVEL is having a hard time. Never mind best seller lists, copy writers, and Sunday book review sections, only one or two works of fiction have been anything like wildly anticipated during the last few years: perhaps *Franny and Zooey* (which everyone had already read in the *New Yorker*), perhaps the final volumes of Durrell's *Alexandria.* There have been, of course, any number of novels and books of short stories which the newspapers and their advertisers told us were major works by the best writers of their generation under fifty, or forty, or thirty—but has any of them generated an excitement approaching that surrounding *Dolce Vita, Hiroshima, Rocco, L'Avventura, La Notte, Lolita, Marienbad, The Misfits, The Lovers,* to name only the most obvious? Are these films better than the fiction which appeared during the same period? Surely not. Hardly any of them is artistically equal to its reputation or the passions it has aroused. But our time wills the cinema and doesn't will the novel. What would be the fate, for example, of a novel as long, as static, as heavily undramatic as *L'Avventura?* It would go unread and unsold and unsung. What would happen to a novel as pretentious and pseudo as *Hiroshima, Mon Amour?* It would be selected by the Book-of-the-Month Club, get on the best seller list, go unread by several myriad purchasers, and be frowned upon by every intellectual except perhaps Clifton Fadiman. Certainly no one as intelligent as Dwight Macdonald, who loved the film, would tolerate its qualities between covers.

Nearly everyone I know—and probably nearly everyone you know—would rather see a movie than read a book, and I count among my acquaintances writers actively weighing down the world with more prose. It isn't that it is easier to see a film than to read a book; films have become as difficult—and almost as expensive. It isn't that films are dirtier than books; they aren't. It isn't that they understand people better or make more important statements; they don't. Yet, however trivial or phony may be the mind or spirit behind a film, it takes on significance simply by virtue of being cinematic. And this is as it should be, for The Movie is only just beginning to find out it is an art form. It is not yet totally self-conscious, though it is getting there by leaps and bounds. The audience is still free to be entertained. The Novel has now become laden with terror for the public and for its writers. It is full of meaning and illuminations, almost as portentous as The Poem. It is Art. It explains things. It educates. And yet, however monumental may be its message, it takes on a triviality simply by virtue of being fiction in a time that does not want it. In all the history of the world no people have ever wanted art for its own sake or meaning for its own sake.

For the makers of fiction, this is a time to be gotten through, until the novel comes back into fashion, takes on a new life—until it is freed. Possibly, there are already symptoms of an unclogging, at least to this extent: that a few of our most serious writers, after years of silence, all burst into speech in one single season. James Baldwin has produced a book of fiction after six or seven years; Salinger after twelve; Carson McCullers after fifteen. (Dare I mention Katherine Anne Porter who, it is rumored, had worked on *Ship of Fools* ever since the Italian Renaissance?) What Salinger is up to in his project, no one yet really knows, except maybe Salinger, but what all the others have been up to is the hope that The Novel will make its comeback in traditional form. Perhaps it will, but meanwhile the French, with their rigorous intellect, have

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

grabbed the bull by his horns—as they did when the theater broke down after the war—and produced the anti-novel, much less exciting than the anti-play in fact, though equally exciting in concept. Unfortunately, the anti-theater on both sides of the Atlantic has moved into decadence without having so far affected the mainstream of drama. Perhaps the anti-novel will do better, though Robbe-Grillet and those women are really hopelessly boring and humorless. Nonetheless, they function at giving the novel an appearance of life and the public an illusion of hope, like the intravenous feeding of a comatose person. If you care about the invalid, you watch the food being ingested and you wait and you hope and you try heroically to suppress your yawns through the long dull night.

IF I MAY take the liberty of calling Nabokov's work American, then *Pale Fire* is the first American anti-novel to come to my attention, and it therefore seems to me notable even if it is notable only for external and peripheral reasons. It is notable in the same way that Carson McCullers' elaborately pretentious Negro in *Clock Without Hands* is notable. Because it represents the first recognition of a certain state of affairs. Perhaps now someone will come along—maybe she will do it herself—and draw the white-aspiring Negro, the Ivy League Negro, the assimilating Negro as he should be drawn. But McCullers has acknowledged his existence, and the world must contend with a new idea. Nabokov, in *Pale Fire,* tells us that there is no novel at present, and he offers this book in its place. It is an anti-novel in the sense that it functions like the French genre in substituting for the novel without vitally altering it or advancing it, in being marvelously disrespectful of traditional communication, in being horrendously emphatic about the personal and relativistic. (The body and the spirit of the book, however, are certainly closer to the anti-play with its insistence on humor and absurdity.) With *Pale Fire,* the question "is this a novel?" becomes irrelevant, since to pose the question is to miss the point.

The first part of the book is a very long poem in heroic couplets by John Shade, the second most famous American poet. (He is second to Frost, he says of himself.) The poem is called *Pale Fire* and is an autobiographical work written during the last weeks of the poet's life. Mostly, it is an uninteresting and prosy sort of thing, but it becomes occasionally moving as when Shade speaks of his wife or of his ugly daughter who killed herself while very young. The larger part of the book is a linear commentary on the poem and is written by Dr. Charles Kinbote who comes from a country called Zembla and teaches Zemblan at the same university where Shade, until his death, taught Pope. Shade and Kinbote have also been neighbors, and after Shade is killed, Kinbote absconds with the manuscript of *Pale Fire* in order to write the commentary. These, more or less, are the events we can be sure of, for Kinbote is a madman and the reader is led to doubt or disbelieve almost everything he says. Lots of additional information is supplied to us as the commentary unfolds, and I hazard—but I don't guarantee—it adds up to something like this: Kinbote is, or imagines he is, the deposed King Charles of Zembla, and he has escaped to America after a revolution. In meeting Shade, who obviously despises him (though Kinbote—or Nabokov—pretends unconvincingly that Kinbote is never aware of this distaste), Kinbote suffers the poet to endure a torrent of Zemblaniana, with particular emphasis on the youth and reign of King Charles. When Kinbote learns that Shade is at work on a long poem, he becomes convinced that the work is about everything he's told Shade. In fact, there is no relationship between the two, and this is the point of the novel. The book is ingenious in concept, for the whole commentary is a vain attempt to give meaning and coherence to the meaningless and incoherent. It is, in concept, an allegory. The insane Kinbote—who is repulsive in every conceivable way—struggles desperately and heroically to relate himself to King Charles (who he may or may not be), to Shade, to Shade's poem, and to a person called Gradus whose reality is indefinite, whose identity is uncertain, but who travels through the commentary and halfway round the world for the purpose of assassinating King Charles Kinbote. In the end, Gradus, whoever he is, *if* he is, accidentally kills Shade, but by the time this presumably happens the reader no longer believes anything. We no longer

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

know what to believe. We know only that reality is what filters through the irrational brain of a man struggling to give shape and meaning to what has neither shape nor meaning. We can know nothing, says the allegorist, except that we can know nothing and that the human being who performs a heroic act is in fact an appalling worm. Man is a foul grotesque, a ludicrous clown caught up in tragedy.

It sounds like a fascinating book, doesn't it? One of the great things about Nabokov is that you can't speak of his novels without making them sound more interesting than they actually are. He is always so full of good ideas, European that he is; he has a wonderful mind and an acute constructive sense; and the central images of his books are always ripped straight from the dark part of the brain, from the creepy nervous terrors of the unconscious. Read any of his work from *Laughter in the Dark* on up, and you will get that macabre closeup of infantile panic, of *things* filled with inaccessible, unrecognizable, but very potent horror. *Pale Fire* has all this and also the additional virtue of taking cognizance of the state of affairs of The Novel. He lets you take nothing seriously, never lets you drop into the world of fiction—and to make doubly, positively certain that you won't, Nabokov even makes a couple of in-person appearances with references to a hurricane called Lolita and a professor of Russian called Pnin.

Despite all this brilliance, *Pale Fire* is a total wreck, and for only one reason: it isn't funny, and it's supposed to be. Nabokov's sense of humor is on the same level—though not with the same object—as German scatalogical humor: excrement is funny simply because it is excrement. To Nabokov a thing is a riot by virtue of being itself, with the *sous-entendu* that he hates it. If you find, as he does and I don't, that it is a scream to write a literary commentary, to be an academician, to be a homosexual, to be insane, to be paranoid, to be unaware of how other people feel about you—and all these things in themselves—then you will roar the sickly laughter of Nabokov. It takes a lot more to make me laugh; it takes the revelation of some truth to make me laugh, and I think I am not in this respect much different from most people. Nabokov's mockery offends me not because I'm an American liberal and can't stand people making fun of other people, but because he is making fun of other people and revealing no truth, except about himself. He ridicules people because he personally doesn't like them, not because what they are or do is ridiculous. Nabokov hates like Swift, but unlike Swift he is without innocence. His comedy is a lie. It is dead. It is evil, like racial prejudice. Less evil by far than Nabokov's cold and repulsive aspersions on such things as bad breath and pederasty, however more sinister, were the Eichmann jokes making the rounds last year which mocked and trivialized the death of six million Jews—and which, nonetheless, even I and other Jews could laugh at. We laughed at the absurdity and impossibility of our mind trying to grasp what was too large for it and of our feelings trying to be moved by what was too grotesque for them. We laughed as an admission of our forgetfulness and our hardness. We laughed, in the deepest sense, because we were *willing* to laugh, and this shamed us. When Nabokov's creature talks endlessly about the things Nabokov hates, we pity him his obsessions and frown at his author's tastelessness. The Eichmann jokes showed us up for what *we* are; Nabokov's humor only shows him up for what *he* is.

REFLECTIONS ON AN OLD TRUTH

PORTRAIT OF A JEW. By ALBERT MEMMI. *Orion Press. 326 pp. $4.95.*

Reviewed by DAN JACOBSON

> *Portrait of a Jew* deals with my life as a Jew. I wrote it because I want to understand who I am—as a Jew—and what the fact of being a Jew has meant in my life. Since this demanded a ruthless honesty with myself, I had to analyze all aspects of my being. But my being embraces that of so many other people, the portrait becomes no longer only my own. There exists, I now believe, a universal Jewish fate. More than my story, this is the story of all Jews. I have tried to sum up my—our—position, without apology, without caution, without niceties; I wanted to tell *everything.*

IT IS WITH these words that Mr. Memmi summarizes his intentions in this essay. From the jacket, and from the references to his

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

career within the book, we learn that Mr. Memmi was born of a poor, Orthodox family in Tunis, and grew up there; in his early manhood, during the Second World War, he was arrested and interned in a forced labor camp, from which he subsequently managed to escape. He was educated at the University of Algiers and at the Sorbonne; he now lives in Paris and devotes himself to teaching and writing. As a boy Mr. Memmi was a devoted Zionist, and intended to settle in Palestine; after he had left home, his Zionism gave way to a belief in universal freedom, socialism, and progress, which made any special preoccupation with Jewishness seem petty and parochial. Inevitably, the war disillusioned him; nevertheless, after the war he returned to Tunisia, helped his Moslem fellow citizens in their struggle for independence—and then, that independence having been attained, found himself confronted once again with his own separateness, with the Jewishness he had put aside (or had imagined he had put aside) so many years before.

From this outline, it can be seen that Mr. Memmi has lived through a series of events or experiences which are central to our understanding of the modern world: he has observed, at the closest quarters, the disruption of the religious, sequestered life of the ghetto; the exile (and worse) of the war years; the postwar fervor of nationalism among the former colonial peoples; the politics of France and Europe during its latest phase. He has necessarily, inevitably, through the accidents of his birth and upbringing, been a man of many worlds, each of which impinges directly upon our own. His personal story could have been a remarkable one.

Unfortunately, instead of keeping his promise and attempting to articulate a general or universal experience through a recital of what has happened to him as an individual, Mr. Memmi far more frequently tries to approach the particular through the universal. And his "universal" is as often as not simply a repetitive, diffuse kind of rhetoric which I cannot help dismissing summarily (and not altogether unjustly, I feel) as "French." When he talks about the "difference" of the Jews, for instance—and I am choosing my example pretty much at random—Mr. Memmi writes:

> Difference, in short, seems to me to have been just another stage. To know its nature we should have to hear the accusation and discuss it. Difference, derived from the accusation, is fluid and complex like the latter; born and bred in confrontation, it is also constantly disrupted by it. Separation, on the contrary, is connected with an obscure hostility, with what one might call the Kafkaian stage of the accusation. As it is not directly derived from the substance of the accusation, it is considered an important but relatively simple fact and of an important nature.

I should add that the context fails to make this passage any clearer than it is out of context; and that anyone who rereads the last sentence must surely agree that no context could possibly make it comprehensible. How much of the confusion is due to an inept translation, I cannot say; but I have little doubt that a large share of the responsibility must be borne by Mr. Memmi.

The curious thing about the book, considering the turgidity and impenetrability of so much of the writing, is that in fact Mr. Memmi's main thesis is a fairly simple one. It is that the Jews are an oppressed people, and that it is a misfortune to be born a Jew. As it happens, this is a view with which I have great sympathy, though I have no doubt that many Jews would regard it as repugnant and insulting. But in view of what has happened to the Jews within my own lifetime, it seems to me that to speak of the Jewish fate as a misfortune is both more truthful and *more dignified* than, let us say, some of the cheerier things written in COMMENTARY'S symposium, "Jewishness and the Younger Intellectuals" (April 1961). Toward the end of the book, Mr. Memmi insists that he is fully aware of the positive aspects of Jewish existence—of Jewish solidarity and family feeling, of the tenacity of Jewish religious practices, of the unparalleled length in time of Jewish survival—and is deeply appreciative of them; but his stress falls heavily and repeatedly on "that painful grimace . . . that distinguishes [the Jew] from other men." Can anyone who has read Jewish history really feel this stress to be misplaced?

Mr. Memmi does not, however, only have the murder and spoliation of the Jews in mind when he speaks of them as an oppressed people; what he tries to do is to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

make explicit all the subtler economic, religious, cultural, and political forms of the oppression; even those of which some Jews may manage to remain unaware. He tries to analyze every force which alienates the Jew from the society around him, which constricts him in the choices he is able to make, which distorts his own image of himself and inhibits his response to the outside world. He constantly compares the inwardness of the Jewish fate with that of other oppressed peoples and groups: in particular, with that of people who have undergone colonialization, like the Moslems in North Africa, with that of proletarians in a capitalist society, with American Negroes in a white society, with women in a male-dominated world. But the effect of these various comparisons is ultimately self-defeating. For in the end all one is left with is this large, vague, ever-expanding term "oppression": the only faintly hopeful prospect for the future which Mr. Memmi holds out is that at some time one may be able to exchange it for an even larger, vaguer term: "liberation." What form this liberation may take is left entirely unexplored. In this particular connection, I find it characteristic of the book that though Mr. Memmi's references to the State of Israel, which has radically changed everyone's conception of the Jewish fate, are warm and admiring in tone, it isn't at all clear whether or not he has ever actually visited the country. Details of that sort don't seem to interest him.

THE BEST SINGLE passage in the book is that in which Mr. Memmi describes how he feels, as a Jew, in a country like France, whose history cannot begin to be understood without some degree of participation in its Christian past; a country where holidays and place-names, buildings, ceremonies of state, and the language itself all celebrate the permanence and dominance of Christianity. (And he makes it clear how different is the "detachment" from that past of the non-believing Christian compared with that of the non-believing Jew.) In this passage one does hear a directly personal, individual voice; and it does go some way toward persuading one that to describe accurately and unsparingly the forms of an oppression or unease is in a measure to free oneself from it. Had all the book been of that quality I would certainly not have found it "negative" or "unconstructive," despite Mr. Memmi's pessimism and somberness of tone: the telling of truth is always a positive and constructive act, no matter how unpalatable that truth might be. But, just because he has nothing but "insight" to offer —no political programs, no religious belief, no new view of Jewish history or the Jewish future—Mr. Memmi's uncertain grasp of the factuality of his own experience everywhere else in the book is all the more damaging to it. "It's hard to be a Jew"—that phrase has been in use for a very long time. Mr. Memmi's gloss adds disappointingly little to it.

THE VIEW FROM THE CAFÉ

LATIN AMERICA BETWEEN THE EAGLE AND THE BEAR. By SALVADOR DE MADARIAGA. *Praeger. 192 pp.* $4.50.

Reviewed by SAMUEL SHAPIRO

A FIXTURE OF every Latin American university is the near-by café where politically-minded students and professors gather to talk, organize factions, and settle the issues of the day. Never wanting in these gatherings are loud ideologists ready to explain, categorically, just what is wrong with their country's political and social system, and how these shortcomings can be set right. The solutions offered vary from Marxism and "Indianism" to free enterprise and John Birch nationalism, but the tone of breezy certainty is generally the same: over a café table everything sounds easy and plausible.

Now Professor Madariaga has put some two hundred pages of this kind of talk between the covers of a book; but what might be impressive in the give-and-take of conversation looks woefully dull and disorganized in print. Señor Madariaga's opinions about Spain and Spanish America were formed decades ago, and nothing that has happened recently has caused him to re-examine them. But Fidel Castro and the Alliance for Progress have created a market for books about Latin America, and the author, with the typically facile pen of a *pensador,* has set himself to satisfying the demand.

Some of the points he makes are valid and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

familiar enough. Too many Latins want white collar government jobs, and too few are interested in science and technology; there is a shortage of "the truly productive and creative" middle class; governments are unstable; the land is monopolized and inefficiently used; there is not enough native capital and a tendency to export what there is of it. He charges the United States with "intellectual disdain towards Spanish culture," and with neglect of Latin America. The State Department's worst sin is its fondness for the Somozas, Franco, Trujillo, Batista, and Perón, "every nation-breaker who had gangstered his way to power," whom it used "like the handle of a frying pan."

All this has been said before, with solid documentation, by American scholars and journalists. Señor Madariaga, like a café conversationalist, has not bothered with the tedious business of research and travel. He has apparently read only two or three books and a handful of magazine articles about contemporary Latin America; like many representatives of the Hispanic tradition he does not understand and is not really interested in the problems of economic development, as his use of outdated and misleading statistics for the year 1950 shows. (Similarly, he wrote the section on the Dominican Republic before Trujillo's assassination, and did not bother to revise it.) His book swarms with errors, not all of which are misprints. President Cárdenas of Mexico is "Cúrdenas"; Ydígoras Fuentes of Guatemala is "Ydagoras"; Petroleos Mexicanos (Pemex) is "Petróleo Mexicano (Petro-Mex)"; Ambassador Dwight W. Morrow is "Monroe." Professor Madariaga writes that Communism got a foothold in Guatemala "when Arévalo died (1950)"; but Arévalo is very much alive, and preparing to run for President again in 1963. The errors, if small, are symptomatic of a Quixotic attitude toward facts; no North American scholar of comparable reputation would be so casual or so careless.

Madariaga's major interpretations are equally dubious. He believes that the Latin American countries' "primary evil . . . is lack of population." This is clearly absurd for countries like Peru, with 1,500 persons per square mile of arable land (U.S. = 240) and an average daily diet of 1,800 calories, or Haiti, with 2,400 persons per square mile and a per capita income of $1.50 a week, the lowest in Latin America. Madariaga concludes that Venezuela's (comparative) prosperity is due to her generous immigration policy—as if oil had nothing to do with it! And Mexico's remarkable progress in the past two decades is attributed, not to political stability, social reform, proximity to the U.S., and tourism, but to "the strong injection of Spanish blood received by Mexico as the outcome of the Spanish Civil War."

Indeed, Señor Madariaga is still fighting the long-won battle against the "Black Legend" of Spanish perfidy and foolishness. For it he substitutes his own "White Legend" of a Spain "more sensitive to the elusive and subtle values," in which there is a "predominance of the individuated faculties of the spirit—intellect and will . . . one of the most intelligent of European peoples; as well as one of those in whose midst intelligence is distributed most equitably."

These murky maunderings about the National Character are reinforced by a Pollyanna-like review of Spanish imperial history. Cuba in the 1890's, Madariaga insists, was "not harshly governed"; there were, to be sure, Weyler's concentration camps (in which 50,000 Cubans died of hunger and disease in the province of Havana alone), but "by Nazi or Soviet standards they were pleasure resorts." Any attempt by Argentina, Mexico, or Brazil (which Madariaga insists is also "Spanish") to develop a separate nationality, "any action directed against their common Spanishness must be condemned as either an error or a crime." This determination to emphasize the Spanish and to play down or ignore the Indian (and English, French, Italian, and North American) aspects of Latin American culture even leads him to miss the significance of some of the little personal anecdotes of which he is so fond:

> [A friend in Cuzco] who was showing me the city suddenly hailed a lean, tall Indian of about fifty and asked him in Quechua: "Who are you?" The man gave his name and volunteered to add: "I belong to Don Bartolomé Gonzáles." He knew perhaps no Spanish; but I had noticed the clothes he was wearing: they were a fairly faithful though shabby version of the Court dress worn in Spain towards 1770.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

An interesting cultural survival; but surely the significant facts about this encounter are that, after four centuries, the Indian could not speak Spanish and that he "belonged" to his landlord.

AFTER THE diagnosis, the prescription: Latin America must curb its labor unions, which Madariaga (mistakenly) believes "are powerful enough to challenge the State." It must put its faith in the military because "there is in all Latin armies a tradition of liberty." Immigration will help (though food production per capita is lower than it was in 1938, and almost all nations must import foodstuffs). Standards of living and the birth rate, he says, are rising rapidly, "and this may help." But the standard of living in most countries is stationary or falling, and a continued rapid increase in population would be calamitous. (Madariaga gives three different figures for the birth rate, all of them wrong.)

Madariaga wants a commission made up of an Argentine, a Frenchman, an Englishman, a Swede, and an Italian (all of whom he names) to inquire into "the unsatisfactory practices in the financial relations between the two Americas"—as if these matters had not been studied again and again by ECLA, the World Bank, Congressional committees, and dozens of independent scholars from both sides of the Rio Grande. He would like to remodel the Organization of American States "so that it is composed of only two partners: the U. S. A. and Latin America"; what a howl of outraged nationalism *that* would call up! He suggests that Puerto Rico be made independent and federated with Cuba and the Dominican Republic, a proposal which all three peoples would emphatically reject. And his comments on the Cuban situation, the most delicate and dangerous in the hemisphere, are vague and useless:

> Cuba must be liberated. . . . Let the Doctrine of Freedom be proclaimed from the White House, and, armed with that Doctrine, let the United States lead a spirited operation against all dictators—right and left. Other American nations may join in the crusade. *But it must be a crusade.*

What are Mr. Kennedy and his advisers to make of this stirring but Delphic oracle?

Professor Madariaga's book is, then, neither a new scholarly investigation of Latin America's problems, nor a successful journalistic attempt to explain the findings of scholars to a general audience. He himself notes the Latin Americans'

> pronounced tendency to general ideas and their disinclination for the merely utilitarian; their dislike of technical work, [which] arises from . . . three centuries of a scholastic, generally classical and disinterested education.

Many of the national development plans drawn up under the Alliance for Progress suffer from just such vagueness and imprecision; and *Latin America Between the Eagle and the Bear* is itself a product of these very tendencies.

A MOVING EQUILIBRIUM

MEMOIRS OF A SPECIAL CASE. By CHAIM RAPHAEL. *Little, Brown. 207 pp. $4.00.*

Reviewed by JULIUS GOULD

THERE PROBABLY is a standard recipe for the contemporary Jewish memoir: one part diluted *schmaltz,* one part youthful rebellion, one part emancipated success; any topping can then be imposed — father-hatred, mother-fixation, anti-Semitism can all be recollected in tranquillity. *Memoirs of a Special Case* does not follow this conventional recipe, and to many readers this will come as an astringent shock. Its author is a distinguished British official, a writer of elegant detective stories, well-known in New York where, for many years, he was with the British Information Service. Now back in London, he is head of the Treasury's Information Division. Born in 1908 in a small Northern English town, he studied at Oxford and, before the war, held research fellowships in Hebrew studies. He first entered government employ in 1940 when he helped to transport to the Americas some of the Jewish refugees whom the British government, incredibly, had placed in a detention camp. Mr. Raphael's career serves as the framework for his book of memoirs: or, rather, his book of memories—augmented and reshaped by the writer, blending a core

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of fact with a penumbra of fiction. We see the narrator at school and on return visits to his native town; on a schoolboy's adventure in Florence and as a graduate student in Oxford, London, Spain, and Palestine. Intermittently we find him in New York—and there is one poignant chapter on the way in which he helped to solve the problems of the detained refugees, anxious as most of them were to press their "special case" for priority transport across the Atlantic.

Several ladies cross and recross his path —English and American girls, Malcah the Polish girl he meets in Florence and aids in her illegal entry into Palestine, Yael the wife of a Russian Jew in Jerusalem who gives him "a gentle kiss on the cheek" before telling him, apropos his interest in the Bible, "You're so wonderfully innocent." All in all a pretty crowded canvas.

THE BOOK MAY be taken on many levels. To me it suggests a Jew who is in fact both innocent and worldly. Many Jews, like Mr. Raphael, have faced the conflict—sharpened by higher education—between environments and cultures. Few will have had the success attributed to the central character of these memoirs in reconciling the conflicts, in superimposing the layers of experience upon one another. As Mr. Raphael presents himself, he is fully aware of clashing loyalties and cross-pressures—but, with great adroitness (or is it innocence?) never allows the pressures to build up into self-hatred or self-torment: the result seems to be that very British product—a moving equilibrium. This may be seen in his affectionate and fair-minded recollections of his schoolteachers —the Lithuanian Rabbi Taub in whose unusual establishment (of "ten sex-hungry rabbinical students") he lived, and Mr. Sedgewick, the Anglican Headmaster who took him on a family trip to Florence. The contrast between these two men is symbolic, though not a contrast between old and new or good and evil (Mr. Sedgewick is not portrayed without irony): what it symbolizes is Mr. Raphael's equilibrium. Very rightly it focuses on the educational cross-pressures which are the major catalyst of traditional Jewish experience in Great Britain. American readers will note the non-political nature of Mr. Raphael's adolescence—they may feel, as his friend Malcah does, that "the tranquil life of an English Jew, and of English students generally, seemed equally mystifying." Certainly Mr. Raphael's American contemporaries knew less than he did about the Bible and much more about Lenin, Martov, Trotsky, and the rest. They will also note the innocence with which Mr. Raphael bridged the gaps between himself and his traditional past: there is symbolism too in the way he combined graduate study of the Midrash with attendance upon a girl-friend—"a devout Anglican" whose "first lover had been a curate."

Mr. Raphael's thoughts upon Jewish experience and history are always pointed and often moving. But there is no direct attempt to explore the less tractable problems of Jewish identity in the modern world. He makes one of his characters say that the Jews are "the sparkle in the champagne, the gherkin that comes with the pastrami sandwich." There is a touch of ethnocentrism in all this: but let that pass. More importantly, it points up a theme which these memoirs tend to mute. Relationships between Jews and Gentiles (even British Jews and Gentiles) are not as simple or tranquil as all that. All is not champagne that sparkles, and being a bubble is a rather precarious fate. Mr. Raphael is wise not to be obsessed with the personal and social agonies of Jewish emancipation: but they *are* part of Jewish identity and ought to be confronted. Perhaps he is reserving them for some later memoirs. Perhaps too he has been enabled to mute them because, for so long, he was a double stranger—an English Jew in New York. If there is nostalgia in this book, it is the credible nostalgia for the small Jewish milieus which he compares, with his usual fair-mindedness, with the metropolitan vastness of New York. "The Jews of New York have evolved a kind of unconscious philosophy that really takes in everything. One might express it like this: *Gefillte fish is not the whole of life: there is also chopped liver.*" Mr. Raphael, like most British Jews who know New York, is enamored of it: but I suspect that he looks back with relish to a milieu which was satisfied with gefillte fish—and rather small pieces at that. However, his equilibrium has gone on moving, and like a good English empiricist he is prepared to like, digest, and interpret other nourishment as well.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ALFRED KAZIN, ESSAYIST

CONTEMPORARIES. By ALFRED KAZIN. *Little, Brown. 509 pp. $7.50.*

Reviewed by LIONEL ABEL

I MUST FIRST of all take up an unwarranted and, I think, malicious attack on Alfred Kazin's new book of essays, *Contemporaries.* The attack, appearing in the guise of a book review in the *New Republic* (July 30, 1962) was made by Joseph Heller, author of the popular and, I am told, interesting novel, *Catch-22.*

Mr. Heller is wrongheaded; he is also cowardly, as can be seen from his first two sentences:

> To read Alfred Kazin's collection of essays, *Contemporaries,* is to come away with the impression of a man who hates literature and loathes his life's work.
>
> This impression, while possibly not entirely true, is certainly not entirely false.

Here Mr. Heller has totally condemned Mr. Kazin and then added the qualification that his total condemnation is possibly not entirely true or justified. To my way of thinking, if one is violent enough to call another man a faker, one should not go back on one's own epithet. It is cowardly to take back half the charge after having enjoyed making it fully.

What Mr. Heller has to say against this volume of Mr. Kazin's recent critical pieces amounts, as far as I can see, to little more than a certain disagreement with Mr. Kazin's estimate of some contemporary writers: Salinger, Bellow, Roth, and Norman Mailer in particular. Now if Mr. Heller likes these writers more than Mr. Kazin does, it does not follow that the latter likes literature less than Mr. Heller does. And the notion that this follows seems to be the only ground for Mr. Heller's attack.

What Mr. Heller simply has not understood about the practice of literary criticism is this: critics almost invariably—Mr. Kazin is no exception—have a certain vested interest in the value of the works they deal with, and are more inclined to overrate than underrate them. The critic knows that a literary piece cannot have more value than the work it is about; the great instances of literary criticism were not devoted to insignificant works. Criticism, when important, is positive. Surely one of the reasons Mr. Kazin's pieces on *Moby Dick* and *Light in August* are so superior to anything else in *Contemporaries* is that the works dealt with in them are so vastly superior to any others Mr. Kazin deals with in his book. I do not believe that the very greatest literary critic of all time would be capable of writing as fine an essay on Norman Mailer's *The Deer Park,* let us say, as Mr. Kazin has written on Faulkner's *Light in August.*

Mr. Heller's objections to Mr. Kazin's book are wrongheaded and foolish, but I must confess to a certain dissatisfaction of my own with it. Everything Mr. Heller says is wrong: Mr. Kazin *is* devoted to literature, in fact he loves it, and he is fair-minded and even magnanimous in his judgments, most of which seem to me to be correct. As a matter of fact, he comes off rather better

Why Americans still fight the Spanish Civil War

THE WOUND IN THE HEART

By Allen Guttmann

The author probes the extraordinary impact of the Spanish Civil War on the American conscience—and shows why our political alignments still reflect divisions that were first crystallized by that remote struggle.

The controversial role of American Catholics . . . the shocking paradox of the Roosevelt administration's failure to support the beleaguered republic . . . powerful personal reactions among minority groups—no facet of American response is overlooked.

For those who remember the Spanish Civil War, its tragedy rises afresh in this memorable work. And for a younger generation, here are the reasons why "the last great cause" has never really died.

Illustrated $5.95

FP THE FREE PRESS OF GLENCOE
A Division of The Macmillan Company

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

on this score than Edmund Wilson, whom he reveres, for Wilson has been guilty of a fair number of very wrong judgments, some of which can even be called howlers. Now I admire Wilson greatly: from which it will be seen that I do not consider the function of criticism to be "right" evaluation, or "right" judgment, of literary works. Curiously enough, the notion that such evaluation is terribly important is shared both by Mr. Heller and by Mr. Kazin.

So far as I am concerned, Mr. Kazin has made right judgments of the books he treats in *Contemporaries*. But to say that is to say only that I have made pretty much the same judgments myself. The "right" evaluation is precisely the evaluation you have made or are capable of making. But that Mr. Kazin is capable of something far beyond "right" judgments or "right" evaluations is shown by his essays on *Moby Dick* and *Light in August*. Both essays are beyond praise, as fine as anything in American criticism.

IN THESE two essays Mr. Kazin does not evaluate or judge the novels he is concerned with, he does not appraise them at all; what he does is something to my mind far more interesting and far more objective: he expresses the way in which he prizes them.

John Dewey distinguished between prizing and appraising, holding that the former was the subjective aspect of judgment, the latter the more objective. I want to suggest that in aesthetic matters there is an important sense in which the very contrary is the case: in the act of prizing the critic looks directly at the object, in the act of appraising he has to look at many other objects. Some people talk and write nowadays as if the main purpose of a literary work were for it to be "properly" evaluated. Now, I should say, its main purpose is to make the reader prize something, and the critic who prizes the work and can indicate that he does so as excellently as Mr. Kazin can, aids the purpose of the work, instead of setting up another purpose—his own—to properly evaluate it. There is far too much of this sort of thing being done now, mainly by critics less sensible and less sensitive than Mr. Kazin. He can do better things, but he does what they do, too. And when he writes of Leslie Fiedler, of *The Deer Park*, of *Goodbye, Columbus*, and the essays of James Baldwin, the best he gives us are the always intelligent, well-informed, chatty, and I think finally flat judgments with which *Contemporaries* abounds.

When, for example, Mr. Kazin poses the question: "How good is Norman Mailer?" —a question Mr. Kazin in fact does not answer, and which evidently he himself does not consider worth answering—one wonders why he brought the matter up at all, and I can find no reason other than the aim of being talky about Mr. Mailer, about whom people happen to be talking. What is striking, though, about this particular effort of Mr. Kazin, is that while it does not lead to any real evaluation, evaluation is precisely what it seems to aim at. As if the critic has to pretend to be a judge, even when he wants to be a gossip. But maybe Mr. Kazin, in this piece, has hit on a new rhetorical device and in the future, instead of saying: "So-and-so is so good," critics, when they want to gossip, will ask, "How good is so-and-so?"

Evidently Mr. Kazin does not disdain to be gossipy since he prides himself on his knowledge of life as well as of literature, and on his ability to place contemporary literary works in their appropriate social contexts as well as in the hierarchy of literature. And in *Contemporaries*, presumably devoted to the judgment of literary works, there are a great many descriptions of what is now going on in society; in such descriptions, Mr. Kazin exhibits an alertness and an intelligence just as acute as he shows in his examination of novels, poems, and essays. Or so it would seem from his comments on the attitudes of college students toward contemporary literature, his interesting report of the effect of American audiences on Dylan Thomas, his reactions to literary milieus in Germany, Russia, and Israel, and his ironic assessment of how the boldest literary works of two or three generations ago are rendered innocuous classics in the literary courses now given in our colleges. The presence in Mr. Kazin's book of so many descriptions of social processes seems to indicate a conviction on his part that by being alert and responsive to changes in society the literary critic puts himself in the best position to understand and judge important changes in literary sensibility.

I like Mr. Kazin's feeling that literature is related to life and that its relation to life

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

should be shown in criticism. What I disagree with is his assumption that criticism is enabled to show the relation of literature to life by situating itself somewhere between the two and by alternately looking first at one and then the other. It seems to me that such looking is also a looking away from, and also a way of not looking very intensely. The curious attractiveness to a critic of such glancing from life to literature is, once again, that it enables him to interest himself in works which are not really interesting. Life is interesting even when looked at casually. Literature is interesting only when seen with intensity.

Now when Mr. Kazin touches on a real historical figure, of more than casual importance, and one difficult to judge, his alertness to and interest in social facts do not help him at all. What I have in mind is Mr. Kazin's judgment of the career and character of Leon Trotsky. On the subject of Trotsky Mr. Kazin exhibits a harshness, intemperateness, and insensitivity which he does not show at all in responding to Herman Melville's Captain Ahab. And this is all the more striking to me since everything Mr. Kazin has to say against Trotsky could be said with equal or greater force against Melville's hero. Surely, the only superiority the latter could be said to have to the Bolshevik leader is to have appeared in a work of fiction rather than in a revolution. Mr. Kazin's assessment of Trotsky tells me mainly that Mr. Kazin is not deeply interested in Trotsky, as he is in Ahab, but I think Mr. Kazin would have been interested in Trotsky, and moved to a fine appreciation of his destiny, had the Bolshevik been a character in a novel by Melville, or by any other writer of like stature.

Georg Lukács contrasted the thinker with the essayist, meaning by the essayist the literary critic. According to Lukács the thinker is one who, looking directly at life, is able to have a feeling of human destiny; the essayist is one who is incapable of such feeling except when looking at some great character in a literary work. Seeing Lear, Hamlet, Phaedra, Ahab, the essayist can observe the workings of human destiny. The great writer has his own vision. To have his own vision, the literary essayist needs the vision of the great writer.

If Mr. Kazin in this volume is mainly a reviewer of current works rather than a

Just published

PAUL GOODMAN'S

bold program for an era of megaton morality

PAUL GOODMAN'S powerful new book draws the line between integrity and cynical compromise in a world that has become hardened to the Cold War, the H-Bomb, a misused technology, and meaningless administration. Here is an original program created to meet today's unique and desperate need for natural values. A hard answer to the statement that "Nothing Can Be Done."

Drawing the Line

A pamphlet by PAUL GOODMAN
Author of *Growing Up Absurd* and *The Community of Scholars.*
$1.50, now at your bookstore.

RANDOM HOUSE
457 Madison Avenue, N.Y. 22

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

literary essayist, this is of course due to the kind of books he has set himself to treat. In saying this, I certainly do not mean to disparage all the writers, other than Melville and Faulkner, discussed in *Contemporaries*. The best of our current writers, to my mind, are Saul Bellow, Philip Roth, and Robert Lowell; they are curiously like Mr. Kazin himself: critical and reflective, writing from consciousness rather than from vision—a more serious matter, this, for the creative writer than for the critic. I should add that, of the three writers I have mentioned, Saul Bellow is the one most keenly aware of how subjective real reflection can be. Personally, I much prefer Bellow, Roth, and Lowell to peddlers of false visions like Salinger and Mailer, and also to Bernard Malamud, witness to an intense and absorbing, but I think finally very tiny, vision. Moreover, lack of vision need not be fatal to creation if consciousness of that lack is pushed far enough. Perhaps in creation, though not in criticism, the act of appraising, carried to its farthest limit, can even become a form of prizing. Robert Musil in the novel, Mallarmé in poetry, are proof that this can happen. Mr. Kazin is deeply sympathetic to Bellow, Roth, and Lowell—they cannot help him, but he is aware of their problems; he knows it is from thorough facing up to problems of the kind they feel that their most important work may come. They must somehow get the equivalent of vision out of their own experience, riddled with criticisms. Mr. Kazin is more fortunate: he has only to put aside the books he regularly appraises and address himself to some work he prizes thoroughly in order to become what I think he is essentially—a literary essayist in the most authentic sense of that term.

BOOK REVIEWERS IN THIS ISSUE

ALFRED CHESTER is a young novelist and critic. His review of John Updike's *Pigeon Feathers* (July) aroused considerable interest.

DAN JACOBSON, the English writer, is a veteran contributor to these pages.

SAMUEL SHAPIRO writes frequently on Latin American developments. Mr. Shapiro teaches history at Michigan State University (Oakland).

JULIUS GOULD, a new contributor, is a reader in sociology at the London School of Economics.

LIONEL ABEL's book, *Tragedy to Metatheater* (Hill and Wang), will be out in February.

a mark of respect Riverside MEMORIAL CHAPEL, INC.

FUNERAL DIRECTORS

Charles Rosenthal Edward Rosenthal Morton Rosenthal
Carl Grossberg Leo J. Filer Lawrence Grossberg

NEW YORK • BROOKLYN • BRONX • WESTCHESTER • LONG ISLAND • MIAMI

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Viceroy's got the taste that's right!

Some filter cigarettes taste too strong–just like the unfiltered kind. Some taste too light–and they're no fun at all. But Viceroy tastes the way you'd like a filter cigarette to taste.

Smoke all seven of the leading filter brands, and you'll agree: some taste too strong . . . some taste too light . . . but Viceroy's got the taste that's right. That's right! That's right!

©1962, BROWN & WILLIAMSON TOBACCO CORPORATION B&W The Mark of Quality in Tobacco Products

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The gasoline improvement you can actually see...

Look for it right on the AMOCO® pump nozzle

Final Filtered Gasolines

—ONLY AT AMERICAN OIL DEALERS

Today's cars need gasolines free of microscopic particles that used to be no problem. These contaminants clog the filter car makers put in fuel lines to protect precision carburetors. Filter clogging cuts power and acceleration, *can even stop your car.*



American Oil Research found a solution—the American FINAL/FILTER, the red filter you'll see on the gasoline pump nozzle *only at American Oil Dealers.* At no extra cost, famous unleaded AMOCO and AMERICAN™ Regular Gasolines are Final Filtered as they go into your tank. Look for the new American FINAL/FILTER—the gasoline improvement you can actually see!

You expect more from American and you get it!

AMERICAN

AS YOU TRAVEL ASK US

©1962 AMERICAN OIL COMPANY

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED